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ABSTRACT
IMPACTS OF ASYMMETRIC DECISION POLICIES AND
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ON SUPPLY CHAIN
COORDINATION UNDER CONSUMER RETURNS
FEBRUARY 2008
HARALD SCHMID
M.S.I.E.O.R., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ana Muriel
Within this thesis we investigate the effect of asymmetric agent decision making
on the coordination of a two echelon supply chain facing consumer returns. On the
basis of the classical newsvendor setup, supply chain players may face stochastic, or
stochastic and price-dependent demand. We consider consumer returns to be either
(1) a specific percentage of sold products, or (2) dependent on the retail price. Given
the lack of coordination of the decentralized supply chain, we not only consider whole-
sale price-only contracts but also examine a buy-back option, where the manufacturer
offers to buy back unsold items from the retailer at the end of the selling period. In
all cases, we perform comprehensive computational studies to examine how decision
variables and profits are affected by asymmetric versus symmetric decision making.
In the asymmetric cases only one supply chain player includes consumer returns in his
optimization process. Furthermore, as asymmetric behavior indicates the existence of
a prisoner’s dilemma, we conduct a game theoretic analysis which delivers interesting
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In order to acquire new customers and to satisfy old ones, consumer return policies
have been significantly relaxed over the last few years. Most mass merchandisers
offer full refunds for returned products if the item is returned within 30 − 90 days
of purchase. Gentry (1999) [20] states that customer returns are estimated to be
around 6% and mass merchandisers may have returns as high as 15% of the goods
sold. Catalogue or e-commerce retailers even can face returns up to 75% (Mostard
and Teunter (2006) [39]), whereas this figure varies greatly by product and time of
the year. In the year 2006 reports showed that the value of returned goods accounted
for almost 1% of the total U.S. gross domestic product (Aberdeen Group [19]). Due
to increasing global competition, shorter product lifecycles and a still growing lenient
attitude towards consumer returns, this amount is likely to rise even higher in the
future. Consequently, the management of customer returns requires more and more
attention by companies. The so-called process of reverse logistics, i.e. the return
and exchange, repair, refurbishment, remarketing, and disposition of products, is
today an integral component of competitive retail companies. Improving the reverse
logistics process helps with recapturing lost revenues, reducing operating costs, and
by offering the customer reduced risk when purchasing a product, customer loyalty
and satisfaction are increased as well. In order to manage the reverse logistic process
mutual understanding between retailer and manufacturer of the process itself and of
the applied return policy is crucial. Of course, the process of reverse logistics adds
more complexity to the relationship between manufacturer and retailer.
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The aim of this thesis is to study the effects that asymmetric agent decision
making have on the coordination of a supply chain facing consumer returns, whereas
we extend the work that was done by Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42]. The latter
investigated supply chain coordination in the symmetric cases, where both members
either consider or ignore consumer product returns. Demand in this thesis is assumed
as either stochastic or stochastic and price-dependent. For both types of demand we
further assume returns to be a constant fraction of sold goods, whereas for the latter
we also consider a price-dependent return function. Since the case of a price-sensitive
return function is not studied by Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42], the impacts
on supply chain behavior and coordination under both symmetric and asymmetric
decision making are investigated.
This thesis focusses on a two echelon supply chain with a single retailer and single
manufacturer which are coordinated by a wholesale price-only contract. Consequently
asymmetric behavior is if one part of the supply chain considers consumer returns for
its decision making and the other one not. As a second step we are taking buy-back
contracts into account in order to determine positive or negative impacts on supply
chain coordination. For each of the above mentioned models a computational study
and a sensitivity analysis is conducted in order widen initial findings. As we have
asymmetric information among the players a game theoretic analysis, which delivers
interesting insights on the value of information sharing, is conducted. Furthermore
asymmetric information can cause strategic opportunities for one player to exploit
the other, what is studied as well.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The following chapter 2
gives a review on literature about consumer returns and supply chains. Coordination
issues and considered contracts are presented. Additionally, literature dealing with
asymmetric settings and decision making under such is outlined. Chapter 3 describes
the model and framework under consideration in the thesis. Moreover, we introduce
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the asymmetric decision processes and the profit functions according to which the
members of the supply chain optimize their decisions. The benchmark cases, i.e. the
case where both players either consider or ignore returns in their decision process, are
also presented. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with the computational studies about the
mentioned symmetric and asymmetric settings and respective contracts. Retrieved
results are compared to the benchmark cases which are investigated by Ruiz Ben´ıtez
and Muriel (2007) [42]. The basic assumption in chapter 4 is that demand is stochastic
and the return rate is a constant fraction of sales. The computational work in chapter
5 focusses on stochastic and price-dependent demand, whereas returns are still a
constant rate. Chapter 6 finally introduces the price-dependent return rate with a
underlying stochastic and price-dependent demand model. As in the asymmetric
settings the players lack information about the optimization process of the other
player, a game theoretic analysis in conducted in chapter 7. Furthermore, strategic
options which the players could follow in order to raise their profits are studied as
well. Lastly Chapter 8 summarizes and points out the main findings of this thesis





In the following paragraphs, literature is reviewed in order to put this work into
perspective. We start out by presenting papers dealing with consumer returns. Sec-
ondly, research pertaining to supply chain coordination under respective contracts
is presented. Special attention within this part is paid to the dissertation of Ruiz
Ben´ıtez (2007) [42]. The third and last part of this chapter refers to literature about
asymmetric information settings and supply chain coordination under such.
2.1 Consumer Returns
Consumer product returns are driven by the “consumer is king” attitude prevalent
in the United States. Therefore, consumer returns are an integral part of today’s
business policies, whereas the most relaxed return policies can be found in the United
States. Because customer rights have been strengthened by recently introduced laws
and companies, headquartered in the US, are entering the foreign markets, other
parts of the world are catching up fast (Guide et al. (2006) [23]). Product returns
occur because the product is faulty, it does not meet the customer’s expectation or
the consumer has no further use of it. However, most returns are considered false
failure returns, where the product is indeed working but mistakenly or deliberately
considered as damaged or the consumer simply changed his mind. As an example,
Hewlett Packard faces up to 80% false failure (i.e. type-2) returns of their total
customer returns (Ferguson et al. (2005) [17]). The latter develop a target rebate
contract which helps to decline the type-2 returns by increasing the retailer’s sales
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effort. In particular, the retailer receives a specific dollar amount per each unit of
false failure returns below a target rate. This provides an incentive to increase sales
efforts, and thus decreases the number of false failures. Returns are typically assumed
to be a constant proportion of sales, so that if a retailer sells more items the number of
returned items increases (Kiesmueller and van der Laan (2001) [31]). The relationship
between retail prices and returns is studied by Anderson et al. (2006) [1], whereas
they find empirical evidence for a positive relationship between the price paid and the
number and rate of returns. Guide and Van Wassenhove (2001) [24] study customer
returns and the respective layout of closed-loop supply chains for different products
and industries and point out management and key research issues. The classical
newsvendor problem with resalable returns is studied by Mostard and Teunter (2006)
[39]. Under the assumption that returned items can be resold unlimited times in one
selling season unless they are broken, the authors derive a simple closed-form equation
that determines the optimal order quantity and all relevant revenues and costs in the
supply chain.
DeCroix (2006) [14] analyzes a multi-echelon inventory system where the inven-
tory stages are arranged in series. Returned products are shipped to a recover facility,
where further processing of the item takes place. Considered actions are storing, dis-
posing, or remanufacturing and re-entering the forward flow of material. Guide et al
(2001) [24] and Fleischmann (2001) [18] focus on returns that occur due to the end
of the life of the product or because of overstocking. When dealing with consumer
returns, not all products are handled the same way. Sometimes the manufacturer
does not give retailers the possibility to return items. Instead of, the item could be
disposed right away by the retailer, whereas either the retailer or the manufacturer
bears the costs, or the retailer handles the returned items independently. The latter
is the case at Walmart (Corbett and Savaskan (1999) [12]). Also lump sum transfers
between retailers and manufacturers are common in order not to loose goodwill of the
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other player, whereas those transfers are especially important for returned products in
slotting allowance contracts (Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) [40]). Another im-
portant aspect of returns is the risk associated with them. Tsay (2002) [48] addresses
how the uncertainty about returns affects both sides of a manufacturer-retailer rela-
tionship, and how these dynamics are altered by the introduction of a manufacturer
return policy.
2.2 Supply Chain Coordination and Considered Contracts
Supply chain coordination and its improvement through different contracts be-
tween manufacturer and retailer are studied widely in diverse literature. In general
there are various types of contracts, whereas the simplest one is the price-only con-
tract. In this case, the wholesale price set by the manufacturer is the only required
parameter. In a two-echelon supply chain under a price-only contract, coordination
issues are studied by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) [33], whereas they find the relative
variability to play a key role. As the variability declines the manufacturer charges
higher wholesale prices and takes a larger share of profits. Despite an increased ef-
ficiency of the decentralized system, i.e. total supply chain profits are greater, the
retailer’s profits are lower. Sulaiman and Wooseung (2006) [46] find that the opti-
mal selling price between the manufacturer and the distributor is decreasing as the
customer demand increases, what complies with Lariviere and Porteus.
In a decentralized network, supply chain players generally try to maximize own
profits what consequently leads to the occurrence of the “double marginalization
effect” introduced by Spengler (1950) [44]. Instead of the manufacturing cost, the
retailer faces the wholesale price transmitted by the vendor and therefore has lower
profits than in the centralized case. This leads to the necessity of incentive schemes.
Extensive literature on supply chain contracts and coordination issues can be found
in Lariviere [32], Tsay et al. (1999) [47] and especially in Cachon (2003) [5].
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Buy-back contracts represent a widely used instrument to improve the perfor-
mance of decentralized supply chains. In particular, the vendor agrees to buy back
unsold items partly or to the full extent of left over items at the end of the period
. Consequently, the retailer gets an incentive to order more than without a contract
since a buy-back contract raises the retailers marginal revenue. Note, that the phe-
nomenon of “double marginalization” leads to lower orders of the retailer than in a
centralized system. However, a policy that does not allow returns at all or one where
unlimited returns are allowed for partial credit is not optimal (Pasternack (1985) [41]).
Moreover, Pasternack proves that in case of stochastic demand, buy-back contracts
can indeed be used to coordinate supply chains. The null returns policy, where the
manufacturer does not offer the option to buy back unsold items and the unlimited
returns policy (the manufacturer gives full refund for every unsold item) are com-
pared in Padmanabhan and Png (1997) [40]. As observed by Chan et al. (2007) [9]
buy-back contracts can also be misused by a selfish manufacturer to raise his profits
and lock most of the supply chain profits, whereas the retailer may have no profit at
all.
An interesting aspect of buy-back contracts is that they are independent of the de-
mand distribution. Donohue (2000) [15] studies a two-stage production environment
with two distinct production modes and an offered buy-back contract. By deter-
mining the optimal buy-back price and the wholesale prices corresponding to both
production modes, such a contract can coordinate the decentralized supply chain. In
case that the retailer can set the retail price and therefore demand is a function of this
price, Kandel (1996) [29] finds that coordination can not be reached by a buy-back
contract. Buy-back contracts for a decentralized supply chain with price-sensitive
and stochastic demand is studied by Yuyue et al. [51]. Their results show that the
profit functions for both channel partners are unimodal for a large family of demand
functions and randomness distributions, what allows them to determine the unique
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optimal retail decisions and also closed-form expressions for the optimal contract pa-
rameters. A pricing and return-credit strategy for a monopolistic manufacturer of
single-period commodities is also extensively studied by Lau and Lau (1999) [34]. By
setting respective wholesale and repurchase prices, a return-credits agreement can
often be manipulated by a shrewd manufacturer to increase his profit egoistically.
In other words he has the lion share of profits, unless the retailer is supported by
an external force. More literature containing buy-back contracts under random and
price dependent demand can be found in Granot and Yin (2005) [22] and in Emmons
and Gilbert (1998) [16]. The latter shows that buy-back contracts increase the coor-
dination of supply chains, since the offer to buy back items at the end of the selling
season tends to increase total profits of the retailer and manufacturer. The former
develop closed-form expressions for the optimal wholesale and repurchase price under
linearly growing expected demand. Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) [3] find that,
if demand is stochastic and price-dependent, buy-back contracts can not be used to
coordinate supply chains. Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] consider a two echelon
supply chain under the presence of consumer returns with a single manufacturer and
a single retailer that faces only stochastic or stochastic and price dependent demand.
They extensively study the effects of wholesale and buy-back contracts on the co-
ordination of a decentralized supply chain that faces consumer returns, when either
none or both of the players consider returns in their optimization process. Generally,
supply chain coordination is enhanced when ignoring returns, due to higher order
amounts by the retailer. Also, the player that faces the higher share of logistic costs
benefits from considering returns in the optimization process. Further results are
that buy-back contracts can help to ensure coordination when considering returns in
the optimizations. Beyond buy-back contracts Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42]
also consider return allowance contracts, revenue and price sharing contracts and also
price postponement strategies in their work. In extension to the latter, Lenk (2007)
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[36] studies the effects that price postponement has on the performance and coordi-
nation of a decentralized organized two-echelon supply chain facing product returns.
In contrast to the results of Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42] considering returns
leads to higher supply chain profits than ignoring returns. Under price-postponement
a buy-back option improves the supply coordination, regardless if the players consider
returns or not. However, the last-mentioned contracts are only of minor importance
for this work. For the sake of completeness, we briefly present other types of con-
tracts and incentive schemes that can help to improve or ensure coordination. In
order to realize coordination Jeuland and Shugan (1983) [28], for example, proposed
a quantity discount schedule. Profit maximization of the total supply chain is then
achieved by fixing the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits to a linear function of
total channel profits. Moorthy (1987) [38] states that quantity discount schemes are
not necessary for channel coordination. Pricing schemes with quantity surcharges
are sufficient instead. More literature pertaining to different kinds of contracts and
coordination strategies can be found in Lee and Tang [35] and in Van Mieghem and
Dada [49]
Primarily, this work understands itself as an extension to the work of Ruiz Benitez
and Muriel (2007) [42] with particular attention to the aspect when asymmetric set-
tings are present, where only one player considers returns and the other one not. Also,
the game theoretic aspect of having two players equipped with different information
and thus arising strategic options is considered.
2.3 Asymmetric Information and Coordination
Research involving supply chain contracts under asymmetric information in a
newsvendor setting is rare in the literature. Kandel (2006) [29] for example finds that
asymmetric information leads to the phenomenon of more optimistic sales forecasts
by the manufacturer compared to the retailer. Usually different parties make com-
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mitments under different states of information. Decision making based on a local
rather than global perspective is also a natural consequence of decentralized control,
whereas double marginalization is one salient issue likely to arise. Tsay (1999) [47]
shows that these problems can be partially remedied by a quantity flexibility contract,
in which the retailer commits to a minimum purchase and the manufacturer guaran-
tees a maximum coverage. However, other contracts are not able to coordinate the
supply chain effectively. Interesting literature for this thesis is found in Gong (2000)
[21]. He studies the optimal contract for a supplier selling to a retailer when demand
is uncertain and when the retailer can take a costly hidden action to forecast demand.
In other words, he analyzes an asymmetric setting of information. He finds as a result
that the best optimal solution for the supply chain can not always be implemented
when asymmetric information is given.
Information asymmetry in the demand and its distribution in a single retailer and
manufacturer supply chain is studied by Chambers and Snir [8]. Given a critical
property of the demand, namely Separability under Individual Optimization, the
supply chain can be coordinated by using buy-back contracts. As a further result,
offering the retailer multiple contracts is not necessary. Moreover, it is optimal to
offer the retailer only a single contract to reach the best coordination. Corbett (2001)
[10] analyzes the buyer’s optimal menu of contracts when the supplier has private
information about setup costs and shows how consignment stock can help to reduce
the impact of this information asymmetry. Moreover, he studies consignment and
assumes that the supplier cannot observe the buyer’s backorder cost. Other literature
pertaining to asymmetry in supply chain deals with available information of the cost
structures of the players (Corbett and de Groote [11]), whereas Corbett, Zhou and
Tang [13] studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a
buyer’s cost structure, and of being able to offer more general contracts.
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Asymmetric information is also an important part within the subject of game
theory. The general ideas of game theoretic concepts that we are going to use are
summarized in Varian (1982) [50]. As shown later in this thesis, depending on avail-
able information, the players can raise their profits or at least foresee the possible
outcome of a deal given that both do act rationally. If decisions are made multiple
times, results might also change. Samuelson (1984) [43] studies a bargaining model
under asymmetric information in which an uninformed buyer faces an informed seller.
He concludes, that the uninformed buyer achieves his best possible outcome when
he has the opportunity to make a first-and-final offer which the seller can reject or
accept. Further, he finds that asymmetric information may preclude a mutually bene-
ficial sale. A two player game with bayesian information (i.e. incomplete information
about the other player) is studied by Harsanyi (1968) [26], whereas he shows how
erroneous beliefs of one agent can be exploited by the other. However, the setting
in this thesis is to have complete information about costs but asymmetric informa-
tion about the decision making process. Optimal retail contracts under conditions of
asymmetric information and moral hazard are examined by Blair and Lewis (1994) [4].
The dealer is privately informed about demand and can increase it through promo-
tion, which is not observable by the manufacturer before contracting with the latter.
They conclude that optimal coordinating contracts exhibit some form of resale price
maintenance and quantity fixing.
Asymmetric information and the respective efficiency in such environments is also
considered in Holmstroem and Myerson (1983) [27] and Harris and Townsend (1981)
[25]. Speaking of lower efficiency and a worse coordination under asymmetric infor-
mation, Sulaiman (2006) [46] presents supply chain models for developing optimal
pricing strategies to achieve partial and maximal joint coordination in centralized
systems. Another main conclusion is that strategic partnerships and/or strong trust
among participating companies is critical in the success of the coordinated operation
11
of supply chain. Strategic options that arise due to information asymmetries are con-
sidered in the work of Cachon and Lariviere (1999) [6]. In a two-stage supply chain
the retailer’s and manufacturer’s situation regarding orders and capacity is studied.
The retailer has the option to either order more than needed to gain a more favor-
able allocation or show his real needs by ordering the needed amount exactly. The
manufacturer, in turn, has to deal with the capacity allocation problem. However,
Cachon and Lariviere find that truth-indicating mechanisms do not coordinate the
supply chain, and finally resulting profits might even be worse. Studies about pure
strategies and Nash-equilibriums in supply chains are conducted by Anupindi (2001)
[2] and Cachon and Zipkin (1999) [7]. The latter studies a two-stage serial supply
chain with stationary stochastic demand and fixed transportation systems. They find
that the players (almost) always end up in a Nash-equilibrium which differs from the
optimal solution. Thus, competition reduces efficiency. The former studies a general
framework for the analysis of inventory decisions in a multi retailer distribution sys-
tem. For the inventory decision they develop conditions for the existence of a pure
strategy Nash-equilibrium.
Observe that in most cases the asymmetry arises from the lack of information
on the demand or cost parameters in the respective model. In our case, however,
asymmetry arises due to retailer and manufacturer following different decision making
policies. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that is dealing with
decision making or supply chain coordination under the presence of consumer returns
with the given situation of asymmetric information about the optimization policy




Within this work we mainly study the case where retailer and manufacturer are
not following the same policy regarding consumer returns. In other words, the deci-
sion process is asymmetric, where only one player includes consumer returns in his
optimization process and the other one ignores them. The idea is to extent findings
of the symmetric optimization processes from Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42]
under both, stochastic, and stochastic and price-dependent demand, to the asym-
metric settings. For the first part of the thesis we consider consumer returns to be
a constant proportion of sales, whereas we later also focus on price-dependent re-
turns. As literature hasn’t dealt with supply chain performance under the premise of
price-dependent consumer returns yet, the symmetric cases are studied as well and
retrieved results are compared to the performance of the asymmetric settings.
This chapter first outlines the respective formulas for the expected profits and or-
der quantities of the manufacturer and retailer under both, stochastic, and stochastic
and price-dependent demand. Importantly, these formulas are taken to set up the two
asymmetric optimization processes, which are described thereafter. Since the respec-
tive optimization formulas are different for different forms of demand, we present the
two models in this chapter separately, starting out with the simpler case of stochastic
demand and thereupon showing the more complicated stochastic and price-dependent
case. Note, that the latter model is also used when returns are price-dependent.
Next, chapter 4 focusses on the computational study under stochastic demand,
where the results for the asymmetric settings are compared to the findings that have
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been gained by Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42], who studied the symmetric de-
cision making processes. When needed, we simply borrow their results. Chapter 5
deals with supply chain performance under stochastic and price-dependent demand
when consumer returns are a constant proportion of sales. Again we extent findings
to the cases of asymmetric decision making. In chapter 6 consumer returns are con-
sidered to be dependent on the retail price. Starting out by presenting respective
return functions, an analysis of the symmetric and asymmetric cases follows.
3.1 General Framework
As stated in the introduction, we study a two echelon supply chain including a
single manufacturer and a single retailer. The model that we are using throughout
the thesis was introduced by Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42]. Since we are
considering one product and a single period with only one replenishment opportunity
by the retailer, the classic newsvendor problem setup is given. The selling season,
as mentioned, is one period, whereas the selling price remains constant over that
period. Furthermore, we are not including customer goodwill in our model and as
a consequence, unmet demand is lost without incurring costs. Total sales S equal
the minimum of ordered goods Q by the retailer or the total amount of demand at
the end of the period, that is S = min(Q, y). Accordingly, the retailer has a single-
replenishment possibility. Goods that are left over at the end of the selling period have
a salvage value of v. In the case of an existing buy-back contract, the manufacturer
agrees to buy back all unsold items from the retailer for a fixed price s after the
selling season. If there is no such contract, the salvage value is kept by the retailer.
The manufacturer has production costs of c and unlimited production capacities. We
assume that the manufacturer can not utilize economies of scale, that is the production
costs per item are constant. For the basic framework we assume that a certain
(constant) percentage α of the periods’ sold goods is returned to the retailer, who
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gives the customers a full refund. The manufacturer then gives the retailer a refund
to the amount of w. As mentioned, we also study price-dependent returns what,
however, does not alter the presented framework. The vendor is in charge of handling
the returned product, i.e. shipping, inspection, possible refurbishment or scrapping of
the items. The salvage value of a returned item is represented by vr. Incurred logistic
costs on average per returned good are l1 for the manufacturer and the retailer faces
l2 in costs. Total reverse logistic costs are l = l1 + l2. The letter β is used to express
the fraction of the total logistic costs l faced by the retailer, i.e. β = l1
l1+l2
× 100.
Of course β varies greatly from industry to industry, depending on how much work
product returns cause for the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. Finally, R
represents the total amount of consumer returns. Consequently, R can be expressed
as R = α× S.
As in relevant literature, assumptions are made to have a meaningful problem.
We require r > w > c and w > s > v ≥ vr. Additionally, r > w − ( α1−α)l2
and w > ( c
1−α) + (
α
1−α)(l1 − vr) ensures that both players face positive profits when
considering returns. More restrictions are mentioned in the respective chapters when
needed.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the selling and return process and shows monetary flows in
the supply chain.
Figure 3.1. Setup and Monetary Flows within the Supply Chain (Ruiz Benitez and
Muriel (2007) [42])
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We are also assuming a certain sequence of actions or events that occur within
the considered period.
1. Ahead of the selling period the wholesale price w is assessed by the vendor. In
case of an existing buy-back contract the resale price s is also set.
2. The order quantity Q and, in case of stochastic and price-dependent demand,
also the retail price r, at which the goods are sold, are determined by the
retailer.
3. As a last step, demand uncertainty is observed and total sales S and the amount
of product returns R as well as profits or losses in the supply chain are found.
Since the model was first formulated in Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42], we
mainly stick to the notation given in their work. The manufacturer is considered as
female and the retailer as male. The use of the superscripts CR and IR is different.
In this work, CR and IR refer to the optimization strategies after which the players
act in the symmetric or asymmetric settings. If surrounded by brackets, however, the
symmetric optimization policies are referred to. Since we are looking at the supply
chain setting of two asymmetrically acting players, i.e. only one player considers
returns, we introduce the superscripts MC,RI and MI,RC to describe these additional
cases. MC,RI expresses that the manufacturer is considering returns, whereas the
retailer’s optimization is without taking them into account. Thus, MI,RC describes
the respective converse setting of the optimization process. Subscripts M , R and T
indicate whether the manufacturer, the retailer or the total supply chain is considered.
As examples, total profits ΠMI,RCT in the asymmetric setting (MI,RC) consist of the
profits of the manufacturer (ΠIRM ) and the retailer (Π
CR
R ), whereas the retailer’s profits




3.2 Model for Stochastic Demand
We further present the formulas we are going to use in the thesis, whereas we
firstly introduce the model for stochastic demand. The retailer faces stochastic de-
mand y, with density and cumulative functions f(·) and F (·), respectively. The retail
price of the good is exogenously given. This assumption, which is a basic microeco-
nomic concept in fully competitive markets, can be made since we are considering an
industry where no player has enough market share to dictate the retail price. Note,
that the formulas presented in this section include the buy-back option. The case
without a buy-back contract (i.e. a wholesale contract) can be covered by simply
setting s equal to v. This gives no incentive to the retailer selling back left over in-
ventory to the manufacturer. The salvage value then remains at the retailer. In the
asymmetric settings, we are looking at a decentralized supply chain where each player
tries to maximize its own profits independently. In order to describe the asymmetric
optimization process, we first present the formulas that are used by the players when
optimizing their respective profits in a decentralized supply chain in sections 3.2.2
and 3.2.2. The description of the respective asymmetric policies according to the op-
timization processes is done in section 3.4, whereas we also extent analytical findings
from the symmetric policies (IR) and (CR). However, the symmetric cases where both
supply chain members either consider or ignore returns in the optimization procedure
are well-described in Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42].
3.2.1 Centralized System
In the centralized system the whole system behaves as if operated by a central plan-
ner who is maximizing the system-wide profits. The centralized systems have been
studied by Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] (considering returns) and Pasternack
(1985) [41] (ignoring returns). As we are focussing on decentralized decision making,
the centralized systems are of minor importance for our work. However, since we
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are using them for matters of comparison as benchmark cases, we briefly present the
respective formulas here. Total expected profits - including consumer returns - for
the supply chain are:







Differentiating expression 3.1 with respect to Q results in:
QCR∗C = F
−1(
r(1− α)− α(l − vr)− c
r(1− α)− α(l − vr)− v ) (3.2)
In Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] it is shown that this solution is unique and
therefore a global maximum. The corresponding expected profits in a centralized
system where no consumer returns are considered equals the following expression:
ΠIRC,T (Q) = −cQ+
∫ Q
0








r − v ) (3.4)
3.2.2 Decentralized System
In the decentralized system manufacturer and retailer try to maximize profits on
their own. The supply chain members are rational decision makers which use existing
information about prices and/or quantities to reach the best expected profits. In
other words, each supply chain member is acting in his own best interest and is not




Firstly, we present the formulas for the retailer and manufacturer when considering
consumer returns in their optimization process. According to Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel
(2007) [42] the retailers expected profit in one selling season is:








The wholesale price w is given by the manufacturer. In order to find the optimal
order amount Q∗, we differentiate ΠCRR (Q) with respect to Q and set this amount
equal to 0. This gives us the following result:
QCR∗ = F−1(
(1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− w
(1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− s ) (3.6)




= −f [(1− α)r − α(l2 − w)] ≤ 0 (3.7)
In case of considering the returns, the manufacturer faces profits according to the
following formula:




where Q is as written in formula 3.6.
Players Ignoring Returns
The optimization formulas according to which manufacturer and retailer find their
optimal respective wholesale price or order amount by not taking consumer returns
into account are presented in this section. The expected profits for the retailer in case
of a decentralized two echelon supply chain have been studied by Pasternack (1985)
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[41]. However, we are not including goodwill in our model and the retailer can sell
back all items that are left over at the end of the selling period.








r − s ) (3.10)
The second derivative is non-positive:
∂2ΠIR(Q)
∂Q2
= (s− r)f(Q) ≤ 0 (3.11)
Thus, formula 3.10 describes again a global maximum.
By setting α to zero in formula 3.8 we can derive the manufacturer’s profit when
ignoring returns.


























Q is according to formula 3.10.
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3.3 Model for Stochastic and Price-dependent Demand
Within the following sections we present the formulas for stochastic and price-
dependent demand. Demand at the retail level is now affected by the retail price r
as well. In other words, an altered retail price leads to a change in demand for the
products. We therefore modify our initial model by a distribution of the demand
parameterized by the retail price r. Two groups of stochastic and price-dependent
models can be found in literature: the additive demand model, D(r, x) = y(r) + x
(Mills (1959) [37]), and the multiplicative demand model, D(r, x) = y(r)x (Karlin and
Carr (1962) [30]) where y(r) is decreasing in the retail price r and x is the random
component with mean 1. In what follows, we utilize the multiplicative model that
is formulated in Emmons and Gilbert (1998) [16] and make necessary extensions in
order to include customer returns. Following its wide use throughout the literature,
expected demand is assumed to be of the form D(r) = b × (r − k) with b < 0
and k > 0. Because demand can’t be negative, we require k ≥ r. Since D(r) is
only defined on [c, rup], D(r) = 0 ∀ r ≥ rup. The expected demand quantity D(r)
is assumed to be decreasing in the retail price, to be continuous, nonnegative and
also twice differentiable. Consequently, the actual demand, y, can be modeled as a
product of the expected demand D(r) and the positive random variable x. Hence,
the density function for demand can be expressed as follows:
g(x, r) = D(r)−1f(
x
D(r)
) with y ≥ 0, (3.14)
where f(·) is the density distribution function of x and F (·) is the corresponding
cumulative distribution function. F (·) is assumed to be invertible and f(·) shall
have a continuous derivative f ′(·). Both players, manufacturer and retailer, have
knowledge of the respective demand distribution and the retailer can, up to a certain
extent, control demand with the setting of the retail price r. As a consequence the
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retailer finds his optimal order quantity now to be dependent of D(r) and profits of
the players are dependent of D(r) as well.
In the next sections we present the formulas for the profits of both, manufacturer
and retailer as well as the optimal order quantities. We start out with the centralized
supply chain and then go over to the decentralized case. The model that we are
considering in the following is an extension of the classical newsvendor problem (see
Emmons and Gilbert (1998) [16]). Additions to include consumer returns occurring
at the retail level are studied by Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42]. For the decen-
tralized systems the terms include the buy-back option. Again, by simply setting s
to v the wholesale contract can be modeled.
3.3.1 Centralized System
Ignoring Returns
Total profit for the supply chain is:




By differentiating the latter expression with respect to Q we find the optimal order
quantity:
QIR∗(r) = D(r)F−1




For a fixed retail price r, the expected optimal profits are:




where ξ1 = (r − c)/(r − v).
However, the inverse cumulative distribution function makes it difficult to analyze
and obtain a closed form expression for the optimal retail price. For the purpose of
gaining more insight into the problem, we can simplify the expression by assuming
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f(x) to be a uniform distribution on the interval [0,2]. With this assumption the
retailer’s profit reduces to:
ΠIR(r) =
(r − c)2
r − v D(r)
As we assume a linear demand model with the form D(r) = b× (r− k), where b < 0
and k > 0, D(r) is strictly decreasing in r. Thus, an explicit expression for the
retail price r can be easily obtained by solving the equation resulting when taking
the derivative of (3.18) with respect to r and equal it to zero. The retailer’s profit
maximizing price is
rIR∗ =
3v + k +
√
(k + 8c− 9v)(k − v)
4





The supply chain expected profit is:





The optimal order quantity Q∗ is found by differentiating ΠCR(Q, r) with respect
to Q and simplifying:
QCR∗(r) = D(r)F−1
( (1− α)r − α(l − vr)− c
(1− α)r − α(l − vr)− v
)
(3.19)
Then, for a fixed retail price r, the expected optimal profits follow





where ξ2 = ((1− α)r − α(l − vr)− c)/((1− α)r − α(l − vr)− v).
As shown by Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42] under deterministic and price
dependent demand the optimal retail price increases and thus the optimal ordering
quantity decreases when consumer returns are considered. This is valid ifD(r)×(r−c)
is unimodal.
By making the assumption that f(x) is a uniform distribution defined on the
interval [0,2] it is possible to find an explicit expression for r. Taking the specified
uniform distribution, the expected optimal profit for the centralized supply chain
becomes:
ΠCR(r) =
((1− α)r − α(l − vr)− c)2
(1− α)r − α(l − vr)− v D(r)
Taking derivative of the latter expression with respect to r, equal it to zero and
simplifying gives:
And thus, the optimal order quantity is:
QCR∗ =
( (1− α)r∗ − α(l − vr)− c








((1− α)k + 8c− 9v − α(l − vr))((1− α)k − v − α(l − vr))
4(1− α)
3.3.2 Decentralized System
In the decentralized system players act rational. In other words, they act individ-
ually and seek to maximize their own profits instead of the total supply chain profits.
This section presents the respective formulas for the expected profits and order quan-
tities of the manufacturer and retailer in a decentralizes setting. We first present
the expressions in case of consumer returns are ignored in the player’s individual
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optimization process. Secondly, we consider the setting when consumer returns are
included in the decision process. The latter formulas are presented in Ruiz Benitez
and Muriel (2007) [42], whereas Emmons and Gilbert (1998) [16] consider the former
case.
Players Ignoring Returns
Depending on the values w and s, which are set by the manufacturer, the retailer
faces profits according to






Qf(x)dx)−Q(w − s) (3.21)
For a specific r, the problem can be reduced to the traditional newsboy problem.






Hence, the retailer’s profit function for the optimal order quantity and with given
r is:




where η1 = (r − w)/(r − s).
As under stochastic demand, the manufacturer finds her profits, given that the
retailer acts optimally by choosing (Q∗, r∗), according to the following formula:
ΠIRM (w, s; r
∗, Q∗) = (w − c)Q∗ − (s− v)
∫ Q∗/D(r∗)
0
(Q∗ − xD(r∗))f(x)dx (3.24)
Identical to the centralized case, the inverse cumulative distribution function
makes it difficult to analyze the formulas. Again, the assumption of a uniform distri-
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bution on the interval [0, 2] and D(r) = b(r− k), the optimal order quantity and the








r − s D(r)
Note that we require k > w ≥ s. If w ≥ k the retailer would not be able to sell
the item at a profit, since D(r) is negative for any r > w ≥ k. Taking the derivative




(k + 8w − 9s)(k − s)
4
Consequently, the manufacturer’s optimal profits are




R) = (w − c(1− η2))Q∗R −
(s− v)(Q∗R)2
4D(r∗R)
where η2 = (r
∗
R − w)/(r∗R − s).
Players Considering Returns
When considering returns in the optimization process, the retailer expects profits,
depending on w and s, to be as follows:







− Q(w − s) (3.25)
For a given retail price r the latter expression can be reduced and the optimal
order quantity is:
QCR∗(r) = D(r)F−1
((1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− w




The retailer’s profit function for the optimal order quantity and with given r is
then




where η = ((1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− w)/((1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− s).
The manufacturer finds her profits including the costs of returns according to the
following formula. The retailer is expected to act rational again.
ΠCRM (w, s; r











Again, assuming f(x) to be a uniform distribution defined on [0, 2] and Demand
to be of the type D(r) = b(r − k), we find the optimal order quantity and the profit
function of the retailer:
QCR∗(r) =
((1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− w




(((1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− w)2
((1− α)r − α(l2 − w)− s)
)
D(r)
Of course, the optimization formulae include the costs of returns. The manufac-
turer’s share w+ l1− vr, whereas the retailer faces r−w+ l2 of the total return costs
r + l − vr. The following expressions for the manufacturer’s profit function and the
retailer’s optimal price are obtained by Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42]:
rCR∗R =












R ) = (w − c− α((w + l1 − vr) + v)(1− η2))QCR∗R





where η2 = ((1− α)rCR∗R − α(l2 − w)− w)/((1− α)rCR∗R − α(l2 − w)− s).
3.4 Asymmetric Optimization Procedures
An asymmetric optimization process is given if manufacturer and retailer do not
optimize for w or Q, respectively, with regards to consumer returns similarly. Since
the manufacturer has to find the optimal wholesale price initially, she first has to make
an assumption on whether the retailer considers returns or not. In the asymmetric
cases, the wrong assumption is made. Clearly, the type of the considered demand
distribution changes only the formulae for profits and order quantities but has no effect
on the asymmetric optimization process. For purposes of convenience we describe the
asymmetric setup by means of the hitherto presented stochastic demand formulas.
We now consider the two policies (MC,RI) and (MI,RC).
Policy (MC,RI)
In this case, the manufacturer is considering consumer returns in his optimization
process for the wholesale price w. In turn, the retailer does not consider them. This
means that the manufacturer erroneously makes the assumption that the retailer finds
his optimal order quantity under the premise of consumer returns. The optimization
process is as follows:
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1. The manufacturer optimizes for w.
In order to do this, an exhaustive search for the best wholesale price is con-
ducted. For any w the respective optimal order amount for the retailer is
determined (see formula 3.6). After this step the manufacturer’s total profits
can be calculated. Observe that Q is found by the manufacturer by assuming
consumer returns and she therefore uses formula 3.8.
2. The retailer calculates his optimal order amount Q.
Formula 3.10 is applied by taking the given wholesale price w, which was found
through optimization by the manufacturer in the previous step. Note that this
means he finds the optimal Q without considering returns. The retailer’s profit
is calculated according to 3.9.
3. Profits of the manufacturer are updated and total supply chain profits for the
case (MC,RI) are calculated.
Comparing the order amounts of the retailer under the two policies (IR) and
(CR), which are studied by Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42], we find that the
amount of ordered items is higher in the case without consumer returns.
QIR = F−1(
r − w
r − s ) ≥ F
−1(
r − α(r − w − l2)− w
r − α(r − w − l2)− s ) = Q
CR (3.29)
This is true because w ≤ s. As a consequence, the manufacturer receives more orders
from the retailer than she had assumed in her optimization, what entails a higher
total profit as well. We evaluate the effects of this false assumption on the profits
and order quantities of the retailer, the manufacturer, and on the total supply chain
in the computational study part.
Policy (MI,RC)
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Now the manufacturer does not take returns into account, but the retailer does. The
sequence of actions is according to the one stated for the first asymmetric case:
1. The manufacturer optimizes for w.
Since she assumes returns are ignored in the whole optimization process, formu-
las 3.13 and 3.10 are used to find the optimal w or the assumed order amount,
respectively.
2. The retailer calculates his optimal order amount Q.
Since the retailer considers returns, he finds his profits according to the whole-
sale price w of the manufacturer and formula 3.5. The optimal order quantity
Q according to 3.6.
3. Total profits of the manufacturer and supply chain for the case (MI,RC) are
calculated.
Since demand faced by the manufacturer is lower when considering returns in the
optimization process, the retailer now makes a smaller order than assumed by the
manufacturer. Hence, profits are lower for the manufacturer. Again, the effects are




This chapter extends the stochastic demand model presented earlier with com-
putational studies. The goal of the computational work is to find and compare the
optimal order quantities, the respective wholesale prices, and the profits for the re-
tailer and manufacturer as well as for the whole supply chain in the asymmetric
settings. In order to compare retrieved results, both symmetric decentralized and
centralized policies are considered, whereas the centralized system - when considering
returns - realizes the best performance the supply chain can achieve (Ruiz Ben´ıtez
and Muriel (2007) [42]). The policies under consideration in the computational study
are those, which are described in section 3.4, namely (MC,RI) and (MI,RC).
Throughout this chapter demand is assumed to be stochastic and therefore rep-
resented by a normal distribution y ∼ N(µ, σ). For the base case we choose µ = 3
and σ = 0.75. The retail price r is 4 per unit and the salvage values v and vr are set
to zero. As stated in the introduction, return rates reach from 6% to 75% in extreme
cases. For now, we set α = 0.2. The manufacturer bears most of the reverse logis-
tic costs incurred by consumer returns. Corresponding to the handling of returned
products, we consider that the retailer faces only 5% of total logistic costs l = 2.
Accordingly, l1 = 1.9 and l2 = 0.1. In order to calculate final profits when a player
ignores returns in its optimization process, the cost of returns have to be subtracted a
posteriori. The share of reverse logistic costs carried by the retailer and manufacturer
is r−w+ l2 and r+ l1−vr, respectively. This combines to total logistic costs per unit
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that are incurred by consumer returns of r − vr + l. For the first part, a buy-back
option is not considered, that is, the value s is set to v.
4.1 Wholesale Price-Only Contract
Using Maple interesting results are retrieved for the cases of asymmetric opti-
mization process especially when comparing order quantities and profits with the
decentralized symmetric optimization processes. Figure 4.1 shows the assumed order
quantities QCRM and Q
IR





that are in fact realized by the retailer. The curves subtend the x-axis at the value of
the retail price. Clearly, the assumed order amount by the vendor ignoring returns
is the same as the indeed realized order size by the retailer if he ignores consumer
returns as well and vice versa. However, the graphs reflect that the order amounts
in case of ignored returns are higher than if included as we showed earlier. Con-
sequently, in the asymmetric setting, the manufacturer faces lower profits than she
assumed when including returns or higher profits when not taking account of them
in her optimization process.
In general, results for the asymmetric case reflect the findings in the symmetric
settings. Accordingly, in the asymmetric supply chain setting the profits for the man-
ufacturer are negative for low values of w. The retailer, in turn, faces his highest
profits at low wholesale prices. As in the symmetric cases, the vendor is significantly
better off after a threshold wt following the asymmetric setting (MC,RI). This de-
scribes the same situation as found in the work by Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007)
[42], where the manufacturer makes more profit if the retailer ignores consumer re-
turns in his optimization process. On the other hand, after a certain w profits for the
retailer are higher when he includes consumer returns in his decision making. Note,
that the profit functions for the retailer are the same for the policies (MC,RI) and
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Figure 4.1. Order Quantity of the Retailer over w under Stochastic Demand
(IR) or (MI,RC) and (CR), respectively. Thus, the difference in the retailers profits
for the two asymmetric cases is very small.
Regarding coordination, the total supply chain profits obtained in the asymmetric
cases (MC,RI) and (MI,RC) are in between the range of the symmetric policies
(CR) and (IR). However, profits of the manufacturer and retailer can be higher (or
lower) than the best (or worst) performance reached in the decentralized cases. For
the manufacturer this is the case because she expects to have profits according to the
symmetric cases’ results, whereas the in fact realized order amount is different, what
as a consequence lowers or increases her final profits. The retailer in turn can realize
higher profits than in (CR) because a lower wholesale price w of 3.47 instead of 3.56
is given by the vendor, what allows him to move to the left on his profit function
and is consequently raising his profits (see figure 4.2). Under the policy (MC,RI)
the observation is the opposite. Due to a higher transferred wholesale price of 3.56
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Symmetric Asymmetric
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
Q∗ 3.27 3.50 - -
Cent. Π 4.61 4.58 - -
Q∗ 1.97 2.16 2.08 2.06
w∗ 3.56 3.47 3.56 3.47
Decent. ΠR 0.5405 0.6805 0.5355 0.6862
ΠM 2.9273 3.0746 3.0970 2.9112
ΠT 3.4678 3.7551 3.6325 3.5974
Table 4.1. Equilibrium Values for Centralized and Decentralized Policies including
the Asymmetric Settings in the Base Case with a Normally Distributed Demand
instead of 3.47 resulting profits are worse than in (IR). Looking at the relative values
though, both, the retailer and the vendor can be only about 1% better or worse off
in the asymmetric cases compared to the initial symmetric ones.
As a result, supply chain coordination is not reached and the centralized policy
(IR) still performs best. Table 4.1 comprehends for each policy the optimized order
quantities and wholesale prices as well as profits for each player and the total supply
chain. Note that optimal wholesale prices are the same because of the incorrect
assumption about the optimization process which the manufacturer makes initially.
Figure 4.2 visualizes profits of the players and of the total supply chain for the two
considered asymmetric policies as a function of the wholesale price w.
Our computational study also shows that the profit-curves in the asymmetric
cases, which the manufacturer indeed realizes after receiving the order amount from
the retailer, are the same than respective curves of the symmetric policies. Assumed
profits ΠMI,RCM,ass and Π
MC,RI
M,ass are found by taking Π
IR
M (w, s|QIR∗) or ΠCRM (w, s|QCR∗),
what equals the symmetric optimization cases (IR) and (CR). Now, observe in
figure 4.3 that the assumed profit functions are identical to the indeed realized profit
functions of the vendor in (MC,RI) and (MI,RC), i.e. ΠMC,RIM (w) and Π
MI,RC
M (w).
Different profits to the symmetric cases are realized because the order quantity has
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Figure 4.2. Base Case Profits of Manufacturer, Retailer, and the Total Supply Chain
in the Asymmetric Settings under Stochastic Demand
changed. However, this is only valid under a price-only contract, that is if s is set to
v. We will see changes that occur when considering buy-back rebates.
4.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to find the impacts of consumer returns on supply chain coordination in
the case of asymmetric settings and to show the robustness of our initial findings, a
sensitivity analysis is conducted. Different values for c, r and v, as well as changes in
l, α, β, and the coefficient of variation σ
µ
are considered. Additionally, the option of
a buy-back contract (i.e. s > 0) is studied extensively. Note that for high values of σ
a truncated normal distribution is used to avoid negative demand. Unless otherwise
noted, the settings of the base case are used, that is α = 0.2, β = 0.05, l = 2 and
the salvage values v and vr are set to zero. Furthermore, no repurchase option is yet
offered by the retailer.
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Figure 4.3. Assumed and indeed Realized Profits of the Manufacturer under
Stochastic Demand in the Asymmetric Settings
Changes in Beta and Different Return Rates
It is intuitive that profits of the supply chain members are affected by the share
of logistic costs they have to bear, i.e. l1 and l2, and by the overall product return
rate α. In the following, we evaluate the robustness of our findings in the base case
and therefore vary the percent share of logistic costs faced by the manufacturer and
retailer, β, and the percent volume of returns, α.
Figure 4.4 shows the optimal order quantities and profit functions for both asym-
metric cases for different magnitudes of β. Identical to the results of Ruiz Ben´ıtez
and Muriel (2007) [42], the optimal wholesale price decreases when the manufac-
turer considers returns and remains constant when ignoring them. Consequently, for
the asymmetric cases the optimal order quantity of the retailer decreases in policy
(MI,RC) and increases in policy (MC,RI). In the latter case, the reason is that







































Figure 4.4. Profits, Order Quantities and Optimal Wholesale Prices for Different
Shares of Logistic Costs β in the Asymmetric Settings
lower wholesale prices are submitted by the vendor. However, his profits only de-
cline marginally, what is due to the fact that the higher logistic costs are almost
fully compensated by higher sales. The total profit of the supply chain ΠMC,RIT raises
with β, since the lower wholesale price w coordinates the system better. For the
policy (MI,RC) total supply chain profits decline with a rising β. The more logistic
costs the retailer has to bear, the lower his order quantity is, what can be seen as
a reaction on high return costs. In other words, the effect of “double marginaliza-
tion” in setting (MI,RC) increases for higher magnitudes of β. Consequently, the
retailer’s profit ΠMI,RCR decreases steadily to zero. Since the manufacturer’s profits
are also decreasing, ΠMI,RCT is a falling function in β. Therefore the supply chain
faces better coordination for higher values of β in the asymmetric case (MC,RI)
than in the asymmetric base cases, whereas of the two supply chain members only
the manufacturer can raise her profits significantly.
Figure 4.5 shows received profits, optimal and assumed order quantities as well as
optimal wholesale prices in the asymmetric cases for different α-values with an equal




















































Figure 4.5. Profits, Order Quantities and Optimal Wholesale Prices for Different
Return Rates for an Equal Share of Logistic Costs (β=0.5)
falling functions of profits. Considering ΠMC,RIT the total supply chain is facing a loss
if more than 50% of all sold goods are returned. Excluding returns in his calculations,
the retailer’s profit is already negative before this threshold. He still expects to have
positive profits, whereas, unnoticed beforehand, the costs of returns puts him in the
red. At about 52% the manufacturer realizes a loss, and consequently a deal is not
made for higher return rates. However, for the second asymmetric setting (MI,RC)
the behavior is different.
Firstly, when including returns in the retailer’s optimization process order quan-
tities are lower, resulting in a worse performance of both players and the total supply
chain than compared to (MC,RI). The wholesale price remains constant, since it is
found according to formula 3.10 on page 20. At about 35% of returns the retailer’s
profit is getting negative. Solely provided with a wholesale contract he does not or-
der anymore after this threshold. Consequently, policy (MI,RC) is not existing for
α > 35%.
With lower or higher values of β, the curves for profits, Q∗, and w∗ are dropping
slower or faster, respectively. Consequently, the range over which policy (MI,RC)
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β = 0.05
α 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.51 0.84
w∗ 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.47
ΠIRM 4.11 2.91 1.76 0.67 -0.34 -0.44 -0.76
(MI,RC) ΠCRR 0.82 0.69 0.56 0.44 0.32 0.31 0.00
ΠMI,RC 4.92 3.60 2.32 1.11 -0.02 -0.13 -0.76
Q∗CR 2.11 2.06 1.99 1.92 1.82 1.81 0.37
w∗ 3.50 3.56 3.63 3.74 3.89 3.88 -
ΠCRM 4.21 3.10 2.00 0.95 0.01 -0.08 -
(MC,RI) ΠIRR 0.76 0.54 0.33 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -
ΠMC,RI 4.97 3.63 2.34 1.08 -0.01 -0.10 -
Q∗IR 2.14 2.08 2.01 1.86 1.56 1.59 -
β = 0.5
α 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.36 0.4 0.50 0.52
w∗ 3.47 3.47 3.47 3.42 - - -
ΠIRM 4.12 2.91 1.66 0.80 - - -
(MI,RC) ΠCRR 0.63 0.34 0.08 0.01 - - -
ΠMI,RC 4.75 3.25 1.74 0.80 - - -
Q∗CR 2.03 1.84 1.46 0.96 - - -
w∗ 3.41 3.34 3.25 3.19 3.14 2.99 2.91
ΠCRM 4.39 3.40 2.37 1.75 1.32 0.21 -0.06
(MC,RI) ΠIRR 0.74 0.50 0.26 0.09 -0.02 -0.33 -0.36
ΠMC,RI 5.12 3.90 2.63 1.84 1.30 -0.11 -0.42
Q∗IR 2.21 2.27 2.33 2.38 2.41 2.50 2.55
β = 0.95
α 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.4 0.50 0.52
w∗ 3.47 3.47 3.39 - - - -
ΠIRM 4.08 2.32 1.35 - - - -
(MI,RC) ΠCRR 0.46 0.05 0.00 - - - -
ΠMI,RC 4.54 2.37 1.35 - - - -
Q∗CR 1.93 1.32 0.87 - - - -
w∗ 3.31 3.12 3.00 2.87 2.54 2.09 1.94
ΠCRM 4.54 3.63 3.14 2.63 1.52 0.29 -0.03
(MC,RI) ΠIRR 0.73 0.46 0.32 0.16 -0.18 -0.57 -0.61
ΠMC,RI 5.26 4.09 3.46 2.79 1.34 -0.28 -0.64
Q∗IR 2.29 2.42 2.49 2.57 2.74 2.96 3.03
Table 4.2. Profits, Order Quantities and Optimal Wholesale Prices for Different




CV w∗ Q∗ ΠIRM Π
CR
R Π




0.10 3.84 2.42 4.10 0.25 4.35 3.86 2.46 4.20 0.21 4.41
0.25 3.47 2.06 2.91 0.69 3.60 3.56 2.08 3.10 0.54 3.63
0.35 3.22 1.95 2.41 0.86 3.27 3.33 1.99 2.65 0.68 3.33
0.55 2.80 1.89 1.81 1.07 2.88 2.93 1.98 2.11 0.87 2.97
1.00 2.29 2.01 1.35 0.77 2.13 2.44 2.16 1.73 0.56 2.29
Table 4.3. Performance of the Asymmetric Settings for Different Coefficients of
Variation
exists is wider or smaller. Table 4.2 lists the results for β-values of 0.05, 0.5 and 0.95.
Under the setting (MC,RI), for smaller magnitudes of β, ΠMC drops below zero
before ΠRI does, what means that the deal is not made. Moreover, the manufacturer’s
profits are calculated with the order quantity QIR∗ > QCR∗. It follows, that the
manufacturer finds his assumed profits to be negative before the respective α-values
presented in table 4.2.
Different Mean and Variance of the Expected Demand
After studying different magnitudes of consumer returns and share of logistic costs,
we perform a sensitivity analysis regarding the impacts of changes in the coefficient




), which expresses the variation of the demand distribution
relative to its mean. It directly affects all decision variables and profits. In order to
prevent possible negative demand at a normal distribution for higher values of σ, a
truncated normal distribution is being used. Table 4.3 shows the equilibrium values
of the asymmetric policies for different coefficients of variation. The CV of 0.25 is
highlighted in bold as it represents the base case.
For the symmetric policies Lariviere (1999) [32] proves that the optimal wholesale
price is determined by the coefficient of variation and increases the smaller the CV
is. This finding holds true for the asymmetric cases under stochastic demand as well.
Interestingly, the order quantity which is finally realized by the retailer is convex, i.e.
40
it has its minimum for medium values of the CV. Total supply chain profits are always
better in (MC,RI) - just as in the base case. The overall finding, which is declining
profits in a rising CV, holds for the asymmetric cases as well as for the symmetric
cases that are studied by Ruiz Benitez (2007) [42].
Different Production Costs and Retail Prices
Production costs and retail prices affect the marginal revenues of the players
directly. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis concerning values of r under different logistic
costs l = {0.5, 1, 2} is performed. However, in the centralized cases the condition
r > c+α(l−vr)
1−α , derived from the optimal order quantity (see condition (SC) in Ruiz
Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42]), has to be observed. In the following, we show the
effects of higher resale prices on the supply chain if the players decide asymmetrically
when optimizing their profits. As both, production costs c and retail price r, have
an identical impact on the profit margins of the players, we can simply focus on
r. Table 4.4 shows absolute values for the two asymmetric cases compared to the
best achievable results under the centralized policy (CR). The percent differences in
profits to the respective decentralized cases (IR) or (CR) are presented in table 4.5.
Omitted values are due to negative profits that cause percent values over 100%.
Conducting the according computational studies the following results are gained:
• Except for very small marginal revenues the total supply chain is for the given
values of l better off in the case (MC,RI). Coordination is worse than in the
symmetric centralized and decentralized policies, though.
• Regarding the retailer’s profits we find him except for some high values of r
better off under the setting (MI,RC), as opposed to the manufacturer, who
makes higher profits if setting (MC,RI) applies. Note, that the manufacturer
does not know he is better off when considering returns, since he expects the
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Asymmetric (MC, RI) Asymmetric (MI, RC) Central (CR)
r w∗ QIR ΠCRM Π
IR
R ΠT w








1.38 1.37 1.28 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.32 1.64 -0.06 0.06 0.00 1.19 0.01
2 1.88 1.83 0.76 0.13 0.89 1.83 1.88 0.70 0.20 0.90 2.68 1.09
4 3.52 2.12 3.68 0.63 4.31 3.47 2.07 3.51 0.72 4.23 3.35 5.47
8 6.74 2.25 9.74 1.77 11.52 6.72 2.16 9.32 1.82 11.14 3.75 14.76
10 8.35 2.27 12.79 2.35 15.14 8.36 2.17 12.25 2.35 14.59 3.86 19.47
20 16.47 2.30 28.07 5.12 33.19 16.53 2.20 26.89 5.04 31.93 4.15 43.23
l = 1
1.51 1.49 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.42 1.70 -0.09 0.09 0.00 1.19 0.01
2 1.90 1.77 0.59 0.09 0.68 1.83 1.86 0.52 0.19 0.71 2.58 0.84
4 3.53 2.11 3.49 0.60 4.09 3.47 2.07 3.31 0.71 4.02 3.32 5.18
8 6.80 2.22 9.54 1.66 11.20 6.72 2.16 9.11 1.81 10.92 3.74 14.46
10 8.39 2.26 12.58 2.27 14.85 8.36 2.17 12.04 2.34 14.37 3.85 19.18
20 16.53 2.29 27.86 5.00 32.86 16.53 2.20 26.68 5.02 31.70 4.15 42.93
l = 2
1.76 1.73 1.41 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.63 1.76 -0.12 0.12 0.00 1.19 0.01
2 1.93 1.64 0.28 0.04 0.32 1.83 1.83 0.17 0.18 0.34 2.27 0.38
4 3.56 2.08 3.10 0.54 3.63 3.47 2.06 2.91 0.69 3.60 3.27 4.62
8 6.79 2.23 9.13 1.66 10.78 6.72 2.16 8.70 1.79 10.48 3.73 13.88
10 8.43 2.24 12.17 2.18 14.35 8.36 2.17 11.62 2.31 13.93 3.84 18.58
20 16.49 2.30 27.43 5.05 32.48 16.53 2.20 26.25 5.00 31.26 4.14 42.33
Table 4.4. Asymmetric Settings under a Wholesale Contract: Profits, Order Quan-
tities and Optimal Wholesale Prices for Varying Retail Prices at Different Logistic
Costs l = 0.5, 1 and 2 with c = 1, β = 0.05 and α = 0.2
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1.385 51.97 -12.07 1.23 -4.19 1.55 -
2 5.81 -0.79 4.80 -5.23 0.81 -3.94
4 4.73 -0.60 3.92 -4.49 0.57 -3.67
8 4.48 -0.64 3.66 -4.31 3.56 -3.11
10 4.43 -0.52 3.63 -4.27 2.06 -3.30
20 4.38 -0.51 3.59 -4.19 1.61 -3.32
l = 1
1.51 72.51 -35.96 2.33 -4.29 2.05 -
2 7.75 -1.72 6.37 -6.23 1.07 -4.36
4 5.05 -0.75 4.15 -4.76 0.71 -3.84
8 4.62 -0.60 3.81 -4.42 3.58 -3.18
10 4.54 -0.57 3.74 -4.35 2.11 -3.36
20 4.42 -0.53 3.64 -4.23 1.59 -3.35
l = 2
1.76 - - - -4.00 2.71 -86.49
2 16.13 -8.43 12.45 -10.28 1.96 -4.43
4 5.80 -0.95 4.75 -5.31 0.81 -4.20
8 4.86 -0.66 3.97 -4.66 3.67 -3.34
10 4.74 -0.69 3.88 -4.52 2.17 -3.47
20 4.50 -0.53 3.68 -4.31 1.62 -3.41
Table 4.5. Percent Differences of Equilibrium Values between Asymmetric and re-
spective Decentralized Policies under a Wholesale Contract for Different Retail Prices
and Logistic Costs
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retailer to consider returns as well. We focus on this subject matter in chapter
7 again.
• The percent differences shown in table 4.5 confirm our initial findings that the
results of both asymmetric cases are in between those of the decentralized cases.
The manufacturer has higher profits when (MC,RI) applies and lower ones in
case of (MI,RC) compared to the respective benchmark cases. For the retailer
it is vice versa.
• As the profit margin of both players increases, the percent difference of the
asymmetric settings compared to the respective decentralized policies decreases.
Higher logistic costs lead to slower declining differences.
Positive Salvage Values
Salvage values represent the estimated value of an asset, in this case the product, at
the end of the selling period. Salvage values can be realized in various ways, including
mark-downs on the product, alternative use of the total or parts of the good or sale
of the product for scrap or recycling. In this section we vary the unsold item salvage
value v with according values of vr = {0, v2 , v}. Note that if the manufacturer is not
offering a buy-back option, the salvage value is kept by the retailer. Therefore, within
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profit functions as well as in the formulae for the
optimal order amounts which are presented in chapter 4, s has to be substituted by
v.
First of all, positive salvage values improve the performance of each of the players
and of the total supply chain. Furthermore, as positive salvage valuea vr decrease the
costs of returns, the effect on channel profits is reverse to those of α and l. The results
in table 4.6 represent the fact that higher unsold item values v are an incentive for the
retailer to order more, as well as higher salvage values vr of the returned items allow
the manufacturer to set lower wholesale prices, which leads to a higher optimal order
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amount in the case (MC,RI). Both players and the total supply chain are better
off for higher values of v and vr, what is intuitive. For values of v close to w
∗, the
retailer faces almost no loss for an unsold item, what allows him to order significantly
more and finally boost his profits. In other words, he finds himself almost completely
hedged against low demand. For higher salvage values a decentralized supply should,
if trying to maximize total profits, therefore set the wholesale price close to the
respective v-value. Individually, the manufacturer herself has, however, no incentive
do to so, since this would lessen her profits.
As mentioned in chapter 3, the cost of a returned unit for the manufacturer is
w + l1 − vr > 0. Obviously higher salvage values for returned items are equivalent
to having a lower value for the parameter of l1, that is the logistic costs incurred at
the manufacturer. This finding is verified by tables 4.4 and 4.6, where the results are
altered in the same way for declining logistic costs and rising salvage values. A shift
in the share of logistic costs, resulting from different β-values, has the same effects as
well, since l1 = l × (1 − β). Under a wholesale contract the same holds true for the
retailer and v.
4.2 Buy-Back Contract
As shown by Pasternack (1985) [41], a pricing and return policy, in which the
manufacturer agrees to buy back unsold items for partial credit from the retailer at
the end of the selling season, can achieve channel coordination. In exchange for the
partial credit s, the manufacturer receives the unsold item with a salvage value of
v ≥ 0. Note that for every tuple (w, s), supply chain profits are divided differently
amongst the players.
In our calculations, an exhaustive search is made in order to determine the opti-
mal (w∗, s∗) combination. According to Theorem 4.1.1 from Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel
(2007) [42], s∗ > α
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0 0 3.56 2.08 3.10 0.54 3.63 3.47 2.06 2.91 0.69 3.60
0.5 0 3.55 2.15 3.19 0.57 3.76 3.47 2.12 3.00 0.71 3.71
1 0 3.55 2.22 3.31 0.59 3.90 3.46 2.20 3.11 0.75 3.86
1.5 0 3.53 2.34 3.46 0.65 4.10 3.43 2.33 3.25 0.84 4.09
2 0 3.49 2.51 3.66 0.76 4.42 3.40 2.49 3.45 0.94 4.39
v vr w
∗ Q∗ ΠCRM Π
IR
R Π




0.5 0.25 3.54 2.16 3.30 0.58 3.88 3.47 2.12 3.11 0.71 3.81
1 0.5 3.51 2.26 3.52 0.66 4.18 3.46 2.20 3.33 0.75 4.08
1.5 0.75 3.49 2.38 3.80 0.72 4.52 3.43 2.33 3.59 0.84 4.43
2 1 3.44 2.56 4.14 0.85 5.00 3.40 2.49 3.93 0.94 4.87
v vr w
∗ Q∗ ΠCRM Π
IR
R Π




0.5 0.5 3.53 2.17 3.40 0.60 4.00 3.47 2.12 3.21 0.71 3.92
1 1 3.49 2.28 3.74 0.69 4.43 3.46 2.20 3.54 0.75 4.29
1.5 1.5 3.45 2.42 4.14 0.79 4.93 3.43 2.33 3.93 0.84 4.76
2 2 3.39 2.62 4.63 0.95 5.58 3.40 2.49 4.40 0.94 5.34
Table 4.6. Player and Supply Chain Performance under Asymmetric Settings for
Different Unsold Item Values and no Repurchase Option offered
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tings this still holds true and buy-back contracts are indeed able to ensure channel
coordination. Although supply chain coordination is possible through a buy-back re-
bate, this type of coordination scheme leads to a considerable shift in profits amongst
the players. Thus, the manufacturer is significantly better off, whereas the retailer is
barely profitable at all. Lau and Lau [34] receive similar results in their work, where
in the given newsvendor setup, a return-credit policy can often be used by a shrewd
manufacturer to increase only his profits. Comparing the retailer’s performance un-
der a wholesale and a buy-back option, his minuscule profits under the latter give
him no incentive to accept an offered buy-back contract. In turn, the risk which
the retailer faces under a buy-back rebate is also infinitesimal, whereas a wholesale
contract exposes him to a far greater risk of not being profitable due to overstocking.
Consequently, the financial theory of risk and returns is satisfied and the buy-back
contract is meaningful. Total supply chain profits are with 4.566 and 4.512 for the
cases (MC,RI) and (MI,RC), respectively, reasonably higher than compared to the
symmetric cases. The optimal buy-back amount of the manufacturer, s∗, is found
to be close to w∗. This is due to the fact that the manufacturer is individually try-
ing to maximize her profits regardless of the performance of the retailer. By giving
the retailer the possibility to sell back items with minimal loss (exactly w∗ − s∗ per
item), he tries to satisfy almost all occurring demand, and therefore, place higher
order amounts. The optimal wholesale price w∗ is the highest possible the vendor
can set, due to the restriction w < r − ( α
1−α)l2 that derives out of formula (3.6).
Note that the manufacturer wants the retailer not to order as much as possible but
quite a reasonable amount. That is why the optimal buy-back price s∗ is only almost
at the maximal possible magnitude. The closer s∗ gets to w∗ the more the retailer
orders and, for extreme high values the vendor’s profits start declining again. In the
following sensitivity analysis, we show that w∗ is always close to s∗.
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Wholesale Buy-Back
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
w∗ 3.56 3.47 3.56 3.47 3.95 3.96 3.95 3.96
s∗ - - - - 3.935 3.945 3.935 3.945
Decent. Q∗ 1.97 2.16 2.08 2.06 3.14 3.45 3.55 2.90
ΠM 2.927 3.075 3.097 2.911 4.553 4.569 4.518 4.484
ΠR 0.541 0.681 0.536 0.686 0.050 0.026 0.048 0.028
ΠT 3.468 3.755 3.633 3.597 4.603 4.595 4.566 4.512
Table 4.7. Equilibrium Values for Decentralized Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies
in the Base Case under a Buy-Back Contract and Stochastic Demand
As a result, for combinations (w∗, s∗) the supply chain in both asymmetric settings
(MC,RI) and (MI,RC) can face improved coordination and, hence, better results
than under a wholesale contract can be retrieved. (MC,RI) again reaches the better
results, what derives from a higher order amount set by the retailer when ignoring
returns compared to if he considers them. Table 4.7 compares the decentralized cases
(CR) and (IR) with the asymmetric settings provided with a wholesale and a buy-
back contract, respectively.
As mentioned, our results are based on an exhaustive search over all possible
(w,s)-tuples, whereas the manufacturer is optimizing the wholesale price in order to
maximize his profits. Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] present an analytic way to
find coordinating solutions for the decentralized supply chain. Accordingly, there is
a set of values (w(s), s) satisfying
s >
α
1− α(c+l1−vr)+v and w =
(r(1− α)− l2α)(c− v) + s((1− α)r − α(l − vr)− c)
(1− α)r − α(l − vr + c− v)− v
that achieve supply chain coordination. By applying the formulas, optimal profits
can be calculated for a given s (or w). Note, that this solution does not depend on
the demand distribution. Table 4.8 compares the analytic solution of Ruiz Ben´ıtez
and Muriel for the given buy-back price s = 2 with the exhaustive search method.
Interestingly, we find the total profits to be about the same for the respective policies,
but profits among the players are a good deal more fairly distributed. However, it
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Analytical Solution Exhaustive Search
(CR) (IR) (CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
w∗ 2.6 2.5 3.95 3.96 3.95 3.96
s∗ 2 2 3.94 3.95 3.94 3.95
ΠM 2.82 3.09 4.55 4.57 4.52 4.48
ΠR 1.79 1.48 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03
ΠT 4.61 4.58 4.60 4.60 4.57 4.51
Table 4.8. Comparison of Analytical and Exhaustive Optimization Methods: Opti-
mal Supply Chain Parameters under a Buy-Back Contract and Stochastic Demand
is now the manufacturer that makes the worse deal of the two since he has reduced
profits compared to the wholesale contract. The retailer, in turn, now has a strong
incentive to accept a buy-back contract since he can raise his profits considerably.
Pasternack (1985) [41] presents values for buy-back contracts where both agents are
better off, whereas he also applies an analytical solution. Finally, the results of the
exhaustive search represent a possible solution of the given analytical formulas.
4.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Provided with a buy-back contract, we find the same basic behavior of manu-
facturer and retailer as under a wholesale contract when varying the respective pa-
rameters. However, a buy-back option allows the manufacturer to shift profits in his
interests. For any considered β-value, the manufacturer is always significantly better
off than the retailer. This finding extends the initial result over the total range of
β. As observable in table 4.9, rising production costs c and higher return volumes
lead to lowered profits of both players and the total supply chain. Of course, values
with negative profits for the manufacturer or retailers in the setting (MC,RI) or
(MI,RC), respectively, mean that no deal is made between the players for the given
basic conditions.
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Figure 4.6. Performance of Decision Variables for Different Shares of Logistic Costs:
Comparison of Wholesale and Buy-back Contracts for the Asymmetric Policies
Summarizing and compared to the asymmetric settings provided with a wholesale
contract, the conducted sensitivity analysis over the respective parameters brings the
following results:
• Sensitivity analysis supports the fact that the manufacturer rakes almost all of
the profits in the system, whereas the retailer is hardly profitable. Consequently,
from the point of profits, the retailer has no incentive to accept a buy-back offer
by the manufacturer if no other additional agreements are made (e.g. lump sum
transfer).
• Optimal order amounts change more significantly over the range of the varied
variables than under a wholesale contract. This follows directly out of the fact
that the buy-back incentive offered by the manufacturer shifts profits in her
interests.
• As mentioned, higher production costs and more returned products reduce the
performance of the supply chain. Table 4.9 shows that the manufacturer tries
to compensate this with maximum possible wholesale prices. Still, the best per-
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(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
c 0.25 1 2 3 0.25 1 2 3
α = 0.2
w∗ 3.91 3.95 3.96 - 3.94 3.96 3.96 3.96
s∗ 3.898 3.935 3.925 - 3.928 3.945 3.915 3.835
Q∗ 3.87 3.55 3.06 - 3.37 2.90 2.40 1.98
ΠM 7.163 4.518 1.501 - 7.067 4.484 1.643 -0.501
ΠR 0.142 0.048 0.021 - 0.073 0.028 0.024 0.020
ΠT 7.305 4.566 1.522 - 7.140 4.512 1.667 -0.481
α = 0.3
w∗ 3.88 3.93 3.94 - 3.92 3.94 3.94 3.94
s∗ 3.861 3.913 3.811 - 3.901 3.923 3.881 3.750
Q∗ 3.83 3.64 2.65 - 3.16 2.83 2.28 1.83
ΠM 5.388 2.736 0.179 - 5.247 2.882 0.284 -1.524
ΠR 0.143 0.043 0.011 - 0.064 0.027 0.023 0.018
ΠT 5.531 2.779 0.189 - 5.311 2.908 0.307 -1.506
α = 0.4
w∗ 3.87 3.92 - - 3.92 3.92 3.92 3.92
s∗ 3.853 3.903 - - 3.903 3.893 3.840 3.657
Q∗ 3.90 3.71 - - 2.66 2.45 2.00 1.58
ΠM 3.661 0.971 - - 3.316 1.291 -0.863 -2.241
ΠR 0.096 0.011 - - 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.010
ΠT 3.757 0.981 - - 3.334 1.307 -0.850 -2.231
Table 4.9. Sensitivity Analysis for Production Costs and Return Rates in the Asym-
metric Settings under a Buy-Back Contract with Stochastic Demand
51
formance of the total supply chain is reached under (MC,RI). For the retailer,
the situation changes: for high production costs and/or increased returns, he
finds himself in a better position.
• For (MC,RI) the optimal buy-back amount, s∗, is always close to the optimized
wholesale price. For the setting (MI,RC), in turn, the gap between s∗ and w∗
grows larger for higher c, α and β. The reason is, that the manufacturer assumes
the retailer order’s more when ignoring returns, why he wants to restrict his
order quantity more.
• Positive salvage values improve both players and the total supply chain. Table
4.10 compares the asymmetric settings under a buy-back and wholesale contract.
Note that under the latter, v is kept with the retailer and under the former it
goes back to the vendor. Due to the fact that returned and unsold items now
are valuable, the manufacturer can charge higher prices than under a wholesale
contract. The idea behind it is simple: by setting a buy-back price as close as
possible to w∗ the retailer is almost perfectly hedged against low demand. This
means he orders substantial higher amounts than if provided with a wholesale
contract, what in turn generates higher profits for the manufacturer. For higher
salvage values, the optimal wholesale price reduces, what leads again - together
with the hedging argument - to higher Q∗-values. Interestingly, for salvage
values close to w∗, the wholesale contract performs better in terms of total
supply chain profits. Particularly the retailer can raise his profits considerably,
whereas the manufacturer is worse off. Under the buy-back option, setting w∗
close to the salvage value will not result in disproportionately higher profits





∗ s∗ Q∗ ΠCRM Π
IR
R Π




0 0 3.95 3.94 3.73 4.44 0.05 4.49 3.96 3.95 3.09 4.56 0.03 4.59
0.5 0.5 3.94 3.93 3.80 5.09 0.07 5.17 3.96 3.95 3.09 5.01 0.03 5.04
1 1 3.91 3.90 3.96 5.78 0.14 5.93 3.94 3.93 3.48 5.69 0.08 5.76
1.5 1.5 3.87 3.86 4.10 6.57 0.24 6.81 3.91 3.9 3.74 6.42 0.14 6.57
2 2 3.81 3.80 4.23 7.43 0.38 7.81 3.86 3.85 3.97 7.27 0.26 7.53




∗ s∗ Q∗ ΠCRM Π
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R Π




0 0 3.56 - 2.08 3.09 0.53 3.63 3.47 - 2.05 2.91 0.68 3.59
0.5 0.5 3.53 - 2.17 3.40 0.60 4.00 3.47 - 2.11 3.21 0.70 3.91
1 1 3.49 - 2.28 3.74 0.68 4.43 3.46 - 2.20 3.54 0.74 4.29
1.5 1.5 3.45 - 2.42 4.14 0.79 4.93 3.43 - 2.32 3.92 0.83 4.76
2 2 3.39 - 2.61 4.62 0.95 5.58 3.4 - 2.48 4.40 0.93 5.34
2.5 2.5 2.51 - 4.85 6.18 3.49 9.68 2.51 - 4.79 6.08 3.49 9.58
Table 4.10. Supply Chain Behavior for Positive Salvage Values: Comparison of
Wholesale and Buy-Back Contracts in the Asymmetric Settings for a Normally Dis-
tributed Demand
4.3 Conclusions
For given stochastic demand, we have examined and investigated the asymmetric
settings (MC,RI) and (MI,RC). Through extensive computational work we were
able to extend the main findings of the decentralized symmetric policies under a simple
price-only and a buy-back contract. We further showed the robustness of our results
by carrying out sensitivity analysis in the respective model parameters. Finally, the
most important findings of this chapter are enumerated:
Results retrieved under a Wholesale Price-Only Contract
1. The performances of the asymmetric settings (MC,RI) and (MI,RC) are in
between the decentralized policies (IR) and (CR). Thus, coordination is not
reached. (MC,RI) constitutes the case where the manufacturer finds her best
profits. The retailer is best off under (MI,RC).
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2. Shifting the share of logistic costs predominantly to the retailer leads to rising
total profits under (MC,RI), whereas it is detrimental under (MI,RC). By
doing so, better coordination can be reached, although an incentive scheme has
to be offered to the retailer in order not to lose goodwill.
3. Conducted sensitivity analysis shows that the results for the asymmetric set-
tings are consistent with findings of Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] in the
symmetric settings. Rising costs, rate of returns, coefficient of variations and
logistic costs lead to declining profits with no shift in profit distribution among
the players. Positive salvage values, in turn, increase profits.
Results retrieved under a Buy-Back Contract
1. Buy-back contracts lead to a dramatic shift of profit distribution among the
players. The manufacturer rakes almost all profits, whereas the retailer has
fairly none. However, total profits are improved compared to a wholesale con-
tract.
2. The best performance of the asymmetric settings is still (MC,RI), whereas
both remain in between the decentralized policies (IR) and (CR). The optimal
buy-back value s∗ is always found close to w∗.
3. Buy-back contracts lead to higher order amounts of the retailer. The fact that s∗
is close to w∗ allows the retailer to hedge against unsold items almost completely.
In turn to his infinitesimal profits, he has almost no risk associated with the
deal made under a buy-back contract. Thus, the risk-return ratio is satisfied.
4. Sensitivity analysis shows that the general findings under a wholesale contract
for the asymmetric settings hold still true when the system is provided with a
buy-back contract. Levels and share of profits are different, though.
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CHAPTER 5
STOCHASTIC AND PRICE-DEPENDENT DEMAND
In this chapter, customer demand is assumed to be stochastic and price-dependent.
Total consumer returns are considered to be a constant fraction of sales, i.e. α = 20%.
Most importantly the retail price is no longer exogenously given and, thus, the retailer
has partial control over demand with setting the selling price. As mentioned, the
demand distribution is modeled according to Emmons & Gilbert (1998) [16] with
D(r) = b(r − k) and is known to both players. Further, the general framework
presented in chapter 3 remains valid.
For the case of stochastic and price dependent demand, Ruiz Benitez and Muriel
(2007) [42] study the symmetric cases (CR) and (IR) under a wholesale and buy-back
contract. In the following, we are focussing on asymmetric decision making and the
respective outcome of the settings when varying the model parameters. Retrieved re-
sults are compared with symmetric policies, whereas considered coordination schemes
are the simple price-only contract, and a buy-back option. A comprehensive sensi-
tivity analysis is performed for each of the latter two options. As under stochastic
demand, the main objective of the computational work is to evaluate the effects of
asymmetric decision policies on optimal supply chain profits, optimal ordering quan-
tities, wholesale and retail prices and buy-back rebates, as compared to those in the
classical problems in which returns are either considered or ignored in the decision
making process. In the computational analysis, the simplification of a uniform distri-
bution on the interval [0,2] is made to represent the probability distribution function
of the uncertainty term x, i.e. x ∼ U(0; 2). The respective parameter values for the
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Symmetric Asymmetric
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
r∗ 3.64 3.27 - -
Cent. Q∗ 4.90 7.22 - -
Π 3.71 3.21 - -
w∗ 2.5 2.18 2.5 2.18
r∗ 4.07 3.90 4.05 3.93
Decent. Q∗ 1.84 2.90 2.19 2.49
ΠM 1.4113 1.5848 1.6194 1.2994
ΠR 1.1409 1.6771 1.1082 1.7172
ΠT 2.5522 3.2619 2.7276 3.0166
Table 5.1. Optimal Order Amounts, Prices and Profits of Centralized and Decen-
tralized Policies under a Price-Only Contract with Stochastic and Price-dependent
Demand
demand function are (b, k) = (−3, 5). The production costs c are set to 1, whereas
the salvage values v and vr are 0 if not stated otherwise. According to a β-value of
0.05, the manufacturer faces 95% of reverse logistic costs, as opposed to the retailer,
who bears only 5% of the total logistic costs l = 2.
5.1 Wholesale Price-Only Contract
Firstly, we study the simple price-only wholesale contract, where the manufacturer
does not offer the retailer to buy back unsold items at the end of the selling period. Ac-
cordingly, the parameter s is set to v. Under stochastic and price-dependent demand,
the retailer now calculates his optimal profit and also the optimal retail price for differ-
ent w∗ transmitted by the vendor. Table 5.1 shows profits, optimal order quantities as
well as the optimized wholesale and retail prices. Similar to price-dependent demand
the centralized policy (CR) represent the best possible coordination. However, policy
(IR) faces less coordination in a centralized supply chain than in a decentralized one.
For the decentralized symmetric cases, the expected profits of both players and
of the total supply chain are shown below in figure 5.1. Figure 5.2 visualizes the
asymmetric settings.
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Figure 5.1. Base Case Profits, Order Quantities, Wholesale and Retail Prices under
Stochastic and Price-dependent Demand in the Decentralized Symmetric Settings
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Figure 5.2. Base Case Profits, Order Quantities, Wholesale and Retail Prices under
Stochastic and Price-dependent Demand in the Decentralized Asymmetric Settings
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In general, mostly similar results as under stochastic demand are obtained. The
asymmetric settings behave in the same manner as the decentral symmetric policies
do. In addition to the results that are found for the decentralized policies by Ruiz
Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42], we can summarize for the asymmetric policies:
• Retail prices are increasing and the optimal order amounts are decreasing in w.
QMC,RI = QIR > QCR = QMI,RC for any specific w. Considering the optimal
r∗, the retail price including returns is always higher than if ignoring. This is
explained by the fact that the costs caused by returned items are compensated
by higher retail prices. However, higher retail prices come along with lower total
sales.
• The optimal total profits for the asymmetric cases lie in between the profits of
(IR) and (CR). Thus, supply chain coordination is not achieved.
• Optimal decision variables of the asymmetric settings are in between the range
of the values of the symmetric policies.
• Other than under stochastic demand, the higher total profits are found for
(MI,RC). Interestingly, the retailer outperforms the vendor in the latter set-
ting. Note that under stochastic demand this was also not the case.
• For low values of w the manufacturer faces a loss when ignoring or considering
returns. For higher values of w, however, the vendor is significantly better off
when considering consumer returns.
• In a specific asymmetric setting, one and only one player is better off than in
both symmetric cases, as opposed to the other player, who is facing worse profits
than in (CR) and (IR).
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5.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
As we have experienced in the last chapter, the impact of consumer returns on
the asymmetric settings is driven by the overall return volume α, the share, β, of
total logistic costs l. In order to evaluate the robustness of the obtained results in
the base case, a sensitivity analysis in the respective model parameters is conducted.
Besides the mentioned variables, the market factors b and k as well as the values
which determine the profit margin directly, that is c, v and vr, are varied.
Different Rates of Returns
Intuitively, higher rates of returns lead to lowered system-wide and individual
profits. Table 5.3 shows the performance of system-wide variables as a function of
customer returns α for the case of stochastic and price-dependent demand in the
base case with {c, b, k} = {1,−3, 5} and β = 0.05. Retrieved results, however, are
different compared to those of stochastic demand. Firstly, we find both players facing
higher profits when they individually consider returns, as opposed the stochastic
demand case, where only the manufacturer is better off when including returns in her
optimization process.
Policy (MC,RI) does not exist after a threshold value of α ≈ 0.40, since the man-
ufacturer starts facing losses. Observe, that the threshold value derives out of policy
(CR) because the manufacturer assumes the retailer to optimize with consideration
of consumer returns as well, i.e. he assumes symmetrical behavior. The asymmetric
setting (MI,RC), in turn, faces losses if the return rate is higher than 47% of the to-
tal goods sold. Interestingly, after subtracting the costs of returns, the manufacturer
ends up facing losses much earlier, whereas his profits before returns are positive over
the whole range of α. We therefore find that for higher return rates ignoring returns
is detrimental for both players’ profits.
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The effects that rising consumer returns have on order quantities and prices are
visible in figure 5.3. Moreover, the interdependencies of wholesale and retail prices
and order quantities are illustrated nicely. If the manufacturer considers reverse logis-
tic costs in the optimization process, transmitted wholesale prices remain constant.
This leads directly to retail prices that are fairly constant and are only for higher
return rates rising drastically to cover return costs. Under a constant return rate,
that is returns are independent of the price, high resale prices allow to insure against
high amounts of returns, because reverse logistic costs are simply allocated on buyers
that finally keep the product. As both variables, wholesale and retail price, remain
relatively unchanged, the order quantity under (MI,RC) is declining steadily in α,
whereas the order amount is always higher than Q(MC,RI). If the vendor includes
returns, he covers the expenses of returned items by higher wholesale prices. Conse-
quently, the retailer faces a dropping profit margin, why he sets higher retail prices as
well. However, the rise in the retail prices is not proportional to that of the wholesale
prices because the retailer ignores returns and therefore, has no incentive to cover re-
turn costs. Yet, the considerable jump in purchase prices drives the retailer to order
less.
To round off our sensitivity analysis for α, we also present the results when β =
0.95 (see figure 5.4), that is the retailer bears the lion share of return costs. Now the
asymmetric case of (MC,RI) performs only better if the return volume is greater
than ∼ 30% of sold goods. Both players still are better off when considering returns,
whereas the manufacturer’s profits are superior to those of the retailer, regardless of
including or excluding returns. Regarding prices and order amounts, wholesale prices
remain fairly constant under both settings, since the manufacturer has to bear only
very little of return costs. Accordingly, the wholesale price does not have to make up
for increased reverse logistic costs. Incidentally, the behavior is as described for the






















































Figure 5.3. Performance of the Asymmetric Cases under Stochastic and Price-
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Figure 5.4. Performance of the Asymmetric Cases under Stochastic and Price-
dependent for varying Return Rates and β = 0.95
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Symmetric Asymmetric
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
w∗ 2.12 2.18 2.12 2.18
r∗ 4.09 3.90 3.87 4.12
Q∗ 1.97 2.91 3.07 1.85
ΠM 1.4901 2.4028 2.2071 1.4880
ΠR 1.1776 0.8592 0.9504 1.0819
ΠT 2.6677 3.2620 3.1575 2.5699
Table 5.2. Equilibrium Values of the Asymmetric policies when the retailer faces
95% of total reverse logistic costs
Different Shares of Logistic Costs
As observable in the previous chapter, the share of logistic costs is an important
parameter regarding the impacts of consumer returns on relevant decision variables
and system-wide profits of the players. As stated in chapter 4, the share of logistic
costs faced by the retailer is denoted as β = l2
l1+l2
× 100. Within the following, we
are considering changes in β, whereas we elsewise use the base case settings in order
to better understand the dynamics of the supply chain. For stochastic and price-
dependent demand, coordination is not reached with any asymmetric optimization
setting when shifting reverse logistic costs amongst the players.
Table 5.2 presents the equilibrium values if β = 0.95. The first eye-catching
result is that the retailer’s profits in both asymmetric settings are now in between the
symmetric policies. Also the manufacturer finds her profits to be in between, except
for (MI,RC), where she is worse off than under (CR) and (IR). According to
the results of Ruiz Benitez and Muriel (2007) [42], profits in the symmetric policies
remain fairly unchanged if players consider consumer returns in their optimization
process. Excluding returns leads to disastrous outcomes for the retailer: over the
total range of β, his individual profits lessen by 50%. The manufacturer, however,
prefers to ignore returns, since her profits almost double (see table 5.5). Since the
asymmetric cases can be seen as a mixture of the two symmetric policies, (MC,RI) is
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improving its coordination and (MI,RC) is getting worse for a shift in logistic costs
towards the retailer. However, the performance is still under that of policy (IR).
However, (MC,RI) almost closes up to the level of (IR). As experienced in chapter
4, the retailer suffers under the burden of additional returned item costs, whereas
the manufacturer can benefit. The graphs for PR(MI,RC) and PR(MC,RI) show
the continuous declining of profits for the retailer. For the manufacturer, the graphs
for PM(MI,RC) and PM(MC,RI) outline rising profits for higher magnitudes of
β. Regarding the asymmetric policies and the respective graphs in table 5.5, it is
observable that the player that considers returns in his optimization process has the
dominant influence on total supply chain profits. If the retailer bears more of the
costs associated with returned items, the optimized wholesale price is declining under
policy (MC,RI). According to intuition, order quantities are increasing, what is a
direct consequence of lower retail and wholesale prices. For (MI,RC), of course, the
wholesale price remains constant and, since the retailer considers returns, the retail
price rises to cover return costs. Hence, the order quantities decreases. The results
continue to hold true for lower or higher volumes of returns, with respectively less or
more accentuated variations.
Different Production Costs
Since the level of production costs, along with overall customer returns and the
share of logistic costs, is of paramount importance for the marginal revenue for the
manufacturer’s profits, they determine whether the asymmetric decision policies are
optimal for the supply chain players.
Table 5.3 presents the sensitivity analysis for the production costs c and varying
return rates α. Further, we use the parameters specified for the base case. When in-
creasing the manufacturing costs, the dynamics of the asymmetric settings are similar




c 0.5 1 2 3 0.5 1 2 3
w∗ 1.82 2.25 3.03 3.79 1.78 2.18 2.92 3.64
r∗ 3.72 3.93 4.27 4.57 3.71 3.91 4.23 4.52
Q∗ 3.92 2.74 1.27 0.44 3.92 2.81 1.37 0.54
ΠM 4.6187 2.9735 1.0363 0.2317 4.4803 2.8690 0.9827 0.2084
ΠR 3.4344 2.1134 0.7158 0.1540 3.5857 2.2990 0.8532 0.2224
ΠT 8.0531 5.0869 1.7522 0.3857 8.0660 5.1680 1.8358 0.4308
α = 0.1
c 0.5 1 2 3 0.5 1 2 3
w∗ 1.87 2.32 3.15 3.97 1.780 2.180 2.920 3.640
r∗ 3.75 3.96 4.32 4.64 3.720 3.913 4.238 4.522
Q∗ 3.77 2.58 1.10 0.31 3.793 2.710 1.313 0.508
ΠM 4.0548 2.5121 0.7747 0.1302 3.8033 2.3217 0.6661 0.0686
ΠR 2.9764 1.7627 0.5252 0.0822 3.2914 2.0998 0.7721 0.1992
ΠT 7.0312 4.2748 1.2999 0.2124 7.0947 4.4215 1.4382 0.2678
α = 0.2
c 0.5 1 2 3 0.5 1 2 3
w∗ 2.00 2.50 3.48 4.42 1.780 2.180 2.920 3.640
r∗ 3.81 4.05 4.45 4.80 3.740 3.930 4.249 4.530
Q∗ 3.39 2.19 0.72 0.09 3.517 2.489 1.186 0.450
ΠM 2.9132 1.6194 0.3433 0.0173 2.5152 1.2994 0.0983 -0.1710
ΠR 2.0820 1.1082 0.2118 0.0093 2.7219 1.7172 0.6187 0.1559
ΠT 4.9952 2.7276 0.5552 0.0266 5.2371 3.0166 0.7170 -0.0151
α = 0.3
c 0.5 1 2 3 0.5 1 2 3
w∗ 2.20 2.80 3.95 - 1.780 2.180 2.920 3.640
r∗ 3.91 4.18 4.63 - 3.763 3.949 4.263 4.539
Q∗ 2.86 1.63 0.33 - 3.213 2.248 1.051 0.391
ΠM 1.7964 0.8310 0.0795 - 1.3329 0.3919 -0.3724 -0.3535
ΠR 1.2316 0.5183 0.0402 - 2.1813 1.3586 0.4782 0.1172
ΠT 3.0280 1.3493 0.1197 - 3.5142 1.7505 0.1058 -0.2364
Table 5.3. Asymmetric Settings for Different Production Costs and Rates of Returns
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Figure 5.5. Comparison of Manufacturer’s and Retailer’s Performance under De-
centralized Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies over the Range of β
the vendor, she reacts with increased wholesale prices in order to bolster her declining
margins, what leads to the impacts on retail prices and order quantities as described
earlier. Consequently, the lower wholesale price is given to create an incentive for the
retailer to raise his marginal revenue and thus allows him to increase his order quan-
tity. Comparing both order quantities QIR∗ and QCR∗ in the asymmetric settings,
we examine that the difference between the two is small but increasing with higher
production costs and return rates. The same holds true for the optimized selling price
r∗.
Over the feasible region for α and with the share of logistic costs β = 0.05 figure
5.3 shows that policy (MC,RI) is always inferior to (MI,RC) in terms of supply
chain profits. Contrary to this, the latter relationship is not true for all conditions
within the sensitivity analysis for c. The respective cases are highlighted in bold in
table 5.3. However, the initial observance allows us to conclude that this happens
solely due to the change in production costs, what seems to have erratic influences
on the performance of the asymmetric settings.
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Observe that for rising return rates and especially for increased production costs,
the retailer’s performance is better under setting (MI,RC). However, for low rates
of returns and costs, the manufacturer also performs better than the retailer if he
ignores returns. On one hand, this results certainly from lower return cost, whereas
on the other hand, sunk production expenses lead to the mentioned improvements
in revenue, making her more flexible in her optimizations. Both issues finally put
the manufacturer in the position to optimize the supply chain better in her interests,
since she can offer a greater incentive scheme to the retailer. Omitted values in table
5.3 are due to the non-existence of the policy since one player faces negative profits
when considering product returns.
Different Reverse Logistic Costs
Total profits for each of the agents and of the total supply chain for different
reverse logistic costs l, for respective combinations of α and β, are shown in table 5.4.
We consider total return volumes of 5% and 20% and share of logistic costs β of 5%
or 95%, respectively, when either the manufacturer or the retailer faces most of the
costs associated with returned items. Furthermore, the deviations in percent of total
profits for settings (MC,RI) and (MI,RC) compared to the respective decentralized
symmetric policies are presented. As stated in the asymmetric optimization process
in chapter 3, we consider the manufacturer to have the initial part in the optimization
process, that is, if she considers returns, policies (MC,RI) and (CR) and respectively,
if she ignores returns, (MI,RC) and (IR) are compared, respectively. Table 5.1
reveals that (IR) performs always better than both asymmetric policies and (CR)
is always worse. However, the differences between the respective policies decline or




α β ΠM ΠR ΠT %∆ to (CR) ΠM ΠR ΠT %∆ to (IR)
total logistic costs l = 0.5
5 % 5 % 3.133 2.225 5.358 1.80% 3.034 2.307 5.341 -1.90%
5 % 95 % 3.183 2.254 5.437 2.54% 3.041 2.258 5.299 -2.71%
20 % 5 % 2.183 1.455 3.638 6.55% 1.893 1.748 3.641 -8.32%
20 % 95 % 2.353 1.449 3.803 9.33% 1.934 1.571 3.505 -12.52%
total logistic costs l = 1
5 % 5 % 3.078 2.276 5.354 1.80% 2.979 2.305 5.284 -1.93%
5 % 95 % 3.179 2.200 5.379 3.31% 2.994 2.206 5.201 -3.56%
20 % 5 % 1.984 1.338 3.322 6.52% 1.694 1.737 3.431 -8.32%
20 % 95 % 2.313 1.273 3.586 11.95% 1.780 1.396 3.176 -17.02%
total logistic costs l = 2
5 % 5 % 2.974 2.113 5.087 1.92% 2.869 2.299 5.168 -2.01%
5 % 95 % 3.169 2.144 5.313 4.79% 2.900 2.105 5.005 -5.33%
20 % 5 % 1.619 1.108 2.728 6.43% 1.299 1.717 3.017 -8.13%
20 % 95 % 2.207 0.950 3.158 15.51% 1.488 1.082 2.570 -26.93%
total logistic costs l = 3
5 % 5 % 2.870 2.083 4.953 1.98% 2.760 2.294 5.053 -2.08%
5 % 95 % 3.159 2.060 5.218 6.26% 2.808 2.007 4.814 -7.15%
20 % 5 % 1.298 0.883 2.181 6.41% 0.910 1.697 2.607 -7.69%
20 % 95 % 2.095 0.551 2.645 17.64% 1.219 0.814 2.033 -38.11%
Table 5.4. Wholesale contract under Stochastic and Price-dependent Demand: Prof-
its of Manufacturer, Retailer and Total Supply Chain for different logistic Costs, l,
and Shares, β and Return Volumes α
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• (MC,RI) is outperforming (CR). For rising logistic costs l and values of β and
α, total profits in policy (MI,RC) are dropping faster than in the respective
policy (IR). This relation is a direct effect of lower order quantities (due to
the rising costs of returns) submitted by the retailer. For the retailer, order
quantities are primarily a consequence of transmitted wholesale prices of the
vendor who, on her part, reacts on return costs as well.
• For high logistic costs, that are mostly carried by the manufacturer (β = 0.05),
the supply chain is better off under (MI,RC). Giving the retailer the burden
to cover return costs (β = 0.95) has either extremely positive (MC,RI) or
extremely negative (MI,RC) effects on the asymmetric system-wide profits.
We also observe that setting (MC,RI) is steadily improving its coordination
for rising costs of returns. Policy (MI,RC) is experiencing less coordination.
• The only case in which the retailer faces better profits as the vendor is, if return
volumes are high and the associated costs are borne by the latter.
• The detrimental effects of high return rates along with high reverse supply chain
costs are visible.
Positive Unsold Item Values
We continue our analysis by examining positive values v and vr for unsold and
returned items. Since the manufacturer does not provide a buy-back option yet, left-
over inventory at the end of the selling period remains with the retailer. Returned
items from the customer still go back to the vendor for possible salvaging, refurbish-
ment or ulterior use. In the following, we consider two combinations of v and vr:
1. {v, vr = v2} and 2. {v, vr = v}. For the upcoming tables and figures we use the



















































under Stochastic and Price-dependent Demand for varying Return Rates
and β = 0.95
From figure 5.6 we gain the expected results that rising salvage values lead to
a better performance of both players and the total supply chain. Just as under
stochastic demand, the costs of returns are reduced by positive returned item salvage
values. We also find the retail and wholesale price to be decreasing for higher v and
vr. In fact, the inter-dependencies of order amounts, resale and wholesale prices in the
system suggest that lower wholesale prices are initiated by higher transmitted order
amounts of the retailer, which he can realize because of reduced reverse logistic costs.
As a consequence, the retailer can lower his selling price what attracts more customers
as well. As mentioned, a significant difference in the retailer’s optimization under a
wholesale contract is, that he can consider the value of unsold items (case (MI,RC))
to benefit him. Thus, for rising salvage values, we find higher order amounts when the
retailer ignores returns in his optimization process. However, this fact is supported
by lower wholesale prices of the vendor. Under the premise of ignoring returns, the
costs of returns are partly absorbed by the salvage values. This allows him to be
partly better off under policy (MC,RI) when he faces the bigger part of return costs.
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(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
v vr ΠM ΠR ΠT ΠM ΠR ΠT
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 1.81 1.32 3.12 1.59 2.03 3.63
0.8 0.4 2.08 1.61 3.69 2.02 2.42 4.44
1.2 0.6 2.52 2.25 4.77 2.66 3.04 5.70
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 2.46 1.15 3.61 1.81 1.30 3.11
0.8 0.4 2.82 1.54 4.35 2.25 1.58 3.83
1.2 0.6 3.41 2.38 5.78 2.93 2.03 4.96
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 1.89 1.35 3.24 1.69 2.03 3.72
0.8 0.8 2.27 1.77 4.04 2.23 2.42 4.65
1.2 1.2 2.88 2.61 5.49 3.03 3.04 6.07
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 2.57 1.20 3.77 1.88 1.30 3.18
0.8 0.8 3.07 1.69 4.76 2.42 1.58 3.99
1.2 1.2 3.88 2.73 6.62 3.23 2.03 5.26
Table 5.5. Asymmetric Supply Chain Performance for Positive Item Salvage Values
(v, vr = v) and (v, vr =
v
2
) under Different Shares of Reverse Logistic Costs
We also find policy (MC,RI) to be inferior to (MI,RC) for low rates of β, whereas
it is vice versa for higher magnitudes of the latter coefficient. This is basically an
extension of our findings up to now under stochastic and price-dependent demand.
Considering the individual profits of the supply chain agents, the gap between the
asymmetric policies as well as between the players itself decreases with rising salvage
values. This aspect is even more noticeable when costs for returned items are shifted
differently between the players. (see table 5.5).
Change in Market Parameters
Finally, we present the robustness of our results when changing market conditions
occur. Within the considered model, total market demand D(r) = b × (r − k) is
depending on the variables b < 0 and k > r. Therefore, k represents the total size
of the market, whereas b describes the demand elasticity of the market. The demand
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elasticity is decreasing in k: E(r) = − r∗D′(r)
D(r)
= − r
r−k . In table 5.6 we present three
cases of changed market environments. Besides the base scenario (b=-3, k=5), two
additional scenarios with respectively half or double the market size and elasticity
than in the base case are compared. For these market data, the optimal individual
and system-wide profits under asymmetric settings is presented when varying overall
return volumes, reverse logistic costs and share of them.
We observe that for the values under both asymmetric settings, reducing the
elasticity and increasing the size of the market results throughout in higher profits,
whereas reduced profits are found under smaller markets and higher elasticity. The
results for changed values of the elasticity represent the economic theory, which pro-
poses to make less profits when consumers are more price sensitive. The specified
return rates influence profits as we have examined it in the previous sensitivity anal-
ysis. We also find both policies to be better off if β is higher. However, differences
are only marginally. Also, we observe that α has a stronger influence on profits than
logistic costs in both settings. This last comprehensive sensitivity analysis allows us
to state that the result of the retailer being better off than the manufacturer in setting
(MI,RC) (compare table 5.1) is (almost) only valid for our initial base case setting.
Consequently, changing the diverse model parameters allow the manufacturer to ab-
solutely outperform the retailer, what is similar to findings under stochastic demand.
5.2 Buy-Back Contract
For both supply chain agents, buy-back contracts help mitigating the risk associ-
ated with consumer returns. Additionally, costs occurring due to consumer returns
are balanced more equally among both players. In the last chapter, we have con-
ducted numerical studies in order to show possible supply chain coordination that
can be reached with buy-back rebates. In doing so, a severe shift of profits amongst
the players became observable which arises because the manufacturer is egoistically
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(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
α = 0.05 α = 0.35 α = 0.05 α = 0.35
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
β = 0.05
ΠM 3.08 2.87 0.94 - 2.98 2.76 0.59 0.23
ΠR 2.28 2.08 0.55 - 2.30 2.29 1.22 0.12
ΠT 5.35 4.95 1.49 - 5.28 5.05 1.81 0.36
b = -3 β = 0.95
k = 5 ΠM 3.18 3.16 1.31 0.24 2.99 2.81 0.80 -
ΠR 2.20 2.06 0.31 0.15 2.21 2.01 0.73 -
ΠT 5.38 5.22 1.62 0.39 5.20 4.81 1.54 -
β = 0.05
ΠM 9.66 9.38 5.03 3.27 9.40 9.10 4.08 2.39
ΠR 7.26 7.02 3.23 2.15 7.27 7.25 4.02 3.93
ΠT 16.93 16.40 8.26 5.42 16.66 16.36 8.10 6.32
b = -1.5 β = 0.95
k = 10 ΠM 9.80 9.77 5.80 5.08 9.42 9.18 4.24 2.98
ΠR 7.17 7.03 3.05 1.27 7.14 6.86 3.28 2.00
ΠT 16.96 16.80 8.84 6.36 16.56 16.04 7.52 4.98
β = 0.05
ΠM 0.52 0.42 0.01 0.00 0.49 0.38 -0.28 -0.79
ΠR 0.36 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.42 0.21 0.18
ΠT 0.88 0.71 0.01 0.00 0.92 0.80 -0.08 -0.61
b = -6 β = 0.95
k = 2.5 ΠM 0.57 0.55 0.00 - 0.50 0.41 -0.01 -
ΠR 0.36 0.27 -0.17 - 0.38 0.28 0.03 -
ΠT 0.93 0.82 -0.17 - 0.88 0.69 0.02 -
Table 5.6. Behavior of the Asymmetric Policies under Different Market Parameters.
α = {0.05, 0.35}, β = {0.05, 0.95} and l = {1, 3}
72
maximizing her profits. In addition, Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] present
an analytical solution which also coordinates the system, but, more important, can
distribute profits almost equally between the players.
For the case of stochastic and price-dependent demand, it is not possible to re-
ceive closed-form expressions because most of the parameters in the manufacturer’s
expected profit function depend on s and therefore, the expression for the derivative is
not obtainable easily. Ignoring returns and facing a multi-retailer environment, Bern-
stein and Federgruen (2005) [3] also find that buy-back contracts are not suitable
to ensure supply chain coordination. Emmons and Gilbert as well as Ruiz Ben´ıtez
and Muriel (2007) [42] conduct calculatory analyses in order to show the effects of
buy-back contracts. When ignoring consumer returns, the former show that there
exists a threshold value, say wt, for the wholesale price ,and thus a buy-back price
of s > 0, after which both players are indeed benefitting from buy-back contracts,
whereas the same results are retrieved by the latter when considering returns in the
optimization process. When excluding returns, Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42]
obtain that the positive effects of a buy-back option no longer exists for all pairs of
(w, s).
In the following, we evaluate the effects of consumer returns on the asymmetric
cases by solving the manufacturer’s problem numerically and show the impacts of
consumer returns on the individual agent’s and total supply chain profits. Further, we
present sensitivity analysis regarding the impacts of changing environmental variables,
such as overall return rates, logistic costs, the share of them between the players and
positive product salvage values as well as production costs in order to maintain our
general observances. Additionally, we vary the parameters of the considered market,
i.e. b and k. Note that b and k can be seen according to the parameters of µ and
λ under stochastic demand. Of course, optimal order quantities as well as wholesale




(CR) %∆ (IR) %∆ (MC,RI) %∆ (MI,RC) %∆
w∗ 3.34 25.1% 2.99 27.1% 3.34 25.1% 2.99 27.1%
s∗ 2.84 - 2.49 - 2.84 - 2.49 -
r∗ 4.32 5.7% 4.13 5.6% 4.29 5.8% 4.16 5.5%
Q∗ 2.47 25.5% 3.63 19.8% 2.79 21.4% 3.27 23.9%
ΠM 1.857 24.0% 1.769 10.4% 1.792 9.6% 1.712 24.1%
ΠR 0.942 -21.1% 1.481 -13.2% 0.932 -18.9% 1.493 -15.0%
ΠT 2.799 8.8% 3.250 -0.4% 2.724 -0.1% 3.205 5.9%
Table 5.7. Comparison of the Decentralized Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies
under Wholesale and Buy-Back Contracts
Table 5.7 shows the equilibrium values for all decentralized policies. Additionally,
the percent differences (referring to the left cell of it) between the considered policy
under a wholesale contract and a buy-back contract are included. Note that for the
centralized system a buy-back option is not available. Thus, the system-wide profit
of 3.71 of the centralized symmetric policy (CR) presented in table 5.1 on page 56
remains the best coordinated solution of the considered supply chain.
For the asymmetric settings, an improvement of supply chain coordination is pos-
sible with a buy-back contract, just as in the decentralized cases (CR) and (IR).
Although coordination is not reached with buy-back rebates, the asymmetric setting
(MI,RC) is close to the decentralized benchmark policy of (IR). However, its total
profits have declined marginally compared to the wholesale contract (−0.4%). The
development of profits of both players and of the total supply chain under a whole-
sale contract (s = 0) and under a buy-back option is shown in figure 5.7. We find
threshold values, indicated as w′ and w′′ on the abscissas, from where on both players
are better off (blue and purple lines). The total supply chain is never better off (red
lines). Moreover, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price in order to egoistically
maximize his profits and therefore puts the retailer into a worse position.
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In short, we examine the following for the asymmetric settings in the base case
specifications under a buy-back rebate:
• Coordination is not reached under asymmetric settings. The gained results from
table 5.7 show that the profits of the players and of the total supply chain are
either within the range or only slightly off of values from policies (CR) and (IR).
Decision variables however, have higher magnitudes compared to the wholesale
contract.
• We observe relations for the optimal decision values: the buy-back value s∗ is
s∗ = w∗− c
2
. With the findings of Granot and Yin (2005) [22] and the extension





and thus s∗ = k
2
.
• After certain threshold values, both players can, as in the decentralized sym-
metric policies, be better off than if simply provided with a wholesale contract.
• As under stochastic demand, the manufacturer rakes most of the profits in the
system. However, the profit shift observed under stochastic and price-dependent
demand is not that severe.
The mentioned percent differences allow us to explicitly notice the effects of a
buy-back contract. As already stated, buy-back rebates partly hedge the retailer
against low demand. In other words, he orders more units to be able to satisfy more
demand, whereas the higher risk to overstock is mitigated by the buy-back option
offered by the manufacturer. Since this thought of the retailer drives his order de-
cision predominantly under a buy-back contract, the manufacturer can consequently
exploit this fact in her optimization process. Figure 5.7 states that under stochastic
and price-dependent demand the manufacturer’s profits indeed rise with buy-back
options, regardless of the policy considered. The reason is a combination of the fol-










































Figure 5.7. Performance of the Asymmetric Cases under a Wholesale and a Buy-
Back Contract for Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand in the Base Case Setting.
higher. The latter happens because it is compensating the buy-back offer and, more
important, the vendor takes her part of increased retailer profits. According to earlier
observances in this thesis, the retailer reacts in higher purchase costs w with higher
retail prices r. However, the percent difference stated for w and Q is roughly be-
tween 20% and 30%. The retail price, in turn, only goes up by a comparably small
percentage of about 5%. Since the retailer’s and manufacturer’s income is mainly
driven by r∗ ×Q∗ and w∗ ×Q∗, it becomes clear that under buy-back contracts, it is
the manufacturer who rakes most of the (additional) profits. Considering the effects
of returns, in the base case only 20% of the goods sold are returned, what means,
the latter finding is not changed throughout the base cases. In order to study the
effects of returns on this issue, we vary α below. As a consequence, the retailer is
worse off under any decentralized policy if he accepts the buy-back option from the
vendor. The absolute values of both supply chain players in tables 5.1 and 5.7 show,
that the manufacturer can considerably increase his profits in the settings (CR) and
(MI,RC). Aside from the incentive scheme of the retailer, the vendor benefits from
an (on a percentage basis) even higher transmitted order quantity, what is the re-
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action on return costs by the former. If the retailer ignores returns in his decision
process, the absolute increase in the manufacturer’s profits is smaller. As a result,
the level of the manufacturer’s profits in both, asymmetric and symmetric policies, is
aligning. Coordination, as mentioned, is not reached due to the weak performances
of the retailer.
5.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In the upcoming sensitivity analysis, we aim at comparing the buy-back rebate
with the wholesale contract under stochastic and price-dependent demand and a
constant return rate of total goods sold for the case of asymmetric decision making.
Profits, optimal order quantities as well as retail and wholesale prices are examined.
As buy-back rebates are an option to improve coordination of the system, we are
studying changes to the results of a wholesale contract and draw conclusions for the
players whether they would benefit from a buy-back contract or not under asymmetric
decision making. We shall see that coordination is never reached and therefore the
symmetric policy (CR) remains optimal in terms of total supply chain profits.
Different Constant Return Rates
Firstly, we look at different rates for returned products α. Table 5.8 shows the
equilibrium values for the considered asymmetric policies (MC,RI) and (MI,RC)
under a wholesale and buy-back option, whereas the impact of more returned items on
optimal order amounts and prices is equivalently. Further, the relationships between
the latter variables is as outlined above. Under the premise that a player considers
returns in his optimization process, raising rates of returns, i.e higher reverse logistic
costs, lead to higher magnitudes in their relevant decision variables in order to bolster
against the negative effects of returned items. Of course, in case of the manufacturer
ignoring returns, his decision variables remain unchanged. Since the retailer adjust
his retail price by rising it, order quantities are decreasing. Unaltered to the initially
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Wholesale Buy-Back
(MC,RI) (MI,RC) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
α = 0.05
w∗ 2.24 2.18 3.06 3.00
s∗ - - 2.54 2.50
r∗ 3.93 3.91 4.16 4.14
Q∗ 2.77 2.81 3.41 3.53
α = 0.2
w∗ 2.50 2.18 3.34 3.00
s∗ - - 2.84 2.50
r∗ 4.05 3.93 4.29 4.16
Q∗ 2.19 2.49 2.79 3.25
α = 0.35
w∗ 3.00 2.18 3.74 3.00
s∗ - - 3.22 2.50
r∗ 4.26 3.96 4.48 4.19
Q∗ 1.31 2.12 1.84 2.90
Table 5.8. Decision Variables of the Asymmetric Supply Chains provided with a
Buy-Back Contract for different Return Rates α
retrieved results for buy-back contracts, the option to take back left over inventory at
the end of the selling period leads to higher magnitudes in the considered parameters
as well. The effects of changing return rates on total and individual supply chain
profits in the asymmetric settings are studied in the following. We also find that
coordination is not reached.
Different Total Logistic Costs and Shares
Total logistic costs and the division of them among the supply chain players di-
rectly affect their profit margins. We vary the return volume α, the share of logistic
costs β and the total logistic costs k between [5%; 35%], [0.05; 0.95] and [1; 3], respec-
tively. Table 5.9 presents the sensitivity analysis in the latter mentioned parameters
and shows optimal profits for the supply chain players and the total system in case of
asymmetric optimization. Furthermore, the percent difference of total profits to the
system under a wholesale contract is shown.
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(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
α β ΠM ΠR ΠT %∆ to Wholesale ΠM ΠR ΠT %∆ to Wholesale
total logistic costs l = 1
5 % 5 % 3.621 1.785 5.406 0.96% 3.403 1.701 5.103 -3.53%
5 % 95 % 3.719 1.788 5.507 2.32% 3.594 1.824 5.418 4.01%
20 % 5 % 2.184 1.101 3.285 -1.13% 2.148 1.515 3.663 6.33%
20 % 95 % 2.428 1.033 3.460 -3.64% 2.216 1.142 3.358 5.43%
total logistic costs l = 2
5 % 5 % 3.511 1.748 5.259 3.28% 3.473 1.922 5.396 4.22%
5 % 95 % 3.703 1.719 5.422 2.02% 3.482 1.718 5.200 3.75%
20 % 5 % 1.792 0.932 2.724 -0.13% 1.712 1.493 3.205 5.88%
20 % 95 % 2.171 0.757 2.928 -7.82% 1.848 0.810 2.658 3.30%
total logistic costs l = 3
5 % 5 % 3.403 1.701 5.103 2.96% 3.356 1.916 5.272 4.15%
5 % 95 % 3.685 1.687 5.372 2.87% 3.371 1.615 4.986 3.45%
20 % 5 % 1.446 0.739 2.185 0.19% 1.282 1.471 2.754 5.32%
20 % 95 % 1.844 0.393 2.237 -18.27% 1.488 0.538 2.026 -0.34%
Table 5.9. Equilibrium Values of the Asymmetric Settings for different α, β and l,
and Percent Differences to a Wholesale Contract.
For the considered values in both asymmetric settings, buy-back contracts (mostly)
improve the coordination of the system. However, the retailer suffers under the buy-
back contract since his outcome is worse than if provided with a wholesale contract.
Consequently, it is the manufacturer that rakes the additional profits and is also in the
position to further shift supply chain profits in his interests. Again, this extends our
initial findings. Note, that if logistic costs are carried predominantly by the retailer,
the manufacturer can be worse off. Worse performances of the total system or of the
players under a buy-back contract compared to the price-only contract are highlighted
in bold in table 5.9. We also find that for low return rates (α = 0.05), system-wide
profits of (MC,RI) outperform (MI,RC), whereas for higher return rates it is vice
versa. Regarding the relative changes, the asymmetric setting (MI,RC) benefits
more from the offered option to buy back unsold items. If the retailer ignores re-
turns, rising logistic costs have ruinous effects on his profits and also on the system’s
performance, especially if he bears the lion share of costs associated with returns. For
the asymmetric settings graphs of the optimal order amounts, wholesale and retail




























Figure 5.8. Buy-Back Contract vs. Wholesale Contract: Behavior of the Decision
Variables for varying Shares of Logistic Costs under Asymmetric Decision Making
sented in figure 5.8. The results are as expected and, moreover, generalize the results
that we obtained so far. The undulation in the curves for the setting (MC,RI) are
due to rounding restrictions in the calculational process.
Positive Salvage Values
Under a wholesale contract, the bottom line is that positive salvage values for un-
sold and returned items improve both players absolute profits. Since the unsold item
stays with the retailer, this incentive allows him to order more and lowers the optimal
retail prices. As mentioned, he is partly hedged against overstocking. Equipped with
a buy-back contract, unsold items go back to the vendor, whereas she pays s for each
product. Accordingly, just as under a price-only contract positive salvage values have
the opposite effects on the supply chain’s performance than increased logistic costs,
that is α, l and partly β.
Confirming earlier results, table 5.10 shows that positive salvage values are (mostly)
improving the coordination of the asymmetric supply chain under buy-back contracts.
A declining of profits is indicated by bold numbers. The manufacturer’s performance
80
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
v vr ΠM ΠR ΠT ΠM ΠR ΠT
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 18.98% -16.29% 4.11% 35.39% -14.02% 7.71%
0.8 0.4 40.22% -10.23% 18.21% 39.29% -12.11% 11.29%
1.2 0.6 59.10% -8.54% 27.19% 46.68% -14.31% 14.16%
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 5.43% -16.80% -1.64% 25.95% -25.10% 4.57%
0.8 0.4 32.29% -15.93% 15.27% 29.77% -21.51% 8.64%
1.2 0.6 45.93% -21.02% 18.40% 34.34% -21.15% 11.65%
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 18.23% -15.34% 4.22% 33.90% -14.02% 7.71%
0.8 0.8 36.83% -12.98% 15.01% 36.23% -12.11% 11.09%
1.2 1.2 51.18% -14.96% 19.74% 40.99% -14.31% 13.32%
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 5.83% -18.43% -1.91% 25.07% -25.10% 4.53%
0.8 0.8 28.21% -15.75% 12.61% 27.97% -21.51% 8.43%
1.2 1.2 38.06% -25.56% 11.77% 30.99% -21.15% 10.88%
Table 5.10. Positive Unsold Item Values: Percent Differences of the Asymmetric
Settings under a Buy-Back Contract compared to a Price-Only Contract
is considerably better than compared to the wholesale contract. On the other side,
the retailer faces a severe declining of his profits.
This is explained as follows: Both, a buy-back option, and positive salvage values,
propose incentive schemes to the players. The former hedges the retailer against
demand and the latter mitigates the financial charges that occur due to unsold or
returned items. In other words, the rise in the order quantity is due to the buy-back
offer and due to positive salvage values. As we find higher order amounts and lower
wholesale prices, retail prices decrease as well. Under buy-back contracts, in total, the
effects of positive salvage values on profits are stronger as changes in α, β or l. Table
5.11 presents the total absolute profits of the policies (MC,RI) and (MI,RC). For
the latter setting, the better outcome is reached if the retailer has the major burden of
dealing with return costs, whereas the former setting performs better for lower shares
of logistic costs β. Concluding, positive salvage values lead directly (buy-back rebate)
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(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
v vr ΠT ΠT
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 3.25 3.91
1.2 0.6 6.07 6.50
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 3.55 3.25
1.2 0.6 6.85 5.54
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 3.38 4.01
1.2 1.2 6.57 6.88
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 3.70 3.32
1.2 1.2 7.39 5.83
Table 5.11. Positive Unsold Item Values: Total Profits of the Asymmetric Settings
under a Buy-Back Contract
and indirectly (positive v allows the manufacturer to lower w) to a “double-incentive”
for the retailer to order more items. The manufacturer systematically exploits this
fact by shifting the division of total supply chain’s profits in her interest.
Change in Market Parameters
Externally given market variables directly affect the performance of the supply
chain. As we observed in section (5.1.1), the manufacturer’s and retailer’s profits
ameliorate or decline according to the change in market demand. Neither of them is
in the position to rake more profits in different market sizes or for different market
elasticities. This holds true under a buy-back contract as well. Table 5.12 shows
the relative performance of the vendor and retailer and of the total system. Omitted
values are due to the fact that the policy is not existing (one player facing negative
profits when considering returns) or because of negative values that lead to unrea-
sonable percentages. The results are as follows:
• Due to the influence of buy-back contracts on the division of profits, in all
considered markets the retailer is worse and the manufacturer better off than
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(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
α = 0.05 α = 0.35 α = 0.05 α = 0.35
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
b = -3 ΠM 17.63% 18.57% -19.74% - 20.47% 21.60% 41.02% -
k = 5 ΠR -21.56% -18.34% -8.08% - -16.35% -16.45% -8.28% -
ΠT 0.97% 3.05% -15.42% - 4.41% 4.33% 7.71% -
b = -1.5 ΠM 19.36% 19.93% 0.53% -1.28% 22.20% 22.86% 34.08% 47.71%
k = 10 ΠR -20.85% -19.15% -13.85% -7.50% -18.27% -18.31% -7.59% -8.07%
ΠT 2.10% 3.19% -5.09% -3.75% 4.55% 4.60% 13.39% 12.99%
b = -6 ΠM 15.35% 16.87% - - 18.81% 22.25% -7.53% -7.81%
k = 2.5 ΠR -19.05% -16.45% - - -17.59% -17.94% -14.40% -18.76%
ΠT 1.16% 3.18% - - 1.89% 1.05% 66.46% 15.55%
Table 5.12. Change in Exogenous Market Settings: Relative Performance of To-
tal Profits in the Asymmetric Settings under a Buy-Back Contract compared to a
Wholesale Contract
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
α = 0.05 α = 0.35 α = 0.05 α = 0.35
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
w* 3.05 3.09 3.51 - 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
b = -3 s* 2.54 2.59 3.01 - 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.49
k = 5 r* 4.16 4.18 4.37 - 4.13 4.14 4.17 4.20
Q* 3.46 3.39 2.39 - 3.56 3.55 2.98 2.86
w* 5.54 5.56 6.00 6.47 5.48 5.48 5.48 5.48
b = -1.5 s* 5.03 5.05 5.50 5.96 4.98 4.98 4.98 4.98
k = 10 r* 7.95 7.96 8.17 8.40 7.93 7.93 7.99 8.02
Q* 5.08 5.05 4.46 3.79 5.12 5.11 4.60 4.53
w* 1.80 1.84 - - 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75
b = -6 s* 1.30 1.33 - - 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
k = 2.5 r* 2.22 2.24 - - 2.21 2.21 2.23 2.25
Q* 1.52 1.36 - - 1.63 1.62 1.21 1.07
Table 5.13. Change in Exogenous Market Settings: Absolute Performance of Deci-
sion Variables in the Asymmetric Settings
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under a wholesale contract. However, for high return volumes, the vendor can
be worse off as well.
• Except for high magnitudes of α in setting (MC,RI), the total supply chain
performs better with a buy-back option than if equipped with a simple price-
only contract.
• Table 5.13 shows that policy (MC,RI) results higher wholesale and retail prices,
w∗ and s∗, and buy-back prices s∗. Consequently, the order quantity Q∗ set by
the retailer is lower. However, total profits are either better in setting (MI,RC)
or (MC,RI), depending on the respective parameters, whereas no rule is ob-
servable. This matches with the findings under a wholesale contract.
5.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigated asymmetric decision making under stochastic and
price-dependent demand at the retail level. We could extend some of the findings
in chapter 4 to stochastic and price-dependent demand, whereas we also observed
different results:
Results retrieved under a Wholesale Price-Only Contract
1. Under stochastic and price-dependent demand performances of the asymmetric
settings (MI,RC) and (MC,RI) are in between the range of the decentralized
symmetric policies. Thus, supply chain coordination is not achieved.
2. Contrary to under stochastic demand, higher total profits are found in setting
(MI,RC). The retailer also outperforms the vendor in this case. Note that
under stochastic demand, the retailer does not outperform the latter in the
base case setting.
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3. In a specific asymmetric setting, one and only one player is better off than in
both symmetric cases, as opposed to the other player who is facing worse profits.
4. Sensitivity analysis shows that a change in the model parameters does not lead
to coordination of the asymmetric settings. In other words, the centralized
symmetric policy (CR) is not outperformed. However, varying respective pa-
rameter leads to different effects on the outcome of the asymmetric settings.
In general, we are able to extend the findings of the work of Ruiz Ben´ıtez and
Muriel (2007) [42] for stochastic and price-dependent demand with a constant
return rate:
• Higher overall return volumes α generally lessen system-wide performances
in both asymmetric cases.
• (MC,RI) improves its coordination and (MI,RC) is getting worse for a
shift in logistic costs to the retailer.
• Setting (MC,RI) is steadily improving its coordination for rising costs of
returns, whereas policy (MI,RC) is experiencing less coordination.
• Positive salvage values and bigger markets with less fluctuations lead to
rising profits. Coordination, however, is not reached.
Results retrieved under a Buy-Back Contract
1. When provided with a buy-back contract, coordination is not reached under any
asymmetric setting if demand is stochastic and price-dependent. Profits of the
players and of the total supply chain are either within the range or only slightly
off the values from the decentralized policies (CR) and (IR). After certain
threshold values of the wholesale price, however, both players can benefit form
a buy-back option.
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2. Decision variables have higher magnitudes compared to the wholesale contract
and, as under stochastic demand, the manufacturer rakes most of the profits
in the system. The retailer faces worse profits than if provided with a whole-
sale contract. However, the profit shift observed under stochastic and price-
dependent demand is not that severe.
3. Granot and Yin (2005) [22] present a relationship between wholesale and buy-
back price in their work. Extended to a linear demand curve, this relationship
still holds true for the the asymmetric settings. That is, s∗ = w∗− c
2
and s∗ = k
2
.
4. Sensitivity Analysis further generalized the findings of the base case:
• Whether coordination in setting (MC,RI) or (MI,RC) is better depends
on the parameter specifications
• For high return volumes, the vendor can be worse off than under a whole-
sale contract as well.
• Positive salvage values have the same effects as under a wholesale contract.
• In the three considered markets, the retailer is worse and the manufacturer
better off than under a wholesale contract.
• The total supply chain (mostly) performs better with a buy-back option
than if equipped with a simple price-only contract.
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CHAPTER 6
PRICE DEPENDENT RETURN RATES
So far, we assumed consumer returns to be a constant rate of total sold items,
i.e. α = 0.2. However, regarding diverse kinds of consumer products and also the
corresponding prices, it is intuitive that return rates and prices are correlated. Costly
products are more likely to be returned than inexpensive ones due to the reason
that consumers are more sensitive to higher expenditures. For example, a too noisy
microwave is probably be more often returned if the price is very high, whereas if it
is a bargain, consumers might just accept it. Another explanation is given by the
fact that relaxed return policies allow customers to return a product without any
question asked. Some consumers - especially when items are more expensive - buy
a certain product when they need it, use it, and then return it as soon as they are
finished with the respective work. Anderson et al. (2006) [1] shows through empirical
evidence that customer return rates increase with the price paid. In consequence, the
return function α(r) can be described using the exponential type, which reflects the
fact that returns grow faster than the prices of goods. The function we consider for











with the parameters a > 0 and d > 0. D represents the general shape of the return
function. That is d > 1 models disproportionately high returns, d < 1 dispropor-
tionately low ones and d = 1 stands for linearly growing consumer returns in the
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retail price. A controls the speed in which consumer returns grow in r. Note that
for linear and exponential return functions in the base case settings, a = 1 is tan-
tamount to having returned all sold items regardless of the retail price, since we
require r > w > c = 1. In fact, a ≥ 1 is just the mathematical constraint to en-
sure the correctness of the considered formula. For a meaningful problem, we require
a ∈ [35, 90].
The general functions, introduced in section 3.3, after which manufacturer and
retailer find their optimal profits and decision variables remain unchanged. However,
the constant return rate α is substituted by the variable one α(r). Note that when
considering returns, the retailer’s optimal selling price is depending on the return
rate, which is depending on r itself. This fact makes it even more difficult to receive
closed-form expression and perform analytical work. As a result, it is not easy to
show that the order quantity decreases when both players include returns in their
optimization process. Thus, for stochastic and price-dependent demand with price-
sensitive returns we resort again to calculational studies to analyze the performance
of the supply chains in the symmetric and asymmetric settings. Results show that for
price-dependent returns the order-quantity decreases when considering returns. For
similar reasons proves for the convexity of the diverse profit functions are extremely
difficult, whereas our calculations show that the found optima are unique and, hence,
convexity is still given. Moreover, the dependency of overall consumer returns on the
retail price arranges for a stronger decrease than under a constant return rate. For
the following numerical experiments an exhaustive approach is used, i.e. the manu-
facturers searches her best performance under all valid tuples (w,s) of the wholesale
and buy-back price.
As under stochastic demand, the main objective of the computational work is
to evaluate the effects of customer returns on optimal supply chain profits, optimal
ordering quantities, wholesale and retail prices and buy-back rebates. However, for
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the case of price-dependent returns predominantly the symmetric policies, that is
(CR) and (IR), are of importance, as they haven’t been studied yet in existing
literature. Nevertheless, we present the asymmetric cases and examine its behavior
and the differences to the symmetric settings. The considered policies are the same as
described in chapter 3, whereas the policies (IR) and (CR) represent the decentralized
symmetric decision making policies:
• Policy (CR): Decision variables for both players are calculated taking into
account the expected consumer returns that occur at the retail level.
• Policy (IR): Decision variables for manufacturer and retailer are calculated
ignoring the expected consumer returns and the expected associated costs. The
cost of returns are included a posteriori.
• Policy (MC,RI): The manufacturer is considering consumer returns in her
optimization process, whereas the retailer does not consider them.
• Policy (MI,RC): The manufacturer ignores consumer returns when optimizing
her profits. The retailer, in turn, considers them.
In order to perform computational studies, we are using the parameter specifi-
cations from the base case. Total logistic costs l, the division of them among the
players β, and production costs c are set to 2, 0.05 and 1, respectively. Both salvage
values, v and vr, are 0. As before, a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 2] is being
applied and expected demand is of the form D(r) = b(r − k) with b < 0 and r < k.
The latter restriction also limits the return rate. Figure 6.1 shows return functions
of the exponential types (d = 2) with shape parameter settings of a = {35, 70, 200}.
Since in the equilibrium of the decentralized symmetric policies, d = 2 and a = 70
are fairly equivalent to having 20% of sold goods returned, we are considering this
combination, (a, d) = (2, 70), as our base case specification for the return function in
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Figure 6.1. Different Types of Consumer Return Functions: Constant Return
Rate α = 0.2 and Price-Dependent Return Rates with Parameters d=2 and a =
{35, 70, 200}
In the following study, we first consider the simple price-only contract and con-
duct a sensitivity analysis in the model parameters to prove and widen our findings
of price-dependent return rates in the base case. We also vary the parameters a and
d as they are critical on overall return volumes and thus on reverse logistic costs. In
excess of conducted analysis in the symmetric optimization policies, we consider the
asymmetric settings as well. Differences between the latter and the former are eval-
uated, but we especially attach importance to the comparison of the performances
of symmetric and asymmetric settings with price-dependent returns rates versus con-
stant return rates. The last part of this section is dedicated to the buy-back option
again.
6.1 Wholesale Price-Only Contract
Table 6.1 shows the supply chains’ equilibrium values under stochastic and price-
dependent demand for constant and price-dependent returns, whereas we consider
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Symmetric
Constant α Price-Dependent α
(CR) (IR) (CR) (IR)
r∗ 3.46 3.27 2.95 3.27
Cent. α 20.0% 20.0% 12% 15%
Q∗ 4.90 7.22 7.03 7.22
Π 3.71 3.21 4.69 6.02
w∗ 2.5 2.18 2.28 2.18
r∗ 4.07 3.90 3.81 3.90
Decent. α 20.0% 20.0% 20.7% 21.7%
Q∗ 1.84 2.91 2.45 2.91
ΠM 1.4113 1.5848 1.3776 1.4267
ΠR 1.1409 1.6771 1.461 1.6066
ΠT 2.5522 3.2619 2.8386 3.0333
Table 6.1. Symmetric Policies: Equilibrium Values under Stochastic and Price-
Dependent Demand for Constant and Price-Dependent Returns(a=70,d=2)
the base case settings with a = 70 and d = 2. Note that the base case is constructed
to receive approximately 20% of returns in the decentralized cases. Consequently, the
return rate is lower for both centralized policies.
For the centralized policies we gain interesting results from the computational
work, which partly stand in contrast to the ones obtained under a constant return
rate:
• Most important, policy (CR) is outperformed by (IR). Obviously, when ig-
noring returns, lower total returns improve the profits above the outcome of
(CR).
• Ignoring returns induces higher order quantities Q∗ and, as opposed to a con-
stant return rate, rising retail prices r∗.
• Due to the higher retial price when ignoring returns, policy (IR) faces a higher
return percentage (also absolute due to a higher Q∗ as well) than (CR).
As for stochastic and price-dependent demand with a constant proportion of re-
turns, the decision variable r and total profit of the system is independent of the order
91
quantity. Figure 6.2 presents the outcome of policy (CR) over the feasible range of
retial prices. It also includes the reference point for the profits when the centralized























Figure 6.2. Profits and Order Quantity of the Centralized Symmetric Policy (CR)
and the Reference Point for Policy (IR) under Stochastic and Price-Dependent De-
mand with Price-Dependent Returns
For the decentralized policies result mostly confirm the findings of Ruiz Benitez
and Muriel (2007) [42] for the model with constant returns:
• Under stochastic and price-dependent demand and price-dependent returns, the
order quantity increases when consumer returns are ignored in the optimization
processes of both supply chain players.
• The optimal wholesale price, w∗, declines whereas r∗ increases when ignoring
returns. The latter fact is contrary to the results presented in the previous
chapter 5.
For the decentralized system, the optimal wholesale and retail prices as well as the
order quantity, are identical to those under a constant return rate of α = 0.2 when
ignoring returns. In turn, considering returns in the optimization process leads for
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rising wholesale prices w∗ to lower magnitudes in the order quantity and higher retail
prices. Comparing the price-dependent and constant return model, we find the gap
between the order quantities and retail prices to be decreasing for rising values of w
(see figure 6.4).
Having in mind figure 6.1, returns are less at lower selling prices r for a price-
dependent return function. As a consequence predominantly the retailer’s profit
margin is increased since he bears 95% of the total reverse logistic costs. The man-
ufacturer, in turn, benefits from the increase in ordered items by the former as well.
In other words, the fear of high return volumes and an increased demand at lower
retail prices drives the vendor to reduce his decision variable w∗ and, respectively, the
retailer to increase r∗. However, only the retailer is better off by almost 30% under
a price-dependent return rate. The manufacturer faces slightly worse profits (-2.5%).
Thus, total coordination is improved compared to the model with a constant return
rate. In policy (IR), coordination is not improved due to the simple reasons that
overall returns with 21.7% are higher, whereas the relevant decision variables of the
supply chain remain unchanged. The manufacturer faces (absolutely and relatively)
a greater reduction of profits than the retailer.
Note in figure 6.3 that after a certain threshold value total profits are better under
a constant return model. Again, this is due to the fact that high values of w imply
high return rates, which diminishes the players’ earnings and vice versa. For the
manufacturer’s performance this is true as well, whereas the retailer favors price-
dependent returns for low purchase prices w. However, the difference in profits under
the respective models (constant and price-dependent returns) is more articulated for
the manufacturer over the range of w.
Results for the asymmetric settings (MC,RI) and (MI,RC) are different to some
extent: Under stochastic and price-dependent demand and a price-dependent returns


































Figure 6.3. Profits over w of the Decentralized Symmetric Policies under Stochastic
and Price-Dependent Demand with Constant and Price-Dependent Returns
timization policies. However, total supply chain profits in the asymmetric cases are
not in between the range of profits of the decentralized symmetric policies (CR) and
(IR). While for (MI,RC) it is still true, (MC,RI) faces significant losses and drops
below the outcome of (CR). Further results that can be drawn out of the asymmetric
optimization settings are:
• According to table 6.2 the supply chain profits under asymmetric decision mak-
ing are facing worse profits than in policy (IR). Identical to the constant return
model with α = 0.2, (MI,RC) outperforms (MC,RI). Note, that for the first
time this is true for the individual profits of both players as well.
• The manufacturer’s profit is negative for low values of w due to a small profit
margin. The profit function of the retailer is steadily decreasing in w.
• Setting (MC,RI) delivers a retail price r∗ of 3.95. This gives the retailer a


















Figure 6.4. Optimal Order Quantity and Retail Price over w of the Decentralized
Symmetric Policies under Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand for Constant and
Price-Dependent Returns
Symmetric Asymmetric
Constant α Price-Dependent α Constant α Price-Dependent α
(CR) (IR) (CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
r∗ 3.64 3.27 2.95 3.27 - - - -
Cent. α 20% 20% 12% 15% - - - -
Q∗ 4.90 7.22 7.03 7.22 - - - -
Π 3.71 3.21 4.69 6.02 - - - -
w∗ 2.5 2.18 2.28 2.18 2.5 2.18 2.29 2.18
r∗ 4.07 3.90 3.81 3.90 4.05 3.93 3.95 3.78
α 20.0% 20.0% 20.7% 21.7% 20% 20% 22.29% 20.41%
Decent. Q∗ 1.84 2.91 2.45 2.91 2.19 2.49 2.65 2.67
ΠM 1.4113 1.5848 1.3776 1.4267 1.6194 1.2994 1.3040 1.3352
ΠR 1.1409 1.6771 1.4610 1.6066 1.1082 1.7172 1.3770 1.6738
ΠT 2.5522 3.2619 2.8386 3.0333 2.7276 3.0166 2.6810 3.0090
Table 6.2. Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies: Equilibrium Values under
Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand for Constant and Price-Dependent Re-
turns(a=70,d=2)
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As the manufacturer bears most of the logistic costs associated with customer
returns she is worse off as expected due to higher returns .
• Order quantities are for (MC,RI) and (MI,RC), respectively higher and lower
than in the policies (CR) and (IR), what is intuitive. Wholesale and retail
prices, w∗ and r∗, are in between the ranges of the values in the decentralized
symmetric policies. Of course, if the vendor ignores return in his optimization
process the wholesale price is identical regardless of the policy applied.
• Figure 6.5 shows the profits of the players and the supply chain over w un-
der stochastic and price-dependent demand and returns under the premise of
asymmetric decision making. As in the decentralized symmetric policies after
a certain threshold the system-wide profits are better off with the constant re-
turn model. For low magnitudes of the wholesale price both, manufacturer and
retailer, prefer price-dependent returns. After a (different) threshold, they are
better off if the return rate is constant. The explanation of this fact is identical
to that presented for the symmetric policies: lower wholesale prices imply lower
selling prices, what then leads to higher order amounts and customer demand.
Moreover, for low values of w return volumes are less under price-dependent
returns than under a constant return rate α = 0.2.
6.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to widen the findings of price-dependent return rates in the base case,
further sensitivity analysis in the relevant parameters c, β, l, v and vr is conducted.
As external market conditions have great influence on sold items and thus supply
chain performance, the market parameters b and k are varied as well. Moreover, we
especially focus on different price-dependent return functions α(r) by considering the


































Figure 6.5. Comparison of Individual and Total Supply Chain Profits in the Asym-
metric Settings under a Price-Dependent Return Rate and a Constant Return Rate
of α = 0.2
we consider d = {0.5, 1, 2}, which is representative for radical, linear and exponential
growth, respectively. Note that d=2 is used in the base case setting. In what follows
with (IR) and (CR) we refer to the decentralized symmetric policies unless otherwise
stated.
Different Total Logistic Costs and Shares
Except for policy (CR), system-wide profits increase under both, decentralized
symmetric and asymmetric settings, when shifting the burden of logistic costs to the
retailer (figure 6.6). For the case of (IR), profits remain unchanged over the total
range of β and thus the system behaves as under a constant return model. Intuitively,
a shift in reverse logistic costs improves a player by exactly the share in return costs
that is then carried by the other player and vice versa. Remarkably - and opposed to
the constant return model - supply chain coordination is improved when both players
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symmetrically consider returns, whereas only the retailer significantly improves his
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Figure 6.6. Performance of Symmetric and Asymmetric Settings under a Price-
Dependent Return Rate for varying β ∈ [0, 1]
Table 6.3 presents the equilibrium values under a price-dependent return rate when
varying reverse logistic costs and the share of them among the players. Additionally,
the percent difference to total supply chain profits under a constant return model is
shown. Overall, higher magnitudes of β lead to a lower return rate α∗. Consequently,
total supply chain profits improve, what is in accordance to the graphs presented in
figure 6.6. Higher logistic costs directly lead to lower profits of both supply chain
players, whereas the manufacturer highly benefits when the retailer bears most of
the return costs. Surprisingly, the performance under price-dependent return rates is
much worse than if returns are constant over the retail price r. Hence, the gap between
total supply chain profits under constant and price-dependent returns increases with
rising values of l. For logistic costs of l = 3 the performance is about 50% worse.
Looking at asymmetric behavior, coordination is not achieved. However, compared
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(CR) (IR)
β ΠM ΠR ΠT α
∗ %∆ ΠM ΠR ΠT α∗ %∆
total logistic costs l = 0.5
5 % 2.233 2.008 4.240 19.5% -19.41% 2.340 1.655 3.995 21.7% -26.59%
95 % 2.133 1.834 3.967 19.3% -25.13% 2.351 1.644 3.995 21.7% -30.67%
total logistic costs l = 1
5 % 1.805 1.587 3.391 20.4% -35.50% 1.895 1.631 3.527 21.7% -34.52%
95 % 2.015 1.546 3.561 19.5% -31.54% 2.339 1.187 3.527 21.7% -34.52%
total logistic costs l = 2
5 % 1.378 1.461 2.839 20.7% -43.10% 1.427 1.607 3.033 21.7% -42.46%
95 % 1.784 1.455 3.240 18.5% -35.95% 2.314 0.719 3.033 21.7% -42.46%
total logistic costs l = 3
5 % 0.983 1.286 2.270 21.2% -53.25% 0.958 1.582 2.540 21.7% -50.76%
95 % 1.557 1.166 2.722 18.0% -44.35% 2.290 0.250 2.540 21.7% -50.76%
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
β ΠM ΠR ΠT α
∗ %∆ ΠM ΠR ΠT α∗ %∆
total logistic costs l = 0.5
5 % 2.015 1.781 3.796 21.4% -29.15% 1.986 1.708 3.694 20.4% -30.84%
95 % 2.216 1.743 3.959 21.0% -27.19% 2.105 1.509 3.614 20.2% -31.80%
total logistic costs l = 1
5 % 1.784 1.524 3.308 22.0% -38.21% 1.798 1.696 3.495 20.2% -33.86%
95 % 2.186 1.425 3.611 21.1% -32.87% 1.940 1.309 3.249 20.4% -37.53%
total logistic costs l = 2
5 % 1.303 1.397 2.700 22.2% -46.92% 1.364 1.674 3.038 20.2% -41.22%
95 % 2.022 1.244 3.266 20.4% -38.52% 1.654 0.937 2.590 20.4% -48.25%
total logistic costs l = 3
5 % 0.849 1.223 2.072 22.7% -58.16% 0.933 1.652 2.584 20.2% -48.86%
95 % 1.884 0.834 2.718 20.1% -47.92% 1.343 0.610 1.953 20.4% -59.43%
Table 6.3. Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies: Equilibrium Values of Supply
Chain Profits under Price-Dependent Returns for Varying Reverse Logistic Costs




Constant α Price-Dependent α Constant α Price-Dependent α
(CR) (IR) (CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
β = 5%
ΠM 1.411 1.585 1.796 1.895 1.620 1.299 1.291 1.302
ΠR 1.133 1.677 1.598 1.631 1.101 1.717 1.498 1.189
ΠT 2.545 3.262 3.393 3.527 2.721 3.017 2.789 2.491
β = 95%
ΠM 1.490 2.403 1.839 2.339 2.215 1.488 2.005 1.837
ΠR 1.153 0.859 1.931 1.187 0.927 1.082 1.281 0.867
ΠT 2.643 3.262 3.770 3.527 3.142 2.570 3.286 2.703
Table 6.4. Comparison of the Decentralized Policies under Constant or Price-
Sensitive Returns for extreme Values of β = 5% and 95%.
to the symmetric policies (CR) and (IR), for a β of 95% the vendor or the retailer,
respectively, is better of under setting (MC,RI) or (MI,RC). We also examine that
return rates are not diminished through asymmetric decision making.
Table 6.4 compares the decentralized policies when returns are a constant pro-
portion of sales or are variable in the retial price. In most cases the supply chain is
better off if consumer returns are price-dependent (highlighted in bold). For the total
supply chain this fact is most accentuated if the manufacturer considers returns in
his optimization process. Considering the price-dependent cases, for low values of β,
(IR) coordinates the supply chain best, whereas for higher β-values (CR) is the best
possible outcome. Moreover, the supply chain performs better the higher the share of
logistic costs is which the retailer has to bear.
Different Production Costs
Production costs directly affect the profit margins of the supply chain members.
As higher manufacturing costs decrease the margin, the vendor reacts by increasing
the wholesale price w∗. Consequently, the retailer marks up his selling price r∗.
However, under a price-dependent return model, high retail prices imply high return
volumes, what in turn is detrimental for profits within the system. For production
costs of c = 3, returns go up as high as 35% of the goods sold. Resulting, for
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relatively high magnitudes of c, the supply chain is better off under a constant return
rate, whereas the agents prefer price-dependent return rates for lower magnitudes
(compare table 5.3). Hence, table 6.5 nicely describes the relationship between profits
or marginal revenues and return rates. Low profit margins lead to high return volumes
and hence increased return costs and vice versa. Interestingly, for extreme profit
margins policy (CR), and not (IR), coordinates the decentralized system best, what
is in contrast to the findings under a constant α of 20%. The latter is optimal in
terms of total profits for the base case setting of c = 1. Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel
(2007) [42] observe under stochastic and price-dependent demand and a constant
return rate, that if the manufacturer has a sufficient marginal revenue, she lowers her
wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to order more items. The same is valid
under a return rate depending on r. Hence, the optimal order quantity decreases and
commercial returns increase.
(CR) (IR)
c 0.25 1 2 3 0.25 1 2 3
w∗ 1.49 2.28 3.49 4.83 1.57 2.18 2.92 3.64
r∗ 3.31 3.81 4.41 4.84 3.59 3.90 4.23 4.52
α 15.7% 20.7% 27.8% 33.5% 18.4% 21.7% 25.5% 29.1%
Q∗ 5.40 2.45 0.55 0.01 4.75 2.91 1.43 0.56
ΠM 4.1645 1.3776 0.0590 0.0023 4.0899 1.4267 -0.1723 -0.4607
ΠR 4.3085 1.4610 0.1738 0.0001 3.4709 1.6066 0.5017 0.1021
ΠT 8.4730 2.8386 0.2328 0.0024 7.5608 3.0333 0.3294 -0.3586
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
c 0.25 1 2 3 0.25 1 2 3
w∗ 1.49 2.28 3.49 4.83 1.57 2.18 2.92 3.64
r∗ 3.58 3.95 4.46 4.94 3.42 3.78 4.14 4.48
α 18.3% 22.3% 28.4% 34.9% 16.7% 20.4% 24.5% 28.7%
Q∗ 4.83 2.65 0.71 0.01 4.67 2.67 1.21 0.42
ΠM 3.9250 1.3040 0.0268 -0.0046 4.1237 1.3352 -0.1475 -0.3556
ΠR 3.5540 1.3770 0.1509 -0.0001 3.5589 1.6738 0.5436 0.1206
ΠT 7.4790 2.6810 0.1777 -0.0048 7.6826 3.0090 0.3961 -0.2350
Table 6.5. Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies: Equilibrium Values under Price-
Dependent Returns for Varying Production Costs c
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Positive Salvage Values
In the following, we consider positive salvage values for returned and unsold items.
Before exploring the results for price-dependent returns, we shortly recall the main
findings under a constant return rate and a price-only contract, where positive salvage
values reduce the costs of returns. As a consequence, both, retailer and manufacturer,
are in the position to lower their respective decision variables what improves system-
wide coordination. Another insight obtained is the interdependency between w∗, r∗
and Q∗. Wholesale and retail prices are decreasing and the optimal order quantity,
respectively, is increasing in the salvage values v and vr. Having in mind these results
we can draw more general conclusions from tables 6.6 and 6.7, some of which have
already been mentioned previously.
• Policy (CR) outperforms policy (IR) with increasing salvage values v and vr.
• Coordination in the decentralized symmetric cases (CR) and (IR) is better the
higher the salvage values are, and the more reverse logistic costs the retailer
bears. This extends the results under a wholesale contract with a constant
return rate of α = 0.2. In the asymmetric settings the influence of β is different:
(MC,RI) is better off for lower and (MI,RC) for higher magnitudes of β.
The effect of rising salvage values remains identical though. Note that for
high salvage values under setting (MC,RI) coordination of the supply chain is
improved.
• Under symmetric decision making, the manufacturer has better compared pay-
offs in policy (IR), whereas the retailer has no preference towards any policy.
He is reciprocally better off in the symmetric settings. In the asymmetric cases
no rule os observable.
• The mentioned relationship between Q∗, w∗ and r∗ can be extended to α∗. Iden-
tical to the constant return model, salvage values increase marginal revenues
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(CR) (IR)
v vr ΠM ΠR ΠT ΠM ΠR ΠT
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 1.60 1.70 3.30 1.79 1.94 3.73
0.8 0.4 1.95 2.44 4.39 2.30 2.35 4.65
1.2 0.6 2.63 3.47 6.09 3.05 3.01 6.05
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 2.08 1.96 4.03 2.77 0.96 3.73
0.8 0.4 2.56 2.41 4.97 3.38 1.27 4.65
1.2 0.6 3.48 3.31 6.79 4.25 1.81 6.05
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 1.69 1.84 3.54 1.90 1.94 3.84
0.8 0.8 2.18 2.44 4.62 2.54 2.35 4.89
1.2 1.2 3.04 3.97 7.00 3.45 3.01 6.46
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 2.18 1.96 4.14 2.88 0.96 3.84
0.8 0.8 2.80 2.41 5.21 3.62 1.27 4.89
1.2 1.2 3.91 3.78 7.69 4.65 1.81 6.46
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
v vr ΠM ΠR ΠT ΠM ΠR ΠT
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 1.50 1.54 3.05 1.75 2.00 3.75
0.8 0.4 1.77 2.48 4.25 2.27 2.41 4.68
1.2 0.6 2.79 3.91 6.70 3.03 3.06 6.09
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 2.23 1.77 4.00 2.08 1.16 3.24
0.8 0.4 2.67 2.29 4.96 2.61 1.45 4.06
1.2 0.6 3.44 3.49 6.93 3.60 1.94 5.54
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 1.61 1.54 3.15 1.85 2.00 3.85
0.8 0.8 2.03 2.48 4.51 2.49 2.41 4.90
1.2 1.2 2.78 4.02 6.80 3.42 3.06 6.48
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 2.38 1.77 4.14 2.17 1.16 3.33
0.8 0.8 2.99 2.29 5.28 2.81 1.45 4.26
1.2 1.2 3.83 4.07 7.90 3.95 1.94 5.90
Table 6.6. Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies: Equilibrium Values for Supply
Chain Profits under Price-Dependent Returns for Varying Unsold and Returned Item




∗ r∗ α Q∗ w∗ r∗ α Q∗
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 2.26 3.78 20.4% 2.86 2.14 3.86 21.3% 3.41
0.8 0.4 2.10 3.67 19.2% 3.91 2.11 3.81 20.8% 4.03
1.2 0.6 1.93 3.55 18.0% 5.43 2.06 3.74 20.0% 4.99
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 1.84 3.52 17.7% 3.74 2.14 3.86 21.3% 3.41
0.8 0.4 1.82 3.48 17.3% 4.61 2.11 3.81 20.8% 4.03
1.2 0.6 1.73 3.39 16.4% 6.30 2.06 3.74 20.0% 4.99
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 2.26 3.75 20.1% 3.03 2.14 3.86 21.3% 3.41
0.8 0.8 2.10 3.67 19.2% 3.91 2.11 3.81 20.8% 4.03
1.2 1.2 1.93 3.48 17.3% 6.04 2.06 3.74 20.0% 4.99
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 1.84 3.52 17.7% 3.74 2.14 3.86 21.3% 3.41
0.8 0.8 1.82 3.48 17.3% 4.61 2.11 3.81 20.8% 4.03
1.2 1.2 1.73 3.33 15.8% 6.95 2.06 3.74 20.0% 4.99
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
v vr w
∗ r∗ α Q∗ w∗ r∗ α Q∗
β = 0.05
0.4 0.2 2.30 3.94 22.1% 2.95 2.14 3.71 19.7% 3.22
0.8 0.4 2.07 3.79 20.5% 4.17 2.11 3.67 19.2% 3.88
1.2 0.6 1.89 3.71 19.7% 5.24 2.06 3.62 18.7% 4.91
β = 0.95
0.4 0.2 1.84 3.70 19.6% 4.39 2.14 3.73 19.9% 2.59
0.8 0.4 1.81 3.65 19.0% 5.24 2.11 3.72 19.8% 3.16
1.2 0.6 1.69 3.52 17.7% 6.94 2.06 3.62 18.7% 4.26
β = 0.05
0.4 0.4 2.30 3.94 22.1% 2.95 2.14 3.71 19.7% 3.22
0.8 0.8 2.07 3.79 20.5% 4.17 2.11 3.67 19.2% 3.88
1.2 1.2 1.89 3.61 18.6% 6.08 2.06 3.62 18.7% 4.91
β = 0.95
0.4 0.4 1.84 3.70 19.6% 4.39 2.14 3.73 19.9% 2.59
0.8 0.8 1.81 3.65 19.0% 5.24 2.11 3.72 19.8% 3.16
1.2 1.2 1.69 3.45 17.0% 7.55 2.06 3.62 18.7% 4.26
Table 6.7. Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies: Equilibrium Values for Supply
Chain Decision Variables under Price-Dependent Returns for Varying Unsold and
Returned Item Salvage Values v and vr under a Price-Only Contract
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of the players and therefore the manufacturer has the opportunity to lower her
wholesale price. This gives an incentive to the retailer to order more. Addition-
ally, the salvage value vr of unsold products is staying with the latter as well,
what again creates an incentive to increase the order quantity. At this point we
also refer to the hedging argument of (positive) salvage values. Thus, r∗ and w∗
are decreasing and the optimal order amount is increasing in v and vr. Besides
the effect on order volumes, lower retail prices lead to a reduction of returned
items (i.e. α) what benefits the total supply chain and both players as well.
• If the retailer bears more of the logistic costs, dependencies are different. The
manufacturer reduces his wholesale price since his share in return logistic costs
is reduced. However, the retailer has to compensate this additional logistic costs
and thus uses the incentive by the manufacturer primarily to stabilize his profit
margin instead of trying to increase his total sales. Thus, the effects of positive
salvage values on retail and wholesale prices are diminished. Finally, the retailer
is worse, and the manufacturer better off.
Different Market Sizes and Elasticities and Types of Price-Dependent Re-
turn Functions
Because the retailer is selling his products on a unregulated market, its parameters
b and k are crucial for the success of the supply chain. The total market size is
represented by k and b describes the demand elasticity present in the market. As
mentioned demand elasticity is r
k−r ≤ 1. In other words, rising the retail price 1%
implies an increase in demand by less than 1%. Considered market scenarios are
(b; k) = (−1.5; 10), (−6; 2.5) and the base case setting (−3; 5). Further, under the
premise of price-dependent returns the values of a and d are determining the overall
return rate. Varying solely a leads to faster or slower growing consumer returns in
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Figure 6.7. Considered Price-Dependent Return Functions with Parameters (a; d) =
(10; 0.5), (20; 1), (70; 2)
price and returns. The effects of both are intuitive: Rising only a or d directly leads
to higher returns for a given retail price r∗. Thus, we are varying both variables
simultaneously. The return functions are presented in figure 6.7 below. The three
considered functions are (a;d) = (10;0.5), (20;1) and (70;2). Note, that the latter is
the base case setting. Again, in order to better compare and explain retrieved results
for distinct return functions α(r), the initial thought behind the choice of the tuples
is to have the different return types (radically, linearly and exponentially depending
on r) facing about 20% of total goods returned in the equilibrium in the base case
setting for the decentralized cases.
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the equilibrium values for decentralized symmetric deci-
sion making of the supply chain players under different market sizes and elasticities
when returns are depending on different price-dependent consumer return models.
The findings for decentralized symmetric decision making are summarized as follows:
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(CR)
d = 0.5, a = 10 d = 1, a = 20 d = 2, a = 70
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
β = 0.05
α∗ 19.9% 20.1% 19.4% 20.2% 20.4% 21.2%
ΠM 1.78 1.13 1.83 1.14 1.80 0.98
ΠR 1.37 1.05 1.61 1.04 1.59 1.29
b = -3 ΠT 3.15 2.17 3.44 2.19 3.39 2.27
k = 5 β = 0.95
α∗ 19.8% 20.1% 19.3% 19.4% 19.5% 18.0%
ΠM 1.86 1.28 1.94 1.38 2.01 1.56
ΠR 1.51 1.10 1.59 1.22 1.55 1.17
ΠT 3.37 2.38 3.53 2.60 3.56 2.72
β = 0.05
α∗ 27.1% 27.3% 34.4% 35.9% 40.6% 45.1%
ΠM 5.59 4.22 4.43 2.53 2.63 -
ΠR 4.73 4.05 4.52 3.24 3.60 -
b = -1.5 ΠT 10.33 8.27 8.95 5.77 6.22 -
k = 10 β = 0.95
α∗ 27.0% 27.3% 33.9% 33.7% 35.0% 27.0%
ΠM 5.79 4.70 4.85 3.57 3.81 2.90
ΠR 4.87 3.79 4.33 3.13 3.34 2.13
ΠT 10.66 8.48 9.18 6.70 7.15 5.02
β = 0.05
α∗ 14.8% 15.1% 10.8% 11.1% 6.5% 6.5%
ΠM 0.25 0.08 0.34 0.18 0.46 0.33
ΠR 0.20 0.07 0.27 0.16 0.33 0.30
b = -6 ΠT 0.44 0.16 0.61 0.33 0.79 0.64
k = 2.5 β = 0.95
α∗ 14.8% 15.2% 10.8% 11.2% 6.5% 6.7%
ΠM 0.26 0.09 0.35 0.19 0.47 0.36
ΠR 0.18 0.04 0.24 0.10 0.28 0.19
ΠT 0.43 0.13 0.60 0.29 0.76 0.56
Table 6.8. Equilibrium Values for Symmetric Supply Chain Behavior (CR) for Dif-
ferent Market Sizes and Elasticities and Different Price-Dependent Return Functions
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(IR)
d = 0.5, a = 10 d = 1, a = 20 d = 2, a = 70
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
β = 0.05
α∗ 19.7% 19.7% 19.5% 19.5% 21.7% 21.7%
ΠM 2.03 1.18 2.05 1.21 1.90 0.96
ΠR 1.71 1.67 1.72 1.68 1.63 1.58
b = -3 ΠT 3.74 2.85 3.77 2.89 3.53 2.54
k = 5 β = 0.95
α∗ 19.7% 19.7% 19.5% 19.5% 21.7% 21.7%
ΠM 2.44 2.39 2.45 2.41 2.34 2.29
ΠR 1.31 0.45 1.32 0.48 1.19 0.25
ΠT 3.74 2.85 3.77 2.89 3.53 2.54
β = 0.05
α∗ 27.2% 27.2% 37.0% 37.0% 78.1% 78.1%
ΠM 6.67 5.12 5.35 3.23 -0.21 -4.69
ΠR 4.65 4.57 3.50 3.39 -1.33 -1.57
b = -1.5 ΠT 11.33 9.69 8.85 6.63 -1.55 -6.25
k = 10 β = 0.95
α∗ 27.2% 27.2% 37.0% 37.0% 78.1% 78.1%
ΠM 7.41 7.33 6.35 6.24 1.90 1.67
ΠR 3.92 2.36 2.50 0.39 -3.45 -7.92
ΠT 11.33 9.69 8.85 6.63 -1.55 -6.25
β = 0.05
α∗ 14.6% 14.6% 10.7% 10.7% 6.5% 6.5%
ΠM 0.26 -0.05 0.36 0.14 0.48 0.34
ΠR 0.30 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.36
b = -6 ΠT 0.56 0.23 0.70 0.46 0.84 0.70
k = 2.5 β = 0.95
α∗ 14.6% 14.6% 10.7% 10.7% 6.5% 6.5%
ΠM 0.40 0.39 0.47 0.46 0.54 0.54
ΠR 0.16 -0.15 0.23 0.00 0.30 0.16
ΠT 0.56 0.23 0.70 0.46 0.84 0.70
Table 6.9. Equilibrium Values for Symmetric Supply Chain Behavior (IR) for Dif-
ferent Market Sizes and Elasticities and Different Price-Dependent Return Functions
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• A general rule whether policy (IR) or (CR) performs better in the considered
markets with price-dependent return functions is not observable. We find that
total logistic costs and the share of them between the players have varying effects
on both, individual, and system-wide performances. However, the manufacturer
is always better off when the retailer bears most of reverse logistic costs, what
extends the sensitivity analysis for β. The retailer, in turn, is always worse off
for the considered values of l. Identical to under constant returns, players try
to compensate higher costs associated with returns by a positive adjustment in
the retail price. However, this leads to higher return rates α∗. The outcome
of the total profits piT is highly dependent on the type of return function and
market.
• We further investigate the results according to the three different markets:
1. Large markets and high demand elasticities (k=10, b=-5) are detrimen-
tal on supply chain coordination, particularly if the players ignore return
costs. Instead, when making his pricing decision the retailer only looks
at his profit margin and thus increases the retail price considerably. As
a consequence consumer returns increase up to levels where the supply
chain is far in the reds. The manufacturer is in a better position if he has
not to deal with reverse logistic costs. The highest α∗ is found under an
exponential return function, what is intuitive.
2. Smaller markets with lower elasticities behave contrary to the first men-
tioned. As the parameter k limits the retail price r before demand or
return functions do, we experience lower rates of returns for higher val-
ues of d. As the return functions subtend approximately at a retail price
of 3.75, the profits of the player’s and of the total supply chain is best
off under exponential return functions (compare figure 6.7). However, a
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smaller market size entails lower sales. In other words, the level of profits
is comparably small, whereas the risk associated with consumer returns is
mitigated by the exponential type return function.
3. Medium-sized markets and elasticities are consequently performing in be-
tween the latter two. Total and individual profits decrease for higher return
logistic costs and for rising values of d.
Under asymmetric decision making results vary more significantly. We especially
obtain that for some of the presented market sizes and return models coordination is
improved in the asymmetric settings. Whether (MC,RI) or (MI,RC) performs bet-
ter when varying l or β is not generally observable. Extending the findings throughout
this thesis, (MC,RI) behaves according to (CR) and (MI,RC) to (IR), respectively.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the optimal profits of the players and of the total supply
chain under the premise of asymmetric optimization behavior for different market
parameters and price-depending return functions.
The effect of different market parameters and return functions is not predictable.
However, in both settings it is the retailer that has the greater influence on the
performance of the supply chain with his pricing decision. Ignoring returns, he drives
up his profit margin, not knowing that subsequent high return volumes have the
opposite effect and put profits in the red. Considering returns and, hence, steering
the supply chain with adequate retail prices allows good performances. This fact is
most noticeable in large markets, since then the retail price r is not limited by k, as in
small markets. The greatest benefit of asymmetric behavior is that profits, regardless
of markets and return functions, are never negative. If one player recognizes he
would face losses when making this deal, he will simply negate it. As a consequence
of the latter argumentation, (MC,RI) is not existing under returns that depend
exponentially on the retail price.
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(MC,RI)
d = 0.5, a = 10 d = 1, a = 20 d = 2, a = 70
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
β = 0.05
α∗ 20.0% 20.2% 19.6% 20.3% 22.0% 22.7%
ΠM 1.98 1.26 1.97 1.24 1.78 0.85
ΠR 1.34 1.01 1.61 1.01 1.52 1.22
b = -3 ΠT 3.32 2.27 3.59 2.25 3.31 2.07
k = 5 β = 0.95
α∗ 19.7% 19.5% 19.3% 18.8% 21.1% 20.1%
ΠM 2.31 2.04 2.32 2.03 2.19 1.88
ΠR 1.42 0.77 1.51 0.95 1.43 0.83
ΠT 3.73 2.81 3.82 2.98 3.61 2.72
β = 0.05
α∗ 27.1% 27.4% 36.4% 37.6% 70.0% 76.2%
ΠM 6.25 4.69 4.47 2.24 - -
ΠR 4.88 3.88 4.13 2.85 - -
b = -1.5 ΠT 11.13 8.57 8.60 5.10 - -
k = 10 β = 0.95
α∗ 26.9% 26.7% 35.6% 34.9% 66.2% 62.2%
ΠM 6.93 6.48 5.41 4.55 - -
ΠR 4.62 3.46 3.80 2.15 - -
ΠT 11.56 9.94 9.21 6.70 - -
β = 0.05
α∗ 14.8% 15.1% 10.8% 11.1% 6.6% 6.6%
ΠM 0.27 0.09 0.37 0.19 0.48 0.35
ΠR 0.19 0.07 0.27 0.15 0.33 0.30
b = -6 ΠT 0.47 0.16 0.64 0.35 0.81 0.65
k = 2.5 β = 0.95
α∗ 14.6% 14.6% 10.7% 10.7% 6.5% 6.5%
ΠM 0.38 0.32 0.46 0.43 0.54 0.53
ΠR 0.14 -0.16 0.23 0.00 0.28 0.16
ΠT 0.52 0.16 0.68 0.42 0.82 0.69
Table 6.10. : Equilibrium Values for the Asymmetric Supply Chain Behavior




d = 0.5, a = 10 d = 1, a = 20 d = 2, a = 70
l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3 l = 1 l = 3
β = 0.05
α∗ 19.7% 19.7% 19.3% 19.3% 20.2% 20.2%
ΠM 1.75 0.96 1.82 1.03 1.80 0.93
ΠR 1.75 1.71 1.76 1.72 1.70 1.65
b = -3 ΠT 3.49 2.66 3.57 2.74 3.49 2.58
k = 5 β = 0.95
α∗ 19.9% 20.3% 19.5% 20.3% 20.4% 20.4%
ΠM 1.84 1.25 1.93 1.31 1.94 1.34
ΠR 1.40 0.79 1.40 0.77 1.31 0.61
ΠT 3.24 2.03 3.33 2.08 3.25 1.95
β = 0.05
α∗ 27.1% 27.1% 35.2% 35.3% 47.2% 46.7%
ΠM 5.58 4.14 4.39 2.46 2.11 -0.29
ΠR 4.82 4.74 3.88 3.79 1.78 1.65
b = -1.5 ΠT 10.40 8.88 8.27 6.25 3.89 1.36
k = 10 β = 0.95
α∗ 27.3% 27.8% 35.7% 36.8% 44.0% 18.4%
ΠM 5.72 4.54 4.59 3.03 2.43 0.00
ΠR 4.17 2.94 3.04 1.51 0.79 0.74
ΠT 9.89 7.48 7.62 4.54 3.21 0.74
β = 0.05
α∗ 14.6% 14.6% 10.7% 10.7% 6.4% 6.4%
ΠM 0.22 -0.06 0.33 0.12 0.46 0.33
ΠR 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.36
b = -6 ΠT 0.53 0.23 0.67 0.44 0.83 0.68
k = 2.5 β = 0.95
α∗ 14.8% 15.2% 10.8% 11.2% 6.5% 6.7%
ΠM 0.25 0.09 0.35 0.19 0.47 0.36
ΠR 0.19 0.04 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.19
ΠT 0.44 0.13 0.60 0.29 0.77 0.56
Table 6.11. : Equilibrium Values for Asymmetric Supply Chain Behavior (MI,RC)




Finally, we study the option of a buy-back contract and the results obtained
when returns are price-dependent. In chapter 4 (stochastic demand and constant
return rate), we observed that buy-back contracts can help to improve supply chain
coordination, either according to the analytical solution of Ruiz Ben´ıtez and Muriel
(2007) [42], or with the values gained if the manufacturer is egoistically optimizing his
wholesale price. When doing the latter the shift in profits to the side of the vendor
was eminent. Thus, pricing gives the retailer no incentive to accept a buy-back option.
However, since the manufacturer buys back every unsold item at nearly the wholesale
price, the retailer is (almost) completely hedged against uncertain demand. In other
words, the risk to face losses due to overstocking is marginally small for him under
buy-back contracts. As a consequence, the return-risk ratio is satisfied.
Under stochastic and price-dependent demand and a constant return rate α, Ruiz
Ben´ıtez and Muriel (2007) [42] find that in case of policy (CR) buy-back contracts
do improve channel coordination. Moreover, they find a threshold value from where
on both players are better off. However, for high return rates (α > 20%) policy (IR)
is detrimental for supply chain performance. The relationship between wholesale and
buy-back price is s∗ = w∗ c
2
. More important, under stochastic and price-dependent
demand, the profit shift is not as significant as under stochastic demand, but still the
manufacturer is better and the retailer worse off, if both accept the buy-back option.
We extended these findings (mainly) unaltered to the case of asymmetric decision
making, whereas total profits are in between those of the symmetric cases.
Table 6.12 presents the results for buy-back and wholesale contracts under asym-
metric and symmetric decision making and compares the equilibrium values under
constant and price-dependent return models. As a main result we find that for the
base case setting buy-back contracts improve the coordination of the supply chain when
returns are considered in the optimization process by both players. Ignoring returns
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leads to worse outcomes than under a wholesale contract. This extends the findings
described initially in this section.
Further results are:
1. Similar to the findings for constant return rates (stochastic, and stochastic and
price-dependent demand) only the manufacturer is in the position to improve
her performance under buy-back contracts. However, this is not always the
case: in policy (IR) she faces worse profits. Although the shift in profits still
exists, it is less articulated for price-dependent returns.
2. Comparing price-dependent and constant return rates, in policy (CR) the sup-
ply chain is better off under the former and accordingly the latter leads to better
results if both players ignore returns. For the asymmetric settings this fact is
true as well: (MC,RI) performs better with a constant and (MI,RC) with a
variable α.
3. When ignoring returns, the relationship s∗ = w∗ − c
2
holds. However, for (IR)
a difference of c is between (w∗) and (s∗).
4. Under price-dependent returns, (if players consider returns) the manufacturer
reacts with higher wholesale prices and the retailer with lower retail prices
on return costs. Consequently the profit margin increases for the former and,
respectively, decreases for the latter. Thus, the incentive scheme under buy-back
contracts that leads the retailer to order more (also implies higher selling prices)
due to the hedging argument is heavily affected by growing costs associated with
consumer returns over the retail price. In fact, for increasing returns in the retail
price this incentive scheme (mostly) vanishes. Thus, when considering returns,
the optimal wholesale price w∗ = 2.78 is lower as under a constant return rate.
The manufacturer also set a remarkable lower buy-back price s∗ = 1.78. The
idea is to give the retailer less marginal profit so that he is not in the position
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Price-Dependent Return Rate
Buy-Back Contract Wholesale Contract
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
r∗ - - - - 2.95 3.27 - -
Cent. α∗ - - - - 12.4% 15.2% - -
Q∗ - - - - 7.03 7.22 - -
ΠM - - - - 4.69 6.02 - -
w∗ 2.78 3.00 2.78 3.00 2.28 2.18 2.29 2.18
s∗ 1.78 2.50 1.78 2.50 - - - -
r∗ 4.00 4.13 4.09 4.08 3.81 3.90 3.95 3.78
Decent. α∗ 22.9% 24.4% 23.9% 23.8% 20.7% 21.7% 22.3% 20.4%
Q∗ 2.87 3.61 3.10 3.40 2.45 2.91 2.65 2.67
ΠM 1.552 1.270 1.218 1.441 1.3776 1.4267 1.3040 1.3352
ΠR 1.319 1.335 1.281 1.357 1.4610 1.6066 1.3770 1.6738
ΠT 2.871 2.606 2.499 2.798 2.8386 3.0333 2.6810 3.0090
Constant Return Rate α = 20%
Buy-Back Contract Wholesale Contract
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC)
r∗ - - - - 3.64 3.27 - -
Cent. Q∗ - - - - 4.90 7.22 - -
ΠM - - - - 3.71 3.21 - -
w∗ 3.34 3.00 3.34 3.00 2.50 2.18 2.50 2.18
s∗ 2.84 2.50 2.84 2.50 - - - -
r∗ 4.32 4.13 4.29 4.16 4.07 3.90 4.05 3.93
Decent. Q∗ 2.47 3.61 2.79 3.27 1.84 2.91 2.19 2.49
ΠM 1.857 1.769 1.792 1.712 1.4113 1.5848 1.6194 1.2994
ΠR 0.942 1.481 0.932 1.493 1.1409 1.6771 1.1082 1.7172
ΠT 2.799 3.250 2.724 3.205 2.5522 3.2619 2.7276 3.0166
Table 6.12. Comparison of Decentralized Symmetric and Asymmetric Decision Poli-
cies under Wholesale and Buy-Back Contracts when Consumer Returns are either
Constant or Price-Dependent.
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to rise retail prices, since this would mean that the manufacturer has to cope
with additional reverse logistic costs (since β = 0.05). Resulting, the optimal
selling price r∗ is with 4.00 lower than in policy (IR) but still higher than under
setting (CR) in a price-only contract. For price-dependent returns the optimal
order quantity is consequently lower and, important for the vendor, the return
volume α∗ is decreased by about 2% when considering returns.
6.3 Conclusions
Results retrieved under a Wholesale Price-Only Contract
1. Under stochastic and price-dependent demand with price-sensitive returns, op-
timal supply chain coordination is reached in the centralized policy (IR), what
is contrary to the reuslts in the previous chapters.
2. Concerning the decentralized symmetric settings, policy (IR) outperforms (CR)
in terms of individual and system-wide profits. The asymmetric settings do not
reach coordination. (MI,RC) outperforms (MC,RI).
3. For the asymmetric settings, wholesale and retail prices, w∗ and r∗, are in be-
tween the ranges of the values in the decentralized symmetric policies. The rela-
tionship between both variables remains valid, however, changes in the wholesale
price have a stronger influence on profits since returns are price-sensitive. This
explains that (MC,RI) faces significant losses and drops below the outcome of
(CR), whereas (MI,RC) is still above.
4. The impact if the retailer is ignoring returns is greater than under a constant
return rate. This is even more crucial in the asymmetric settings, as return rates
are not diminished through asymmetric decision making. In fact, they increase.
Thus, through his pricing decision, the retailer has the greater influence on the
performance of the supply chain.
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5. More findings obtained by the conducted sensitivity analysis are:
• For extreme profit margins, policy (CR), and not (IR), coordinates the
system best, what is in contrast to the findings under a constant α of 20%.
• Higher logistic costs lead to lower profits of both supply chain players. The
manufacturer highly benefits when the retailer bears most of the return
costs.
• Policy (CR) outperforms policy (IR) with increasing salvage values v and
vr.
Results retrieved under a Buy-Back Contract
1. Under price-dependent returns, buy-back contracts improve the coordination of
the supply chain when returns are considered in the optimization process by
both players. Ignoring returns leads to worse outcomes than under a whole-
sale contract. For the asymmetric settings, (MC,RI) performs better with a
constant and (MI,RC) with a variable α.
2. Identical to the findings for constant returns (stochastic and, stochastic and
price-dependent demand) only the manufacturer is in the position to improve
his performance under buy-back contracts, that is the shift in profits still exists.
However, it is less articulated for price-dependent returns.
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CHAPTER 7
GAME THEORETIC IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC
DECISION MAKING
In the previous chapters, we focussed on performing and evaluating computational
work. We compared the performances of the asymmetric settings to those of the
symmetric policies for different types of demand and return functions. However, the
reasons and implications of asymmetric decision making have not been outlined yet.
Asymmetric behavior can arise due to two reasons: (1) Both players decide in-
dividually whether they consider returns or not in their optimization process. Of
course, they have no knowledge about the other player’s optimization decision. In
other words, the asymmetric behavior occurs accidentally. (2) One of the players
has knowledge about how the other player acts and thus, he can decide to act asym-
metrically, since his payoffs might be better compared to the respective symmetric
policy.
If both players can individually decide whether to include returns or not in their
optimization processes, they also have to consider their final profits. However, the
latter are depending on the decision of the other player. Thus, it makes sense for the
agents to consider the possible performances of the supply chain under symmetric and
asymmetric settings in order to find their optimal optimization policy. This is equiv-
alent to a game theoretic analysis where each supply chain member tries to maximize
his outcome regardless of the other players behavior. In this chapter we therefore
examine the consequences on decision making according to game theory. Further,
strategic options arise when either the manufacturer or the retailer has knowledge
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about the optimization process of the respective other player. Hence, the players can
be in a position to raise their profits on the expense of the other player. This matter
is studied after we outline the game theoretic implications.
7.1 Consequences of Asymmetric Behavior on Decision Mak-
ing
For asymmetric decision making, game theoretic approaches propose good insight
into the behavior of players in the real world. Under the assumption of rationally
behaving actors with private information (i.e. the general settings of the supply
chain is known, but not the optimization process of the other player) we can draw
conclusions about the optimization strategy that the supply chain members should
choose.
So far, we found the total profits of the asymmetric settings to be within the
range of the symmetric ones. However, individual profits of the players are either
better or worse in the asymmetric cases. In the following, we focus on the results
obtained in the previous chapters and interpret them according to game theory. Thus,
we examine the outcomes of the decentralized asymmetric policies in order to find
the specific optimization strategy, according to which a player should act to reach
best performance. We start out by looking at stochastic demand and then go over
to stochastic and price-dependent demand under both, constant, and price-sensitive
return rates.
7.1.1 Stochastic Demand
Looking at the results in table 4.1, it is visible that in the asymmetric cases only
one player is better off, whereas the other one is facing worse profits compared to the
decentralized symmetric settings. Accordingly, following policy (MI,RC) gives the
retailer the best profits and the manufacturer the worst outcome. In case of (MC,RI)
119
it is vice versa. In other words, the players receive their best profits if and only if
they choose to consider returns and the other one not. However, if both players
do consider consumer returns, they end up at the worst possible case (CR). This
situation perfectly describes the prisoner’s dilemma in the subject of game theory.
Under the assumption that both players decide independently and do not coop-
erate, rational actors always choose to consider returns. This results out of the fact
that, no matter if one supply chain member chooses to or not to consider returns, the
best option for the other player is always to consider returns since this gives him/her
the higher compared pay-off. Due to this, the strategy to include returns in the opti-
mization process is a so-called dominant strategy (see Varian (1992) [50], page 262).
As a result, the situation ends up in a pareto-inefficient Nash-equilibrium (i.e. policy
(CR)), where the total supply chain faces its minimum possible profits. Policy (CR) is
also called a pareto-suboptimal situation, since both players can improve their profits
without harming the other player. In other words, a pareto improvement is possible.
According to their dominant decision strategies, policy (IR) is never followed and
consequently the best outcome is not reached. Furthermore, the conducted calcula-
tions for wholesale contracts, which show the robustness of our initial results, allow
us to extent the mentioned prisoner’s dilemma. For changes in the model parameters,
(CR) still is the pareto-inefficient Nash-equilibrium, reached by dominant strategies
of both supply chain players. Thus, the consequences on decision making remain
unchanged. Under a buy-back option, however, the situation is different. According
to table 4.7, the retailer’s dominant strategy is (CR), since this gives him the best
profits regardless of the manufacturer’s decision. For the manufacturer there is no
dominant strategy, because his outcome is not independent of the retailer’s strategy.
Assuming that the retailer is a rational actor, the vendor knows for sure that the re-
tailer includes returns in his optimization process. Thus, the vendor’s non-dominant
strategy is to consider returns as well, since this results in higher profits for her than
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ignoring them. Note, that with a buy-back rebate the supply chain players end up in
the situation (CR), which is pareto-optimal instead of pareto-suboptimal. A player
can only be better off if he concurrently makes the other player worse off. Policy
(CR) actually constitutes the best outcome the retailer can reach under a buy-back
contract, whereas the manufacturer, in turn, is in a suboptimal position. She could
face higher profits in case (IR). Additional sensitivity analysis shows that the pre-
sented game theoretic implications hold and, thus, strategy (CR) should be followed
by both players if demand is stochastic.
7.1.2 Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand
Constant Return Rate
Under stochastic and price-dependent demand (with a constant return rate), total
profits of the asymmetric cases are in between the decentralized symmetric settings -
just as under simple stochastic demand. However, as a major difference to stochastic
demand, the retailer outperforms the vendor under setting (MI,RC) and also faces
higher profits as in policy (IR). The same holds true for the manufacturer with
policies (MC,RI) and (CR), respectively. General game theoretic implications and
the consequences on decision making are unaltered, though. Table 5.1 also shows
that in a specific asymmetric setting one player faces higher profits, whereas the other
one is worse off compared to the symmetric cases. According to the game theoretic
propositions we introduced so far in this chapter, this game, again, has dominant
strategies for both players and, hence, a Nash-equilibrium that is suboptimal for
both players and the total supply chain. In other words, the prisoner’s dilemma is
present as well.
Both players find their best compared profits if they choose to consider returns,
independently of the respective other player’s choice. Since both players decide to
include consumer returns to maximize their outcomes independently, they end up
121
at policy (CR), what is the least favorable for both. Moreover, the strategy to
include returns is a dominant strategy for the supply chain players, resulting in the
pareto-inefficient Nash-equilibrium (Varian (1992) [50]), with the detrimental effects
on total supply chain profits. The profits which the agents face in setting CR can
be improved by concurrently not putting the other player into a worse position by
switching to strategy (IR). This matches with the findings under stochastic demand.
As the dominant strategy of both players is to consider returns, the outcome of policy
(IR) is not reached. As we observe in the conducted sensitivity analysis, the general
prisoner’s dilemma is valid for most variations of the base case parameters under
stochastic and price-dependent demand. An exception is shifting logistic costs among
the players. Looking at the graphs in figure 5.5 we find the decision strategy for the
retailer to remain unaltered. For the manufacturer, in turn, a dominant strategy over
the total range of β is not available. Given the retailer considers returns, his best
outcome is reached if he chooses to consider returns as well. When the retailer ignores
returns, things chance. He prefers to consider or ignore returns for extremely high or
medium to low share of reverse logistic costs, respectively. This is indicated by the red
and light-blue dashed lines for the manufacturers profits. Now, knowing the retailer
always considers returns, the rationally acting manufacturer reacts by doing so as
well, since this gives her the best compared pay-off. Thus, despite of the explained
missing dominant strategy for one agent, the overall strategy for both players still is
(CR) and consequences on decision making remain unchanged.
If a buy-back option is offered mainly similar result to those under a price-only
contract are obtained. According to table 4.7 both players are facing worse profits
in the respective setting where they ignore returns. The manufacturer finds his best
outcome in policy (IR), whereas the retailer prefers the asymmetric setting (MI,RC).
All in all, for stochastic and price-dependent demand with a constant return rate
and under a buy-back option the pure prisoner’s dilemma with the retailer’s and
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manufacturer’s dominant strategy (CR) is present. However, the situation if both
simultaneously consider returns in the decision process is pareto-suboptimal. For
the vendor (CR) yet constitutes the best outcome she can reach under a buy-back
contract. The retailer’s performance is suboptimal and could be increased if solely
the manufacturer or both players switch to considering returns. However, this would
imply lower profits for the former. Through further sensitivity analysis we are also
able to confirm that (CR) remains the Nash-equilibrium when varying specific model
parameters. Ultimately, under stochastic and price dependent demand and a constant
return rate, rational supply chain players act according to policy (CR).
Price-Dependent Return Rate
Table 6.2 on page 95 compares symmetric and asymmetric settings for the base
case if returns are price-dependent. The outcome (MC,RI) is the worst possible for
both players and the total supply chain, whereas the retailer is better off in setting
(MI,RC) compared to (IR). Asymmetric settings do not benefit the vendor’s profits
at all. Consequently, the manufacturer has no dominant strategy. She simply prefers
the same strategy that the retailer chooses. However, the latter prefers to consider
returns - independently of the vendors decision. With the premise of rationally act-
ing supply chain members, the vendor knows that she has to consider returns in
order to reach the best possible outcome. Although this decision is not dominant,
it is the corollary on the retailer’s (dominant) strategy to consider returns. Thus,
we do not find the prisoner’s dilemma, but still the players end up in the pareto-
inefficient case of (CR). The effect of this strategy on individual and total supply
chain profits is detrimental and, moreover, the best outcome (IR) is not reached.
Note, that under price-dependent returns (CR) is pareto-inefficient or equivalently
pareto-suboptimal. Both players can improve their performances without harming
the other one by switching to ignoring returns.
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As we observe in the conducted sensitivity analysis, the general prisoner’s dilemma
is valid for most variations of the base case parameters under stochastic and price-
dependent demand with a price-dependent return rate. Whenever we find no pure
prisoner’s dilemma, a mix of non-dominant and dominant strategies of the players
still lead to the outcome of policy (CR).
Under a buy-back option no Nash-equilibrium is found. Moreover, the retailer
lacks a dominant strategy. Note the ruinous profit situation in setting (MC,RI).
However, the retailer faces his best outcome in the other asymmetric setting (MI,RC).
The manufacturer prefers the symmetric setting when both players ignore returns.
Consequently, the same results as under a buy-back rebate when demand is stochastic
are gained. According to game theory (CR) is reached and it represents a pareto-
optimal solution.
For the considered demand models and return functions within this thesis we stud-
ied game theoretic implications on the decision process of the supply chain players.
Throughout policy (CR) is reached when both players act rationally and do not have
knowledge about the optimization decision of the other player beforehand. This holds
true under a wholesale and a buy-back contract. The equilibrium is either reached
with dominant strategies of both players, that is the prisoner’s dilemma is present, or
since one player reacts on the dominant strategy of the other player to consider re-
turns. Furthermore, the situation (CR) is either pareto-suboptimal or pareto-optimal.
However, regarding the total profits, the situation is always suboptimal. Regarding
possible ways to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma, individual self-interest is simply
a trap rather than a sufficient mechanism for efficiency. Consequently, individual
interest does not improve the situation sufficiently and instead cooperative actions of
the players have to be undertaken.
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First of all, there is communication. Both players could agree on ignoring returns
what puts them in a better position than considering returns. However, mistrust,
egoism and also psychology comes into play. Each player might think that they
could further increase their profits if the other player sticks to the agreed compact
by individually switching to considering returns. Eventually they might also consider
that the other player probably is having this thought as well. Obviously, simple
communication is not sufficient to escape the dilemma. Instead, mechanisms are
needed that either tie the players to agreed decisions or stimulate the players to
act in the (best) interest for the group. Repeating the game or decision about the
optimization strategy multiple times also alters the results presented. However, the
prisoner’s dilemma shows how mutual trust and understanding, and communication
as well as coordination are essential for an optimal supply chain performance. In
failing to do so, results are poor and a break-up of the supply chain may occur.
Additionally, it becomes clear that a better coordination is difficult to reach since
both members have an incentive not to cooperate unless they both simultaneously
do.
Game theory provided the background for the cases when both players act ra-
tionally with no additional information given about the behavior of the other one.
When such information is available, the picture changes. Now the manufacturer can
exploit information in order to raise her profits. The retailer, though, has the option
to react to the vendors strategy. This matters are discussed in the next section.
7.2 Strategic Decision Making
In the asymmetric cases the manufacturer always makes the assumption about
how the retailer acts prior to optimizing. In other words, she estimates how the
retailer acts, whereas she could not foresee possible asymmetric behavior of him.
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Symmetric Asymmetric
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
w∗ 2.28 2.18 2.29 2.18 2.43 1.98
r∗ 3.81 3.90 3.95 3.78 4.01 3.67
α 20.7% 21.7% 22.29% 20.41% 23.00% 19.24%
Q∗ 2.45 2.91 2.65 2.67 2.338 3.23
ΠM 1.378 1.427 1.304 1.335 1.323 1.242
ΠR 1.461 1.607 1.377 1.674 1.123 2.172
ΠT 2.839 3.033 2.681 3.009 2.446 3.414
Table 7.1. Equilibrium Values for Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies under
Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand and Price-Dependent Return Rates
In case that the manufacturer has knowledge about how the retailer acts, she
might be able to raise her profits compared to the symmetric cases. Note that under
strategic decision making one player explicitly uses the additional given information
to raise his/her profits, regardless of the change in the performance of the other player.
However, it is obvious that strategic options are only given if a player reaches its best
performance in any of the asymmetric settings. In general the manufacturer benefits
from two reasons when making use of a strategic decision: (1) The retailer orders
more units when ignoring returns compared to the case when considering returns as
stated in chapter 3, whereas the manufacturer consequently exploits this fact in her
optimizations. (2) She can increase her optimal wholesale price and thus increase her
marginal profit. However, an improvement is not possible in all cases. Observe, that
for price-dependent returns the vendor is not better off in the asymmetric settings
under both, a wholesale and buy-back contract, and thus lacks strategic options in
this case (see table 7.1). The retailer has the possibility to improve his profits in all
of the three considered models in the thesis. Also, he does not need any information
about how the supplier acts in order to improve his performance. He simply can
recognize the optimization process from the given wholesale price w∗. The respective
outcome of any policy chosen by the retailer can directly be identified by means of
w∗.
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In order to calculate and compare the new strategic options, we introduce new
notations. (MIk, RC) indicates that the vendor herself ignores returns but knows
about the optimization process of the retailer to include returns. (MCk, RI) describes
the respective other case if the manufacturer has knowledge that the retailer ignores
returns while she considers them. As we will see, the latter case does not improve the
manufacturer’s situation, what follows out of our initial results (compare table 4.1)
as well. Calculations are done similarly to the asymmetric cases except for the order
amount assumed by the manufacturer. She now uses the order amount Q according
to QCR∗ for the case (MIk, RC) and QIR∗ for (MCk, RI). The considered profit
functions of the retailer and manufacturer stay unaltered. We start out by analyzing
the case of stochastic demand and then continue with stochastic and price-dependent
demand with a constant return rate. For price-dependent returns, as mentioned,
there is no strategic option.
7.2.1 Stochastic Demand
Listed together with the initial results of the symmetric and asymmetric cases, the
new strategic policies under a wholesale contract are shown in table 7.2. According
to the reasoning in the beginning of this section, if the retailer considers returns the
manufacturer can not be better off by using this information. In turn, if the retailer
ignores returns, (MCk, RI) improves the performance of the vendor. The differences
between (MC,RI) and (MCk, RI) are only marginally, though. Observe that the
profits for the manufacturer improve by about 0.02 or less than 1%, whereas the
retailer suffers a loss of 0.18 or equivalently 36% of his total profits. The retailer
has the strategic option to improve his profits by switching from the policy (IR) to
(MI,RC). As a result he can maximize his profits, but in turn the manufacturer
and the total supply chain are facing lower profits. Thus, the retailer can react on
any attempt of the manufacturer to raise her profits on his own expenses by simply
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Symmetric Asymmetric Strategic
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
Q∗ 3.27 3.50 - - - -
Cent. Π 4.61 4.58 - - - -
Q∗ 1.97 2.16 2.08 2.06 2.05 2.08
w∗ 3.56 3.47 3.56 3.47 3.58 3.44
Decent. ΠR 0.5405 0.6805 0.5355 0.6862 0.5044 0.7363
ΠM 2.9273 3.0746 3.0970 2.9112 3.0980 2.9003
ΠT 3.4678 3.7551 3.6325 3.5974 3.6024 3.6366
Table 7.2. Optimal Values for Symmetric and Asymmetric Policies and the Strategic
Options in the Base Case with a Normally Distributed Demand
switching to considering returns when making his order amount. Again, this is a
dominant strategy that leads to a pareto inefficient Nash-Equilibrium. However, by
doing so, his profits are higher than in (MCk, RI).
In order to extend the initial findings for the strategic policies (MCk, RI) and
(MIk, RC) under a wholesale contract in case of stochastic demand, and to show
that the manufacturer can always exploit information - if available - to raise her
profits, we further vary specific model parameters and consider the option of a buy-
back contract.
Return Rates and Share of Logistic Costs
Table 7.3 compares the base cases with the strategic settings for relevant β-
values, whereas the vendor is also in the position to improve her performance under
(MIk, RC), when shifting the major burden of logistic costs to the retailer. Interest-
ingly, for the case of (MIk, RC) at one hand the retailer is facing worse profits and on
the other hand the total supply chain profits are higher when the retailer has to bear
more of the reverse logistic costs. For (MCk, RI) only the manufacturer’s profits are
increasing for higher magnitudes of β. However, since the manufacturer faces worse
in the former case, he will not consider it as a strategic option.
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For different rates of consumer returns α, computational work shows that the
manufacturer has again only one option to raise profits, that is (MCk, RI). However,
higher values of α lead to a lower level of all profits and optimal order quantities.
This represents the initial findings in the strategic part and does not need further
investigation.
(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
β w∗ Q∗ PM PR PT %∆ w∗ Q∗ PM PR PT %∆
0.05 3.58 2.06 3.0980 0.5043 3.6024 + 3.9% 3.44 2.08 2.1973 0.7363 2.9336 - 21.9%
0.5 3.54 2.10 3.4649 0.1966 3.6616 + 4.7% 3.26 2.07 2.3757 0.6699 3.0456 - 18.9%
0.95 3.51 2.13 3.8378 -0.1343 3.7035 + 4.9% 3.08 2.05 2.5548 0.6038 3.1586 - 15.9%
(MC,RI) (MI,RC)
β w∗ Q∗ PM PR PT %∆ w∗ Q∗ PM PR PT %∆
0.05 3.56 2.08 3.0971 0.5356 3.6328 + 4.7% 3.47 2.06 2.9115 0.6861 3.5976 - 4.2%
0.5 3.34 2.27 3.3975 0.5037 3.9012 + 11.5% 3.47 1.84 2.9141 0.3389 3.2530 - 13.4%
0.95 3.12 2.42 3.6342 0.4582 4.0924 + 15.9% 3.47 1.32 2.3191 0.0468 2.3659 - 37.0%
Table 7.3. Strategic Policies for Different Values of β in Comparison to the Asym-
metric Settings under Stochastic Demand and a Price-Only Contract and Percent
Delta to the respective Decentralized Symmetric Cases
Positive Salvage Values
We observe, that both agents can improve their profits under both strategic set-
tings. This is rather surprising, since positive salvage values simply put more “money”
in the supply chain and also reduce the financial risk associated with overstocking. As
an incentive for the retailer to order more the manufacturer transmits lower wholesale
prices, whereas her lessened profits are overcompensated by the returned item values.
The retailer, in turn, benefits from lower wholesale prices as well. Below is figure 7.1,
where we choose to show the graphs for vr =
v
2
. Note that they behave in the same
manner as any other feasible values of vr. As previously stated the effect of positive
salvage values on supply chain profits are equivalent to lower logistic costs or a shift
in them. Therefore, the curve progressions in figure 7.1 are also representative for
changes in the logistic costs l. Finally, we can conclude, that the strategic options




















































When giving the retailer the option to sell back unsold items to the manufacturer
we can observe the same results as under the asymmetric policies, i.e. the manufac-
turer rakes almost all of the profits, whereas the retailer’s profits reduce to a minimum
and are barely positive. Contrary to the hitherto retrieved results is that within the
strategic options under a buy-back rebate, the total supply chain and both players per-
form better in the setting (MIk, RC). This is due to the fact that the manufacturer
now can exploit the incentive (that the buy-back contract proposes) given to the
retailer even better. Thus, if a buy-back contract is given, strategic behavior of the
manufacturer can help to improve the coordination of supply chains. For moderate
levels of production costs and return volumes, both strategic options have improved
total supply chain profits. Table 7.4 shows the profits for different rates of returns
α = {0.2, 0.4} and production costs c = {0.5, 1, 2}. Moreover, the percent differences
of the total channel profits to the comparable policies are presented. Observe that the
optimal buy-back value s found by the manufacturer is just below the optimal value
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Retailer Proftis when ignoring Returns
Alpha = 0.4Alpha = 0.2
Figure 7.2. Manufacturer and Retailer Profits (Retailer ignores Returns in all Cases)
under Different Optimization Strategies for Different α and c under a Buy-Back Con-
tract and Stochastic Demand
studied in the previous chapters. Except for higher values of c and α, both strategic
options are better in terms of total profits. Omitted values are due to negative profits
of any of the supply chains considered.
The development of the vendor’s and retailer’s profits for different return rates and
production costs compared to the respective decentralized symmetric and asymmetric
policies can be seen in figures 7.2 and 7.3. Notice that the manufacturer is (mostly)
better off in both strategic settings. The retailer, in turn, is only better off when
he considers customer returns. This is in accordance with the previous findings and
further sensitivity analysis shows that buy-back options do not alter the basic results
we retrieved for the strategic options under a wholesale contract.
Shifting logistic cost to the retailer does not help improving the coordination of
the supply chain. However, the strategic option for the vendor is available, whereas
in setting (MCk, RI) the retailer is even facing negative profits. Table 7.5 shows the
equilibrium values for the asymmetric settings with and without knowledge of the
optimization process for varied values of β and total logistic costs l. The outcomes
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Retailer Proftis when considering Returns
Alpha = 0.4Alpha = 0 2
Figure 7.3. Manufacturer and Retailer Profits (Retailer considers Returns in all
Cases) under Different Optimization Strategies for Different α and c under a Buy-
Back Contract and Stochastic Demand
(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
α = 0.2
c 0.25 1 2 0.25 1 2
PM 7.2085 4.5914 1.6701 7.3747 4.6968 1.5241
PR 0.0495 0.0231 0.0159 0.1421 0.0947 0.0281
PT 7.258 4.6146 1.6861 7.5168 4.7915 1.5522
%∆(MC,RI)||(MI,RC) -0.6% 1.1% 10.8% 5.3% 6.2% -6.9%
%∆(IR)||(CR) -0.4% 14.3% - 3.5% 4.1% -7.8%
α = 0.4
c 0.25 1 2 0.25 1 2
PM 3.7514 1.3505 - 4.057 1.4343 -1.7051
PR 0.0106 -0.0055 - 0.1513 0.0823 0.0194
PT 3.762 1.345 - 4.2083 1.5166 -1.6857
%∆(MC,RI)||(MI,RC) 0.1% 37.1% - 26.2% 16.0% -
%∆(IR)||(CR) 0.4% 82.1% - 13.1% 13.1% -
Table 7.4. Profits and Order Quantities for varying Production Costs c and return
rates α under a buy-back contract, when the Manufacturer has Knowledge about the




β = 0.05 β = 0.95 β = 0.05 β = 0.95
l 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2
w∗ 3.96 3.95 3.93 3.84 3.72 3.49 3.97 3.97 3.96 3.87 3.75 3.51
s∗ 3.95 3.94 3.92 3.83 3.70 3.48 3.96 3.96 3.95 3.83 3.66 3.29
Q∗ 3.41 3.41 3.41 3.40 3.31 3.29 3.11 2.97 2.90 2.27 2.02 1.77
ΠM 5.53 5.26 4.70 5.50 5.19 4.63 5.38 5.05 4.48 4.55 3.92 3.13
ΠR 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
ΠT 5.61 5.33 4.79 5.59 5.28 4.70 5.42 5.09 4.51 4.57 3.94 3.14
(MCk, RI) (MC,RI)
β = 0.05 β = 0.95 β = 0.05 β = 0.95
l 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2
w∗ 3.98 3.97 3.96 3.87 3.75 3.51 3.96 3.96 3.95 3.85 3.73 3.50
s∗ 3.97 3.96 3.94 3.81 3.61 3.20 3.95 3.95 3.94 3.84 3.72 3.49
Q∗ 3.27 3.41 3.22 3.33 3.28 3.21 3.45 3.45 3.55 4.00 4.21 4.42
ΠM 5.44 5.14 4.59 5.47 5.22 4.71 5.39 5.12 4.52 5.14 4.68 3.92
ΠR 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
ΠT 5.46 5.18 4.61 5.47 5.18 4.61 5.46 5.17 4.57 5.20 4.74 3.96
Table 7.5. Comparison of Profits and Order Quantities for Asymmetric Policies with
and without the Availability of Knowledge under a Buy-Back Contract for β = 0.05
and 0.95 and Different Total Logistic Costs l = {0.5, 1, 2}.
table 7.6. Similar to the result so far, we obtain the coordinating effects of buy-back
contracts on supply chains, whereas under (MIk, RC) the effect is only infinitesimal.
7.2.2 Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand
In the incipient discussion of this section we stressed that if returns are price-
dependent there is no strategic option available for the manufacturer since his com-
pared pay-offs are extremely worse in the asymmetric settings. Thus, we focus on the
strategic options if returns are a constant fraction of a period’s sales. We first present
the simple wholesale contract. Afterwards we consider the option of a buy-back re-
bate.
Table 7.7 presents the cases of strategic optimization (MCk, RI) and (MIk, RC)
and compares them to the respective symmetric and asymmetric settings under
stochastic and price-dependent demand. Results are identical to those under stochas-
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Buy-Back Option
(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
v w∗ s∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT w∗ s∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT
0 3.96 3.94 3.22 4.59 0.02 4.61 3.93 3.915 3.41 4.70 0.09 4.79
0.5 3.96 3.95 3.45 4.86 0.03 4.89 3.92 3.905 3.50 4.99 0.12 5.10
1 3.94 3.93 3.63 5.18 0.07 5.25 3.89 3.875 3.68 5.34 0.19 5.53
1.5 3.89 3.88 3.88 5.60 0.19 5.78 3.86 3.845 3.81 5.76 0.26 6.02
2 3.83 3.82 4.05 6.10 0.33 6.43 3.82 3.805 3.93 6.24 0.35 6.60
No Buy-Back Option
(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
v w∗ s∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT w∗ s∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT
0 3.58 - 2.08 2.20 0.74 2.93 3.58 - 2.06 3.10 0.50 3.60
0.5 3.57 - 2.09 2.22 0.75 2.98 3.57 - 2.07 3.12 0.52 3.64
1 3.55 - 2.10 2.25 0.77 3.02 3.55 - 2.09 3.14 0.55 3.69
1.5 3.54 - 2.11 2.28 0.79 3.06 3.54 - 2.10 3.16 0.57 3.72
2 3.52 - 2.12 2.31 0.82 3.13 3.52 - 2.12 3.18 0.60 3.78
Table 7.6. Results for Positive Salvage Values v and vr = 0 with and without a
Buy-Back Option, when the Manufacturer has Knowledge about the Retailers Opti-
mization Process
tic demand: In policy (MCk, RI) the manufacturer is performing best and thus he
has a strategic option if the retailer ignores returns in his optimization process. The
latter is facing the worst possible outcome and total supply chain coordination is also
not reached. (MIk, RC) is not important as a strategic option since the vendor per-
forms extremely poor. Again, the rise in the profits of the supplier is incommensurate
to the losses that the retailer faces. An increase of minimal 2,5% stands in contrast
to a decline of 40%. Further we observe that the improved performance of the vendor
is due to an increased order quantity, Q∗, and wholesale price w∗, what leads to a
greater marginal revenue.
Different Shares of Logistic Costs
In the strategic policies the retailer is always worse off if he has to bear more
of the costs associated with customer returns, that is for rising values of β. He
finds his best outcome in the strategic setting (MIk, RC), whereas the retailer is
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Symmetric Asymmetric Strategic
(CR) (IR) (MC,RI) (MI,RC) (MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
w∗ 2.5 2.18 2.5 2.18 2.57 2.12
r∗ 4.07 3.90 4.05 3.93 4.08 3.90
Q∗ 1.84 2.91 2.19 2.49 2.05 2.63
ΠM 1.411 1.585 1.619 1.299 1.624 1.251
ΠR 1.141 1.677 1.108 1.717 1.006 1.846
ΠT 2.552 3.262 2.728 3.017 2.630 3.097
Table 7.7. Optimality Values for the Base Case under Stochastic and Price-
Dependent Demand and a Constant Return Rate of the Decentralized Symmetric
and the Asymmetric Policies with and without Knowledge about the Retailers Opti-
mization Process
(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
β w∗ r∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT w∗ r∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT
5% 2.57 4.08 2.05 1.624 1.006 2.630 2.12 3.90 2.63 1.251 1.846 3.097
50% 2.44 4.02 2.31 1.910 0.867 2.777 2.07 3.97 2.40 1.383 1.588 2.971
95% 2.31 3.96 2.60 2.256 0.683 2.939 2.00 4.03 2.23 1.470 1.388 2.858
(IR) (CR)
5% 2.18 3.90 2.91 1.585 1.677 3.262 2.50 4.07 1.84 1.411 1.141 2.552
50% 2.18 3.90 2.91 1.994 1.268 3.262 2.32 4.09 1.88 1.450 1.142 2.592
95% 2.18 3.90 2.91 2.403 0.859 3.262 2.12 4.09 1.97 1.490 1.178 2.668
Table 7.8. Optimality Values for Strategic and Decentralized Symmetric Policies
under Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand and a Constant Return Rate for
varying Shares of Reverse Logistic Costs among the Players
never better off than in (MCk, RI). As an extension to previously retrieved results,
the manufacturer benefits from a declining share of logistic costs. Further, different
shares of return costs do not coordinate the supply chain under stochastic and price-
dependent demand. Although coordination in terms of total profits is suboptimal in
setting (MIk, RC), the distribution of profits among the players is almost equally
distributed for β = 0.95. Summarizing, the strategic option for the manufacturer is
only present if he bears the lion share of logistic costs.
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Different Return Rates and Production Costs
Varying the parameters α (return percentage) and c (production costs) in the
intervals [10%; 30%] and [1; 3] respectively, allows us to further generalize the ex-
istence of tactical options. Table 7.9 shows retrieved results of the computational
work for variations the parameters in the latter stated intervals and reveals an in-
teresting insight: For higher overall return volumes and extreme values of production
costs, strategic options are able to improve the coordination of the supply chain for
stochastic and price-dependent demand and a constant return rate. However, only
for higher production costs and low to medium return rates the manufacturer has
the option to egoistically increase her profits. Especially for lower return volumes
and production costs, the strategic options are detrimental for total and individual
system-wide profits. Further, we find the deteriorating effect on the retailer’s profits,
if the vendor chooses to exploit available information about the optimization process.
Note, that the retailer has the option to react on egoistical behavior of the manufac-
turer by switching to considering returns as well. As described in the game theoretic
section this situation then ends up in policy (CR), which is pareto-suboptimal for
both players. However, it is important for the retailer to have this option, because
this balks the manufacturer in solely acting in her own best interest.
Positive Salvage Values and Change in Market Parameters
Finally, we study different market conditions and positive unsold and returned
item salvage values if the supply chain is coordinated with a simple price-only con-
tract. In each of the three considered markets strategic options are not available to
the manufacturer. This is indicated by the percent differences next to the manufac-
turer, which describe the percentage gap to her profits under decentralized symmetric
optimization procedures. The difference between total profits of the latter and the
strategic cases is also shown in percent. Interestingly, for the considered market sizes,
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c = 0.25
(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
α w∗ r∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT w∗ r∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT
10% 1.67 3.65 4.40 5.06 3.68 8.75 1.54 3.60 4.59 4.77 4.22 8.99
20% 1.81 3.72 3.95 3.81 2.59 6.40 1.50 3.60 4.42 3.31 3.66 6.97
30% 2.03 3.83 3.31 2.54 1.53 4.07 1.45 3.60 4.25 1.90 3.12 5.03
(IR) (CR)
10% 1.57 3.59 4.75 5.68 4.45 10.13 1.60 3.62 4.52 5.52 4.32 9.84
20% 1.57 3.59 4.75 3.90 3.36 7.26 1.73 3.71 3.67 3.40 2.87 6.27
30% 1.57 3.59 4.75 2.72 2.63 5.35 1.90 3.82 2.89 2.15 1.90 4.05
c = 2
(MCk,RI) (MIk,RC)
α w∗ r∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT w∗ r∗ Q∗ ΠM ΠR ΠT
10% 3.17 4.33 1.08 0.78 0.51 1.28 2.91 4.23 1.33 0.66 0.78 1.45
20% 3.52 4.47 0.68 0.34 0.19 0.54 2.90 4.24 1.21 0.08 0.64 0.72
30% 4.04 4.67 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.11 2.88 4.25 1.10 -0.42 0.51 0.09
(IR) (CR)
10% 2.92 4.23 1.43 0.74 0.77 1.50 3.15 4.33 1.01 0.71 0.53 1.24
20% 2.92 4.23 1.43 0.15 0.60 0.75 3.48 4.47 0.58 0.29 0.22 0.51
30% 2.92 4.23 1.43 -0.43 0.43 -0.01 3.95 4.65 0.22 0.06 0.05 0.11
Table 7.9. Performance of Strategic and Decentralized Symmetric Cases under
Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand for varying Shares of Reverse Logistic Costs
among the Players
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(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
v vr ΠM %∆ ΠR ΠT %∆ ΠM %∆ ΠR ΠT %∆
b = -3 0.4 0.2 1.81 -5.4% 1.18 2.99 -23.5% 1.56 -1.9% 2.13 3.70 25.6%
k = 5 0.8 0.4 2.09 -12.5% 1.48 3.57 -25.2% 1.97 5.9% 2.61 4.58 30.7%
1.2 0.6 2.53 -17.0% 2.05 4.57 -24.5% 2.60 12.3% 3.36 5.96 29.7%
b = -1.5 0.4 0.2 7.35 -4.7% 4.98 12.33 -9.8% 6.65 1.3% 6.45 13.10 9.1%
k = 10 0.8 0.4 7.90 -6.5% 5.54 13.44 -10.7% 7.36 3.5% 7.17 14.53 10.5%
1.2 0.6 8.57 -8.1% 6.38 14.95 -9.7% 8.22 5.5% 7.98 16.20 9.4%
b = -6 0.4 0.2 0.08 -175.7% 0.04 0.13 -51.9% -0.14 - 0.41 0.27 108.1%
k = 2.5 0.8 0.4 0.10 -564.8% 0.06 0.16 -69.5% -0.11 - 0.62 0.51 202.0%
1.2 0.6 0.15 -21.3% 0.14 0.30 -77.2% 0.04 - 1.28 1.32 271.8%
Table 7.10. Percent Differences of the Manufacturer’s and Total Supply Chain
Performance to the Cases of Decentralized Symmetric Behavior under Stochastic and
Price-Dependent Demand and a Constant Return Rate for Positive Salvage Values in
Different Markets
(MCk, RI) is outperformed by (MIk, RC) if salvage values are positive. Accordingly,
the retailer benefits from the latter policy, whereas the manufacturer is better off
under the former what is outlined in table 7.10.
Buy-Back Option
To complete the analysis for strategic options under stochastic and price-dependent
demand we examine the buy-back option. Table 7.11 compares decentralizes sym-
metric and asymmetric settings with the strategic optimization policies in the base
case settings under a buy-back contract. Importantly, the relationship w∗ = s∗ + c
2
that we retrieved for the optimal wholesale and buy-back price does not hold under
strategic decision making. However, opposed to the coordinating effect of a buy-back
contract under stochastic demand better coordination is not possible with the strate-
gic optimization if demand is price-dependent as well. The decision variables of the
players are (mainly) found in between the range of those of the symmetric setting.
Thus, the performance of the players has to be in between the symmetric cases as
well. Moreover, strategic decision making is not available under a buy-back rebate in
the base case settings.
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Wholesale Contract Buy-Back Contract
Symmetric Symmetric Strategic
(CR) (IR) (CR) (IR) (MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
w∗ 2.50 2.18 3.34 3.00 3.25 3.07
s∗ - - 2.84 2.50 2.44 2.74
r∗ 4.07 3.90 4.32 4.13 4.28 4.16
Q∗ 1.84 2.91 2.47 3.63 2.41 3.62
ΠM 1.411 1.585 1.857 1.769 1.837 1.615
ΠR 1.141 1.677 0.942 1.481 0.852 1.548
ΠT 2.552 3.262 2.799 3.250 2.689 3.163
Table 7.11. Percent Differences of the Manufacturer’s and Total Supply Chain
Performance to the Cases of Decentralized Symmetric Behavior under Stochastic and
Price-Dependent Demand and a Constant Return Rate for Positive Salvage Values in
Different Markets
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show and compare the player’s pay-offs they receive in the
decentralized policies if the retailer ignores or includes returns throughout for varying
values of β and l. We observe, that strategic decision making does not improve the
manufacturers situation and, hence, the tactical option to selfishly increase her profits
is not given. this extends the initial findings for buy-back contracts. However, setting
(MCk, RI) still shows minimal profits for the retailer. Moreover, the profits of the
players in setting (IR) are (hardly) never outperformed.
The effect of positive salvage values on the availability of tactical options is simi-
lar to under a wholesale contract. The manufacturer can, except for smaller market
sizes, not improve his performance by optimizing egoistically. Consequently, strategic
options are not present. Intuitively, higher salvage values improve the performance
of the supply chain, whereas coordination is also not reached. Table 7.12 presents
the equilibrium values of the strategic policies for identical salvage values (v = vr)
and different market sizes and elasticities. Additionally the percent difference of the
manufacturer’s profits to the decentralized symmetric settings is shown. The results
do extent the findings under buy-back contracts for stochastic and price-dependent















Beta = 95%Beta = 5%

















Retailer's Profits when ignoring Returns (Buy-Back) 
Beta = 95%Beta = 5%
Figure 7.4. Manufacturer’s and Retailer’s Profits (Retailer ignores Returns in all
Cases) under Different Optimization Strategies for Different β and l under a Buy-
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Retailer's Profits when considering Returns (Buy-Back) 
Beta = 95%Beta = 5%
Figure 7.5. Manufacturer and Retailer Profits (Retailer considers Returns in all
Cases) under Different Optimization Strategies for Different β and l under a Buy-
Back Contract and Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand with a Constant Return
Rate
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(MCk, RI) (MIk, RC)
v vr ΠM %∆ ΠR ΠT ΠM %∆ ΠR ΠT
b = -3 0.4 0.4 2.25 -3.8% 1.10 3.35 2.21 -4.1% 1.76 3.96
k = 5 0.8 0.8 3.11 -0.1% 1.50 4.61 3.02 -1.7% 2.13 5.16
1.2 1.2 4.35 0.4% 2.15 6.50 4.28 -0.5% 2.60 6.88
b = -1.5 0.4 0.4 8.83 -2.1% 4.41 13.25 8.78 -0.9% 5.25 14.03
k = 10 0.8 0.8 10.14 -0.4% 5.10 15.24 10.04 -0.5% 5.81 15.85
1.2 1.2 11.67 0.0% 5.81 17.48 11.59 -0.1% 6.33 17.91
b = -6 0.4 0.4 0.96 - 0.00 0.96 -0.07 - 0.34 0.27
k = 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.97 - 0.00 0.97 0.18 -4.2% 0.50 0.68
1.2 1.2 0.98 3.1% 0.50 1.48 0.91 -5.0% 0.83 1.74
Table 7.12. Performance of the Strategic Cases with a Buy-Back Option under
Stochastic and Price-Dependent Demand and a Constant Return Rate for Positive
Salvage Values in Different Markets and Percent Differences of the Manufacturer’s
Profits to the respective Decentralized Symmetric Policies
The presented strategic options, however, require the supply chain members to have
asymmetric information. Taking advantage of this information in order to improve
own profits on the account of the other supply chain member is in general not a fair
practice in a well-functioning relationship. The retailer or manufacturer might also
notice the strategy option applied when comparing expected and received profits after
the deal is made. This affects future deals as well, since the players should learn from
their fault. Consequently the relationship between the supply chain players should
be affected by strategic decision making.
7.3 Conclusions
For the considered demand and return models in this thesis, we have investigated
the results of the computational study in terms of game theoretic implications and
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strategic options that arise out of asymmetric decision making. Finally, the most
important findings in this chapter are summarized:
Results of the Game Theoretic Analysis
1. Applying game theory, we find the “prisoner’s dilemma” since both players
choose (CR) as their dominant strategy if demand is stochastic or stochastic and
price-dependent. Rational acting players thus end up with the worst possible
profits and consequently in a pareto-inefficient Nash-equilibrium. This holds
true for both a wholesale and a buy-back contract.
2. The policy (CR) in which the players arrive, is either found by dominant strate-
gies of both players (i.e. both consider returns independently of the other
player’s optimization process) or by the dominant strategy to consider returns
of solely one player, whereas the other player rationally reacts with the non-
dominant strategy to consider returns as well, since this gives him the better
compared pay-offs.
3. The situation (CR) is either pareto-optimal or pareto-suboptimal depending
on the demand and return model and the coordination scheme considered. In
other words, switching the optimization policy either benefits both players or
only one, with the other one being worse off.
4. Possible ways to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma have to go beyond individual
self-interest of the players. Communication, mutual trust or repeated deals can
help to improve the performance in decentralized organized supply chains.
Results of Strategic Decision Making
1. Exploiting available information about the optimization process of the retailer,
the manufacturer can improve her optimal profits by switching from policy (IR)
to (MCk, RI). Two reasons are crucial: Firstly, an increased wholesale price
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widens her profit margin and, secondly, the optimal order quantity QIR∗ exceeds
QCR∗.
2. The increase in the manufacturer’s profits is only marginally (about 2%), whereas
the retailer faces a severe reduction of about 30% to 40%. As the manufacturer
raises her profits on the back of the retailer’s, he can react by changing its
optimization policy as well, what ends up under the setting (CR) again. Con-
sequences are as outlined in the game theoretic section.
3. Under stochastic demand, supply chain coordination is in some cases possible
through strategic optimization of the manufacturer. Buy-back contracts for
example, can lead to a coordination of the supply chain.
4. For stochastic and price-dependent demand and if a buy-back contract is given,
strategic options are not available in general for the vendor.
5. Under stochastic and price-dependent demand and a price-sensitive return rate,
the manufacturer does not perform better in the asymmetric policies, and thus,




In this thesis we have studied the effect of asymmetric decision making on the co-
ordination of a two echelon supply chain facing consumer returns. We first considered
demand to be stochastic and then to be stochastic and price-dependent, whereas in
both cases returns were a constant fraction of sales. To a large extent, we have been
able to widen the findings of Ruiz Ben´ıtez (2007) [42] for symmetric optimization
to the asymmetric settings, (MC,RI) and (MI,RC). Total profits of the asym-
metric cases are (mostly) in between the ones of the decentralized symmetric policies,
whereas the players can be either worse or better off. This is intuitive, since the asym-
metric settings can be seen as a mix of the decentralized symmetric cases. We have
shown that the relationship between the decision variables holds under asymmetric
decision making. Declining wholesale prices set by the manufacturer induce higher
order quantities of the retailer, and, in the case of stochastic and price-dependent
demand, lower retail prices as well. Further, we found buy-back rebates to improve
the coordination of asymmetrically optimized supply chains compared to a wholesale
price-only contract. In the case of stochastic demand we noticed the severe shift in
profits to the side of the manufacturer. However, regardless of whether the supply
chain is provided with a wholesale or buy-back contract, better coordination than in
the symmetric policies is not reached by optimizing asymmetrically.
Additionally, we studied stochastic and price-dependent demand with a price-
dependent return rate. Observations for the decentralized symmetric and asymmetric
settings are mainly similar to those under a constant return rate, whereas we found
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interesting cases where they are different. Most important, the centralized system
that considers returns in the optimization process is no longer the coordinating so-
lution. In fact, ignoring returns results in higher total profits. However, the strong
influence of the retailer’s pricing decision on return rates and, thus, on individual and
system-wide profits became clear. Concerning total profits, we found that ignoring
returns is the better choice under a price-only contract. Further, when considering
returns, buy-back rebates do coordinate the supply chain, whereas ignoring returns
has detrimental effects on the performance of the total system. The shift in profits
to the manufacturer, however, is much less articulated than under a constant return
rate.
For the asymmetric settings we also conducted a game theoretic analysis from
which we gained interesting insights on the value of mutual cooperation and infor-
mation sharing in decentralized organized supply chains. According to the prisoner’s
dilemma, without cooperation, rationally acting players end up considering returns
which are least favorable for both. Further, strategic options have been studied
through which the manufacturer can egoistically raise her profits by exploiting avail-
able information about the optimization process of the retailer. By doing so, supply
chain coordination is also possible in the asymmetric cases, whereas an incentive
scheme for the retailer is necessary in order not to lose his goodwill.
For possible extensions to this work, we can think of two directions. Firstly,
asymmetric settings can be studied for different pricing schemes, for example price-
postponement. Both possibilities, asymmetric optimization on purpose, that is strate-
gic behavior, and the case of unintentional asymmetric behavior can be regarded.
Especially, the former might gain interesting results in terms of supply chain coordi-
nation under consumer returns. Secondly, as for the case of price-dependent demand,
analytical results seem impossible, variations in the demand and return function could
further generalize retrieved results. Finally, a return model as presented by Su (2007)
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[45] that bases on a stochastic consumer utility for the product should be interesting
to study. In this model, consumers find their valuation of the product after purchas-
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